Yeah, that definitely violates the "every decision is made with full access to the problem statement" condition. The outcome depends on your decision on problem A, but when making your decision on problem A you have no knowledge that your decision will also be used for this purpose.
I don't see how this is useful. Let's take a concrete example, let's have decision problem A, Omega offers you the choice of $1,000,000, or being slapped in the face with a wet fish. Which would you like your decision theory to choose?
Now, No-mega can simulate you, say, 10 minutes before you find out who he is, and give you 3^^^3 utilons iff you chose the fish-slapping. So your algorithm has to include some sort of prior on the existence of "fish-slapping"-No-megas.
My algorithm "always get slapped in the face with a wet fish where that's an...
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