Gary_Drescher comments on Another attempt to explain UDT - Less Wrong
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Comments (50)
How is this not resolved? (My comment and the following Eliezer's comment; I didn't re-read the rest of the discussion.)
This basically says that the predictor is a rock, doesn't depend on agent's decision, which makes the agent lose because of the way problem statement argues into stipulating (outside of predictor's own decision process) that this must be a two-boxing rock rather than a one-boxing rock.
Same as (2). We stipulate the weak player to be a $9 rock. Nothing to be surprised about.
Requires ability to reason under logical uncertainty, comparing theories of consequences and not just specific possible utilities following from specific possible actions. Under any reasonable axioms for valuation of sets of consequences, action B wins.
Without good understanding of reasoning under logical uncertainty, this one remains out.
True, it doesn't "depend" on the agent's decision in the specific sense of "dependency" defined by currently-formulated UDT. The question (as with any proposed DT) is whether that's in fact the right sense of "dependency" (between action and utility) to use for making decisions. Maybe it is, but the fact that UDT itself says so is insufficient reason to agree.
[EDIT: fixed typo]
The arguments behind UDT's choice of dependence could prove strong enough to resolve this case as well. The fact that we are arguing about UDT's answer in no way disqualifies UDT's arguments.
My current position on ASP is that reasoning used in motivating it exhibits "explicit dependence bias". I'll need to (and probably will) write another top-level post on this topic to improve on what I've already written here and on the decision theory list.