timtyler comments on Value Deathism - Less Wrong

26 Post author: Vladimir_Nesov 30 October 2010 06:20PM

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Comment author: Perplexed 31 October 2010 12:10:42AM 4 points [-]

Goertzel: Human value has evolved and morphed over time and will continue to do so. It already takes multiple different forms. It will likely evolve in future in coordination with AGI and other technology.

Agree, but the multiple different current forms of human values are the source of much conflict.

Hanson: Like Ben, I think it is ok (if not ideal) if our descendants' values deviate from ours, as ours have from our ancestors.

Agree again. And in honor of Robin's profession, I will point out that the multiple current forms of human values are the driving force causing trade, and almost all other economic activity.

Nesov: Change in values of the future agents, however sudden or gradual, means that the Future (the whole freackin' Future!) won't be optimized according to our values, won't be anywhere as good as it could've been otherwise. ... Regardless of difficulty of the challenge, it's NOT OK to lose the Future.

Strongly disagree. The future is not ours to lose. A growing population of enfranchised agents is going to be sharing that future with us. We need to discount our own interest in that future for all kinds of reasons in order to achieve some kind of economic sanity. We need to discount because:

  • We really do care more about the short-term future than the distant future.
  • We have better control over the short-term future than the distant future.
  • We expect our values to change. Change can be good. It would be insane to attempt to determine the distant future now. Better to defer decisions about the distant future until later, when that future eventually becomes the short-term future. We will then have a better idea what we want and a better idea how to achieve it.
  • As mentioned, an increasing immortal population means that our "rights" over the distant future must be fairly dilute.
  • If we don't discount the future, we run into mathematical difficulties. The first rule of utilitarianism ought to be KIFS - Keep It Finite, Stupid.
Comment author: timtyler 31 October 2010 10:22:31AM *  5 points [-]

If we don't discount the future, we run into mathematical difficulties. The first rule of utilitarianism ought to be KIFS - Keep It Finite, Stupid.

http://lesswrong.com/lw/n2/against_discount_rates/

The idea is not really that you care equally about future events - but rather that you don't care about them to the extent that you are uncertain about them; that you are likely to be unable to influence them; that you will be older when they happen - and so on.

It is like in chess: future moves are given less consideration - but only because they are currently indistinct low probability events - and not because of some kind of other intrinsic temporal discounting of value.