Will_Sawin comments on Notion of Preference in Ambient Control - Less Wrong
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Comments (45)
This is unclear to me, and I've read and understood Enderton. I would have thought that ZFC and PA were sets of axioms and would say nothing about how an agent reasons.
Also,
Do you mean in the context of some axioms? (of course, you can always talk about whether the statement "PA implies X" is valid, so it doesn't really matter).
I haven't read the rest yet. I'm confident that you have a very precise and formally defined idea in mind, but I'd appreciate it if you could spell out your definitions, or link to them (mathworld, wikipedia, or even some textbook).
An agent that reasoned by proving things in ZFC could exist.
Stupid argument: "This program, computed with this data, produces this result" is a statement in ZFC and is provable or disprovable as appropriate.
Obviously, a real ZFC-based AI would be more efficient than that.
ZFC is nice because Newton's laws, for example, can be formulated in ZFC but aren't computable. A computable agent could reason about those laws using ZFC, for example deriving the conservation of energy, which would allow him to compute certain things.