cousin_it comments on A note on the description complexity of physical theories - Less Wrong

19 Post author: cousin_it 09 November 2010 04:25PM

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Comment author: cousin_it 09 November 2010 05:35:02PM *  1 point [-]

Yeah, I guess the preceding post needs some obvious amendments in light of this post (though the general point still stands). I hope people are smart enough to see them anyway.

I just don't understand what sense it makes for a perfect Bayesian to distinguish between equivalent theories. Is it still honestly about "degrees of belief", or is it now about those other informal properties that you list?

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 09 November 2010 05:57:15PM *  1 point [-]

I just don't understand what sense it makes for a perfect Bayesian to distinguish between equivalent theories.

No sense. It's a correct thing to do if depth of understanding of these theories is valuable and one is not logically omnipotent, but using complexity-leading-to-improbability to justify this principle would be cargo cult Bayesianism.

Comment author: ArisKatsaris 09 November 2010 05:47:43PM -2 points [-]

The prior probability of a simple explanation is inherently greater than the prior probability of a complex explanation.

If all evidence/observation confirm both explanations equally, then the simple explanation still is on the lead: because it started out with a higher prior probability.