shokwave comments on Efficient Charity - Less Wrong

31 Post author: multifoliaterose 04 December 2010 10:27AM

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Comment author: komponisto 05 December 2010 06:07:30AM *  0 points [-]

You are making the perfect (people donating to x-risks charities instead of buying personal luxuries) the enemy of the good (people donating to save lives instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland).

My preference ordering is:

(people donating to x-risks charities instead of buying personal luxuries) > (people donating to save lives instead of buying personal luxuries)>(people donating to to provide trips to Disneyland instead of buying personal luxuries)>(people donating to x-risks charities instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland)>(people donating to save lives instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland).

EDIT: No, this is wrong; see below. Attention should be focused on the grandparent.

Comment author: shokwave 05 December 2010 06:22:00AM *  1 point [-]

(people donating to to provide trips to Disneyland instead of buying personal luxuries)

This has incredibly marginal utility. It is effectively trading your luxury for the fuzzy feeling of providing luxury to another.

(people donating to x-risks charities instead of donating to provide trips to Disneyland)

This has more utility. In fact, it bears a strong resemblance to

(people donating to x-risks charities instead of buying personal luxuries)

given that "providing trips to Disneyland" looks more like a luxury than charity.

I don't understand how you can prefer A>C but C>A*, unless you think that "preventing the purchase of personal luxuries" is worth more utility than preventing existential risk (A, A*) or saving lives (B, B*).

Comment author: komponisto 05 December 2010 06:35:48AM *  0 points [-]

Yes, never mind -- see my reply to JGWeissman.