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JGWeissman comments on A note on the description complexity of physical theories - Less Wrong
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Hmmm. But the very first posting in the sequences says something about "making your beliefs pay rent in expected experience". If you don't expect different experiences in choosing between the theories, it seems that you are making an unfalsifiable claim.
I'm not totally convinced that the two theories do not make different predictions in some sense. The evolution theory pretty much predicts that we are not going to see a Rapture any time soon, whereas the God theory leaves the question open. Not exactly "different predictions", but something close.
Making the same predictions means making the same assignments of probabilities to outcomes.
Which brings us back to an issue which I was debating here a couple of weeks ago: Is there a difference between an event being impossible, and an event being of measure zero?
Orthodox Bayesianism says there is no difference and strongly advises against thinking either to be the case. I'm wondering whether there isn't some way to make the idea work that there is a distinction to be made - that some things are completely impossible given a theory, while other things are merely of infinitesimal probability.
There's a proposal to use surreal numbers for utilities. Such an approach was used for go by Conway.
It might be more accurate to say that surreal numbers are a subset of the numbers that were invented by Conway to describe the value of game positions.
Interesting suggestion. I ought to look into that. Thx.