If you can't take as a given that statements actually are in the language they appear to be in no statement can have any knowable truth value. If "snow" in the utterance is a word in the same language as the identically spelled word in the statement, and the same for "white" (and "is"), and the rest of the statement means exactly the same as it does in English then the statement is still correct. But if "white" might designate orange "true" might just as well designate bubblegum or "only" designate "to treat like a second cousin".
And further the grammar of English is being assumed... as well as the very concept of languages.
Graham Priest discusses The Liar's Paradox for a NY Times blog. It seems that one way of solving the Liar's Paradox is defining dialethei, a true contradiction. Less Wrong, can you do what modern philosophers have failed to do and solve or successfully dissolve the Liar's Paradox? This doesn't seem nearly as hard as solving free will.
This post is a practice problem for what may become a sequence on unsolved problems in philosophy.