Vladimir_Nesov comments on Another attempt to explain UDT - Less Wrong
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Eliezer has expressed the idea that using a Solomonoff-type prior over all programs doesn't mean you believe the universe to be computable - it just means you're trying to outperform all other (ETA: strike the word "other") computable agents. This position took me a lot of time to parse, but now I consider it completely correct. Unfortunately the reason it's correct is not easy to express in words, it's just some sort of free-floating math idea in my head.
Not sure how exactly this position meshes with UDT, though.
Outperform at generating "predictions", but why is that interesting? Especially if universe is not computable, so that "predictions" don't in fact have anything to do with the universe? (Which again assumes that "universe" is interesting.)