The issue here is with language and the meaning of the world "false"
The issue where? Are you saying that this thread is about language, rather than truth? Or that my example, as written, is about language rather than (as intended) about truth?
not with the concept of truth independent of language.
I'm a bit surprised that anyone could conceive of a concept of truth independent of language. I've always considered truth as an attribute of sentences - linguistic objects. Perhaps I am missing your point.
As for your example, yes, I would say that it does point out something interesting, though already known, about the concept of color. That valid classification systems based on this criterion may disagree. This is also true of truth and logic. Some people say that the Liar statement is neither true nor false. Some people say that it is both true and false. Both can be correct, depending on what else they claim.
I'm a bit surprised that anyone could conceive of a concept of truth independent of language. I've always considered truth as an attribute of sentences - linguistic objects.
"Snow is white" is true if, and only if, snow is white - Tarski's material adequacy condition - only makes sense if there is a fact of the matter about whether or not snow is white independent of language.
Graham Priest discusses The Liar's Paradox for a NY Times blog. It seems that one way of solving the Liar's Paradox is defining dialethei, a true contradiction. Less Wrong, can you do what modern philosophers have failed to do and solve or successfully dissolve the Liar's Paradox? This doesn't seem nearly as hard as solving free will.
This post is a practice problem for what may become a sequence on unsolved problems in philosophy.