Goertzel: Human value has evolved and morphed over time and will continue to do so. It already takes multiple different forms. It will likely evolve in future in coordination with AGI and other technology.
Agree, but the multiple different current forms of human values are the source of much conflict.
Hanson: Like Ben, I think it is ok (if not ideal) if our descendants' values deviate from ours, as ours have from our ancestors.
Agree again. And in honor of Robin's profession, I will point out that the multiple current forms of human values are the driving force causing trade, and almost all other economic activity.
Nesov: Change in values of the future agents, however sudden or gradual, means that the Future (the whole freackin' Future!) won't be optimized according to our values, won't be anywhere as good as it could've been otherwise. ... Regardless of difficulty of the challenge, it's NOT OK to lose the Future.
Strongly disagree. The future is not ours to lose. A growing population of enfranchised agents is going to be sharing that future with us. We need to discount our own interest in that future for all kinds of reasons in order to achieve some kind of economic sanity. We need to discount because:
If we don't discount the future, we run into mathematical difficulties. The first rule of utilitarianism ought to be KIFS - Keep It Finite, Stupid.
Too much discounting runs into problems with screwing the future up, to enjoy short-term benefits. With 5-year political horizons, that problem seems far more immediate and pressing than the problems posed by discounting too little. From the point of view of those fighting the evils that too much temporal discounting represents, arguments about mathematical infinity seem ridiculous and useless. Since such arguments are so feeble, why even bother mentioning them?
Ben Goertzel:
Robin Hanson:
We all know the problem with deathism: a strong belief that death is almost impossible to avoid, clashing with undesirability of the outcome, leads people to rationalize either the illusory nature of death (afterlife memes), or desirability of death (deathism proper). But of course the claims are separate, and shouldn't influence each other.
Change in values of the future agents, however sudden of gradual, means that the Future (the whole freackin' Future!) won't be optimized according to our values, won't be anywhere as good as it could've been otherwise. It's easier to see a sudden change as morally relevant, and easier to rationalize gradual development as morally "business as usual", but if we look at the end result, the risks of value drift are the same. And it is difficult to make it so that the future is optimized: to stop uncontrolled "evolution" of value (value drift) or recover more of astronomical waste.
Regardless of difficulty of the challenge, it's NOT OK to lose the Future. The loss might prove impossible to avert, but still it's not OK, the value judgment cares not for feasibility of its desire. Let's not succumb to the deathist pattern and lose the battle before it's done. Have the courage and rationality to admit that the loss is real, even if it's too great for mere human emotions to express.