I wonder if this can't be considered more pragmatically? There was a passage in the MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Sciences in the Logic entry that seems relevant:

Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) have argued that postulating more imagelike MENTAL MODELS make better predictions about the way people actually reason. Their proposal, applied to our sample argument, might well help to explain the difference in difficulty in the various inferences mentioned earlier, because it is easier to visualize “some people” and “at least three people” than it is to visualize “most people.” Cognitive scientists have recently been exploring computational models of reasoning with diagrams. Logicians, with the notable exceptions of Euler, Venn, and Peirce, have until the past decade paid scant attention to spatial forms of representation, but this is beginning to change (Hammer 1995).

This made me think a bit differently about how we might choose between two abstract models with the same explanatory power. It seems that the rational thing to do is to choose the one that allows you to reason the most fluently so as to minimize the likelihood of fallacious reasoning.

In fact, it seems that we should expect the cognitive sciences to provide clues about how we could adjust formal systems with the view of easy of understanding and technical fluency when reasoning about/with them.

Taking this view; assuming we had finished physics, all the future work would be about tweaking the formalisms toward the most intuitive possible ones with respect to the knowledge we have of human reasoning. What would be important is that they be as easy to understand as possible. That way we could hope to ensure more efficiency in technological development as well as better general understanding among the public.