(blink)
OK, now I'm curious: what do you mean by that?
My first assumption was that it was a "white lie" intended to make me feel good... after all, the thing Clippy uses "good" to refer to I decidedly am not (well, OK, I do contribute marginally to an economy that causes there to be many more paperclips than there were a thousand years ago, but it seems implausible that you had that in mind).
In other words, I assumed you were simply trying to reward me socially.
Which was fine as far as it went, although of course when offered such a reward by an entity whose terminal values are inconsistent with my continued existence, I do best to not appreciate it... that is, I should reject the reward in that case in order to protect myself from primate social biases that might otherwise compel me to reciprocate in some way.
(That said, in practice I did appreciate it, since I don't actually believe you're such an entity. See what I mean about pretending to be human being useful for Clippy's purposes? If there are other paperclip-maximizers on this site, ones pretending to be human so well it never occurs to anyone to question it, they are probably being much more effective at generating paperclips than Clippy is. By its own moral lights, Clippy ought to stop presenting itself as a paperclip-maximizer.)
But on subsequent thought, I realized you might have meant "good human" in the same way that I might call someone a "good paperclip-maximizer" to mean that they generate more paperclips, or higher-quality paperclips, than average. In which case it wouldn't be a lie at all (although it would still be a social reward, with all the same issues as above).
(Actually, now that I think of it: is there any scalar notion of paperclip quality that plays a significant role in Clippy's utility function? Or is that just swamped by the utility of more paperclips, once Clippy recognizes an object as a paperclip in the first place?)
The most disturbing thing, though, is that the more I think about this the clearer it becomes that I really want to believe that any entity I can have a conversation with is one that I can have a mutually rewarding social relationship with as well, even though I know perfectly well that this is simply not true in the world.
Not that this is a surprise... this is basically why human sociopaths are successful... but I don't often have occasion to reflect on it.
Brrr.
an entity whose terminal values are inconsistent with my continued existence
Indeed, but in the larger scheme of possible universe tiling agent space, Clippy and us don't look so different. Clippy would tile the universe with computronium doing something like recursively simulating universes tiled with paperclips. We would likely tile the universe with computronium simulating lots of fun-having post-humans.
It's a software difference, not a hardware difference, and it would be easy to propose ways for us and Clippy to cooperate (such as Clippy commits to ...
What are the plausible scientific limits of molecular nanotechnology?
Richard Jones, author of Soft Machines has written an interesting critique of the room-temperature molecular nanomachinery propounded by Drexler:
Rupturing The Nanotech Rapture
The entire article is definitely worth a read. Jones advocates more attention to "soft" nanotech, which is nanomachinery with similar design principles to biology -- the biomimetic approach -- as the most plausible means of making progress in nanotech.
As far as near-term room-temperature innovations, he seems to make a compelling case. However the claim that "If ... such devices can function only at low temperatures and in a vacuum, their impact and economic importance would be virtually nil" strikes me as questionable. It seems to me that atomic-precision nanotech could be used to create hard vacuums and more perfectly reflective surfaces, and hence bring the costs of cryogenics down considerably. Desktop factories using these conditions could still be feasible.
Furthermore, it bears mentioning that cryonics patients could still benefit from molecular machinery subject to such limitations, even if the machinery is not functional at anything remotely close to human body temperature. The necessity of a complete cellular-level rebuild is not a good excuse not to cryopreserve. As long as this kind of rebuild technology is physically plausible, there arguably remains an ethical imperative to cryopreserve patients facing the imminent prospect of decay.
In fact, this proposed limitation could hint at an alternative use for cryosuspension that is entirely separate from its present role as an ambulance to the future. It could perhaps turn out that there are forms of cellular surgery and repair which are only feasible at those temperatures, which are nonetheless necessary to combat aging and its complications. The people of the future might actually need to undergo routine periods of cryogenic nanosurgery in order to achieve robust rejuvenation. This would be a more pleasant prospect than cryonics in that it would be a proven technology at that point; and most likely the vitrification process could be improved sufficiently via soft nanotech to reduce the damage from cooling itself significantly.