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Perplexed comments on Spring 1912: A New Heaven And A New Earth - Less Wrong
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If the focus is going to be about lessons, then here is one way to find those lessons: Let the victors point out mistakes - tactical or strategic - that they noticed had been made by other players in the game. Then let the accused mistake-makers analyze the lapse in rationality that led to the mistake being made. Or if they wish, they can provide an analysis showing that there was no mistake - only bad luck.
I know that my own mistakes arose from a variety of correctable causes - ranging from simple carelessness, through character flaws, to use of wrong decision-making algorithms.
This seems difficult because of imperfect information. I remember being flabbergasted when Germany didn't bounce you out of Sweden (the standard play), but was that a mistake? I can't tell without knowing what information he had at the time he made the decision. A core principle of decision analysis is that you don't judge by outcomes but by the decision made ignorant of the outcome.
For example, one decision I'm ambivalent about was not moving to Tys when England vacated Tun (the same turn I took StP after saying I wouldn't). I was >90% confident England would vacate both Tun and Tys, and taking both of them would have put me in a solid position. But, if I took Tys, I opened Austria and myself up to losing Rome, which would have been unrecoverable. I played the maximin strategy but suspected the expected utility strategy was to move to Tys. That's the place to say whether or not I made a mistake, before we know that England did tell the truth.