David_Allen comments on A note on the description complexity of physical theories - Less Wrong
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There are two problems with this test.
First, the result of a coin flip is almost certainly determined by starting conditions. With enough knowledge of those conditions you could predict the result. Instead you should make a measurement on a quantum system, such as measuring the spin of an electron.
Second the result of this test does not distinguish between QI and not-QI. The probability of being knocked out or left awake is the same in both cases.
I suppose you could be assuming that your consciousness can jump arbitrarily between universes to follow a conscious version of you.... but no that would just be silly.
This is probably what Thomas meant by "quantum" coin flip.
You are right, I missed that. I probably shouldn't post comments when I'm hungry, I've got a few other comments like this to account for as well. :)
I don't postulate anything, what it is not already postulated in the so called Quantum Suicide mental experiment.
I just apply this on to the sleeping/coma case. Should work the same.
But I don't think it works in either case.
The test you proposed does not distinguish between QI and not-QI. I don't think that the current formulation of MWI even allows this to be tested.
Not a factor to my argument, both are untestable. You are arguing this point against other others, not me.
If that's a valid objection, then quantum suicide won't work either. In fact, if that's a valid objection, then many-worlds is impossible, since everything is deterministic with no possible alternatives.
Many-worlds is a deterministic theory, as it says that the split configurations both occur.
Quantum immortality, mind you, is a very silly idea for a variety of other reasons -- foremost of which is that a googleplex of universes still doesn't ensure that there exists one of them in which a recognizable "you" survives next week, let alone to the end of time.