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whpearson comments on Self-empathy as a source of "willpower" - Less Wrong
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Well, strictly from the theoretical perspective of rational-agent game theory, we know quite a lot.
Subagents need to communicate so as to coordinate. Cooperation works best when there are no secrets.
On the other hand, it is often in the interests of the individual agents to keep some things secret from other agents. There is a fascinating theory of correlated equilibria and mechanism design to enable the sharing of the information you want to share and the hiding of information you wish to keep secret.
Punishment of one agent by other agents, and threats of punishment, are important in bargaining and in incentivizing adherence to bargains. There is no known way to dispense with threatened punishment, and probably no way to dispense entirely with real punishment. Rational cooperation (justified by reciprocity) cannot be built on any other basis.
To my mind, the idea of modeling mind as a society of autonomous agents is definitely worth exploring. And I see no reason not to treat at least some of those component agents as rational.
Dennett has been on a competitive neuron kick recently. Which would make game theory (or variants of it with applicable assumptions) a central part of understanding how the brain works.
I'm curious what he will come up with.