PhilGoetz comments on Diplomacy as a Game Theory Laboratory - Less Wrong
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In games like this, my strategy (or at least my ideal strategy - I haven't actually played enough games like this to do it) is to declare that I will keep my agreements in about 70% of the games I play, a statement I try to adhere to.
That gives the other players an incentive to co-operate with me, since in all likelyhood I really am co-operating and they will maximize their expected wins by always co-operating. On the other hand, it still gives me an extra advantage 30% of the time.
That's the theory, at least. I'm not sure how well it works in practice, nor do I know how well it'll work against somebody else pulling the same strategy on me.
Anyway, now that I've publicly declared my 70% strategy, I'd be interested in playing. (At least assuming that this will be play-by-e-mail with turns at least 24 hours long or equivalent, so that time zones won't be an issue.) ETA: Oh, you specified 2-3 turns a week and I missed it. Yeah, that's perfectly fine.
You could probably write out an equation that would take the distribution of decisions (expressed in payoff for defection vs. cooperation), and compute the optimal probability distribution (as a function of expected value for defection, or ratio of cooperation/defection payoff, perhaps) to use for this strategy.
Bongo's comment rightly implies that the result will depend on whether other players observe the probability you will betray them as a function of payoff, or just the probability overall.