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red75 comments on A note on the description complexity of physical theories - Less Wrong
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The probability that there exists an Everett branch in which I continue making that observation is 1. I'm not sure if jumping straight to subjective experience from that is justified:
If P(I survive|MWI) = 1, and P(I survive|Copenhagen) = p, then what is the rest of that probability mass in Copenhagen interpretation? Why is P(~(I survive)|Copenhagen) = 1-p and what does it really describe? It seems to me that calling it "I don't make any observation" is jumping from subjective experiences back to objective. This looks like a confusion of levels.
ETA: And, of course, the problem with "anthropic probabilities" gets even harder when you consider copies and merging, simulations, Tegmark level 4, and Boltzmann brains (The Anthropic Trilemma). I'm not sure if there even is a general solution. But I strongly suspect that "you can prove MWI by quantum suicide" is an incorrect usage of probabilities.
It even depends on philosophy. Specifically on whether following equality holds.
I survive = There (not necessarily in our universe) exists someone who remembers everything I remember now plus failed suicide I'm going to conduct now.
or
I survive = There exists someone who don't remember everything I remember now, but he acts as I would acted if I remember what he remembers. (I'm not sure whether I correctly expressed subjunctive mood)