PhilGoetz comments on Diplomacy as a Game Theory Laboratory - Less Wrong

44 Post author: Yvain 12 November 2010 10:19PM

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Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 12 November 2010 11:29:38PM *  1 point [-]

But I only trust Alicorn and Eliezer because I've discussed morality with both of them in a situation where they had no incentive to lie; it was only in the very unusual conditions of Less Wrong that they could send such a signal believably. Religion is a much easier signal to send and receive without being a moral philosopher.

In games like this, my strategy (or at least my ideal strategy - I haven't actually played enough games like this to do it) is to declare that I will keep my agreements in about 70% of the games I play, a statement I try to adhere to.

That gives the other players an incentive to co-operate with me, since in all likelyhood I really am co-operating and they will maximize their expected wins by always co-operating. On the other hand, it still gives me an extra advantage 30% of the time.

That's the theory, at least. I'm not sure how well it works in practice, nor do I know how well it'll work against somebody else pulling the same strategy on me.

Anyway, now that I've publicly declared my 70% strategy, I'd be interested in playing. (At least assuming that this will be play-by-e-mail with turns at least 24 hours long or equivalent, so that time zones won't be an issue.) ETA: Oh, you specified 2-3 turns a week and I missed it. Yeah, that's perfectly fine.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 14 November 2010 05:24:57PM *  0 points [-]

You could probably write out an equation that would take the distribution of decisions (expressed in payoff for defection vs. cooperation), and compute the optimal probability distribution (as a function of expected value for defection, or ratio of cooperation/defection payoff, perhaps) to use for this strategy.

Bongo's comment rightly implies that the result will depend on whether other players observe the probability you will betray them as a function of payoff, or just the probability overall.