DanielLC comments on Optimism versus cryonics - Less Wrong

34 Post author: lsparrish 25 October 2010 02:13AM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (104)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: Risto_Saarelma 26 October 2010 07:55:58AM 8 points [-]

You come off as assuming that the people in this thread are not aware of the personal identity debate. That doesn't really strike me as productive.

David Chalmers did go into this in his Singularity analysis paper. In chapter 10, he basically noted that both the standard stances lead into unintuitive results in scenarios that seem physically possible.

The interesting thing about the personal identity discontinuity stance is to imagine growing up in a world where reviving people from something that very obviously halts all their bodily functions for a nontrivial duration, such as cryonics or uploading, is commonplace. All your life you see people getting killed, have their heads vitrified, and then the mind-states get reinstated in new bodies and these new people are in all appearances the same as the ones that died.

How would people develop the intuition that the metabolic cessation leads to personal death, and the revived people are new individuals with false memories, in this world?

Comment author: DanielLC 29 October 2010 10:36:45PM 2 points [-]

imagine growing up in a world where reviving people from something that very obviously halts all their bodily functions for a nontrivial duration, such as cryonics or uploading, is commonplace.

I go to sleep every night. It doesn't halt my bodily processes, but I become less intelligent then animals. People largely don't seem concerned with animals dying, so the logical conclusion is that someone reduced to such low intelligence is effectively already dead.