Bongo comments on Best career models for doing research? - Less Wrong
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(I would have liked to reply to the deleted comment, but you can't reply to deleted comments so I'll reply to the repost.)
I don't think Roko should have been requested to delete his comment. I don't think Roko should have conceded to deleting his comment.
The correct reaction when someone posts something scandalous like
is not to attempt to erase it, even if that was possible, but to reveal the context. The context, supposedly, would make it seem less scandalous - for example, maybe it was a private dicussion about philosophical hypotheticals. If it wouldn't, that's a bad sign about SIAI.
The fact that that erasure was the reaction suggests that there is no redeeming context!
That someone asked Roko to erase his comment isn't a very bad sign, since it's enough that one person didn't understand the reasoning above for that to happen. That fact that Roko conceded is a bad sign, though.
Now SIAI should save face not by asking a moderator to delete wfg's reposts, but by revealing the redeeming context in which the scandalous remarks that Roko alluded to were made.
Roko may have been thinking of [just called him, he was thinking of it] a conversation we had when he and I were roommates in Oxford while I was visiting the Future of Humanity Institute, and frequently discussed philosophical problems and thought experiments. Here's the (redeeming?) context:
As those who know me can attest, I often make the point that radical self-sacrificing utilitarianism isn't found in humans and isn't a good target to aim for. Almost no one would actually take on serious harm with certainty for a small chance of helping distant others. Robin Hanson often presents evidence for this, e.g. this presentation on "why doesn't anyone create investment funds for future people?" However, sometimes people caught up in thoughts of the good they can do, or a self-image of making a big difference in the world, are motivated to think of themselves as really being motivated primarily by helping others as such. Sometimes they go on to an excessive smart sincere syndrome, and try (at the conscious/explicit level) to favor altruism at the severe expense of their other motivations: self-concern, relationships, warm fuzzy feelings.
Usually this doesn't work out well, as the explicit reasoning about principles and ideals is gradually overridden by other mental processes, leading to exhaustion, burnout, or disillusionment. The situation winds up worse according to all of the person's motivations, even altruism. Burnout means less good gets done than would have been achieved by leading a more balanced life that paid due respect to all one's values. Even more self-defeatingly, if one actually does make severe sacrifices, it will tend to repel bystanders.
Instead, I typically advocate careful introspection and the use of something like Nick Bostrom's parliamentary model:
In the conversation with Roko, we were discussing philosophical thought experiments (trolley problem style, which may indeed be foolish ) to get at 'real' preferences and values for such an exercise. To do that, one often does best to adopt the device of the True Prisoner's Dilemma and select positive and negative payoffs that actually have emotional valence (as opposed to abstract tokens). For positive payoffs, we used indefinite lifespans of steady "peak experiences" involving discovery, health, status, and elite mates. For negative payoffs we used probabilities of personal risk of death (which comes along with almost any effort, e.g. driving to places) and harms that involved pain and/or a decline in status (since these are separate drives). Since we were friends and roommates without excessive squeamishness, hanging out at home, we used less euphemistic language.
Neither of us was keen on huge sacrifices in Pascal's-Mugging-like situations, viewing altruism as only one part of our respective motivational coalitions, or one term in bounded utility functions. I criticized his past "cheap talk" of world-saving as a primary motivation, given that in less convenient possible worlds, it was more easily overcome than his phrasing signaled. I said he should scale back his claims of altruism to match the reality, in the way that I explicitly note my bounded do-gooding impulses.
We also differed in our personal views on the relative badness of torture, humiliation and death. For me, risk of death was the worst, which I was least willing to trade off in trolley-problem type cases to save others. Roko placed relatively more value on the other two, which I jokingly ribbed and teased him about.
In retrospect, I was probably a bit of a jerk in pushing (normative) Hansonian transparency. I wish I had been more careful to distinguish between critiquing a gap between talk and values, and critiquing the underlying values, and probably should just take wedifrid's advice on trolley-problem-type scenarios generally.
First off, great comment -- interesting, and complex.
But, some things still don't make sense to me...
Assuming that what you described led to:
How did precommitting enter in to it?
Are you prepared to be tortured or raped for the cause? Have you precommitted to it?
Have other SIAI people you know of talked about this with you, have other SIAI people precommitted to it?
What do you think of others who do not want to be tortured or raped for the cause?
Thanks, wfg
I find this whole line of conversation fairly ludicrous, but here goes:
Number 1. Time-inconsistency: we have different reactions about an immediate certainty of some bad than a future probability of it. So many people might be willing to go be a health worker in a poor country where aid workers are commonly (1 in 10,000) raped or killed, even though they would not be willing to be certainly attacked in exchange for 10,000 times the benefits to others. In the actual instant of being tortured anyone would break, but people do choose courses of action that carry risk (every action does, to some extent), so the latter is more meaningful for such hypotheticals.
Number 2. I have driven and flown thousands of kilometers in relation to existential risk, increasing my chance of untimely death in a car accident or plane crash, so obviously I am willing to take some increased probability of death. I think I would prefer a given chance of being tortured to a given chance of death, so obviously I care enough to take at least some tiny risk from what I said above. As I also said above, I'm not willing to make very big sacrifices (big probabilities of such nasty personal outcomes) for tiny shifts in probabilities of big impersonal payoffs (like existential risk reduction). In realistic scenarios, that's what "the cause" would refer to. I haven't made any verbal or explicit "precommitment" or promises or anything like that.
In sufficiently extreme (and ludicrously improbable) trolley-problem style examples, e.g. "if you push this button you'll be tortured for a week, but if you don't then the Earth will be destroyed (including all your loved ones) if this fair coin comes up heads, and you have incredibly (impossibly?) good evidence that this really is the setup" I hope I would push the button, but in a real world of profound uncertainty, limited evidence, limited personal power (I am not Barack Obama or Bill Gates), and cognitive biases, I don't expect that to ever happen. I also haven't made any promises or oaths about that.
I am willing to give of my time and effort, and forgo the financial rewards of a more lucrative career, in exchange for a chance for efficient do-gooding, interaction with interesting people who share my values, and a meaningful project. Given diminishing returns to money in rich countries today, and the ease of obtaining money for folk with high human capital, those aren't big sacrifices, if they are sacrifices at all.
Number 3. SIAIers love to be precise and analytical and consider philosophical thought experiments, including ethical ones. I think most have views pretty similar to mine, with somewhat varying margins. Certainly Michael Vassar, the head of the organization, is also keen on recognizing one's various motives and living a balanced life, and avoiding fanatics. Like me, he actively advocates Bostrom-like parliamentary model approaches to combining self-concern with parochial and universalist altruistic feelings.
I have never heard anyone making oaths or promises to make severe sacrifices.
Number 4. This is a pretty ridiculous question. I think that's fine and normal, and I feel more comfortable with such folk than the alternative. I think people should not exaggerate that do-gooding is the most important thing in their life lest they deceive themselves and others about their willingness to make such choices, which I criticized Roko for.
This sounds very sane, and makes me feel a lot better about the context. Thank you very much.
I very much like the idea that top SIAI people believe that there is such a thing as too much devotion to the cause (and, I'm assuming, actively talk people who are above that level down as you describe doing for Roko).
As someone who has demonstrated impressive sanity around these topics, you seem to be in a unique position to answer these questions with an above-average level-headedness:
Do you understand the math behind the Roko post deletion?
What do you think about the Roko post deletion?
What do you think about future deletions?
Yes, his post was based on (garbled versions of) some work I had been doing at FHI, which I had talked about with him while trying to figure out some knotty sub-problems.
I think the intent behind it was benign, at least in that Eliezer had his views about the issue (which is more general, and not about screwed-up FAI attempts) previously, and that he was motivated to prevent harm to people hearing the idea and others generally. Indeed, he was explicitly motivated enough to take a PR hit for SIAI.
Regarding the substance, I think there are some pretty good reasons for thinking that the expected value (with a small probability of a high impact) of the info for the overwhelming majority of people exposed to it would be negative, although that estimate is unstable in the face of new info.
It's obvious that the deletion caused more freak-out and uncertainty than anticipated, leading to a net increase in people reading and thinking about the content compared to the counterfactual with no deletion. So regardless of the substance about the info, clearly it was a mistake to delete (which Eliezer also recognizes).
Obviously, Eliezer is continuing to delete comments reposting on the topic of the deleted post. It seems fairly futile to me, but not entirely. I don't think that Less Wrong is made worse by the absence of that content as such, although the fear and uncertainty about it seem to be harmful. You said you were worried because it makes you uncertain about whether future deletions will occur and of what.
After about half an hour of trying, I can't think of another topic with the same sorts of features. There may be cases involving things like stalkers or bank PINs or 4chan attacks or planning illegal activities. Eliezer called on people not to discuss AI at the beginning of Less Wrong to help establish its rationality focus, and to back off from the gender warfare, but hasn't used deletion powers for such things.
Less Wrong has been around for 20 months. If we can rigorously carve out the stalker/PIN/illegality/spam/threats cases I would be happy to bet $500 against $50 that we won't see another topic banned over the next 20 months.
That sounds like it'd generate some perverse incentives to me.
Urk.
Just to be clear: he recognizes this by comparison with the alternative of privately having the poster delete it themselves, rather than by comparison to not-deleting.
Or at least that was my understanding.
Regardless, thanks for a breath of clarity in this thread. As a mostly disinterested newcomer, I very much appreciated it.
Well, if counterfactually Roko hadn't wanted to take it down I think it would have been even more of a mistake to delete it, because then the author would have been peeved, not just the audience/commenters.
Which is fine.
But Eliezer's comments on the subject suggest to me that he doesn't think that.
More specifically, they suggest that he thinks the most important thing is that the post not be viewable, and if we can achieve that by quietly convincing the author to take it down, great, and if we can achieve it by quietly deleting it without anybody noticing, great, and if we can't do either of those then we achieve it without being quiet, which is less great but still better than leaving it up.
And it seemed to me your parenthetical could be taken to mean that he agrees with you that deleting it would be a mistake in all of those cases, so I figured I would clarify (or let myself be corrected, if I'm misunderstanding).
I should have taken this bet
Your post has been moved to the Discussion section, not deleted.
I agree with your main point, but the thought experiment seems to be based on the false assumption that the risk of being raped or murdered are smaller than 1 in 10K if you stay at home. Wikipedia guesstimates that 1 in 6 women in the US are on the receiving end of attempted rape at some point, so someone who goes to a place with a 1 in 10K chance of being raped or murdered has probably improved their personal safety. To make a better thought experiment, I suppose you have to talk about the marginal increase in rape or murder rate when working in the poor country when compared to staying home, and perhaps you should stick to murder since the rape rate is so high.
You lost me at 'ludicrous'. :)
but he won me back by answering anyway <3
Great comment Carl!
Thanks!
Roko was not requested to delete his comment. See this parallel thread. (I would appreciate it if you would edit your comment to note this, so readers who miss this comment don't have a false belief reinforced.) (ETA: thanks)
Agreed (and I think the chance of wfg's reposts being deleted is very low, because most people get this). Unfortunately, I know nothing about the alleged event (Roko may be misdescribing it, as he misdescribed my message to him) or its context.
Roko said he was asked. You didn't ask him but maybe someone else did?
Roko's reply to me strongly suggested that he interpreted my message as requesting deletion, and that I was the cause of him deleting it. I doubt anyone at SIAI would have explicitly requested deletion.
I can confirm that I was not asked to delete the comment but did so voluntarily.
I think you are too trigger-happy.
I'm wondering whether you, Nick, have learned anything from this experience - something perhaps about how attempting to hide something is almost always counterproductive?
Of course, Roko contributed here by deleting the message, you didn't create this mess by yourself. But you sure have helped. :)
Well, look, I deleted it of my own accord, but only after being prompted that it was a bad thing to have posted. Can we just drop this? It makes me look like even more of a troublemaker than I already look like, and all I really want to do is finish the efficient charity competition then get on with life outside teh intenetz.
How so? I've just reread some of your comments on your now deleted post. It looks like you honestly tried to get the SIAI to put safeguards into CEV. Given that the idea spread to many people by now, don't you think it would be acceptably to discuss the matter before one or more people take it serious or even consider to implement it deliberately?
I don't think it is a good idea to discuss it. I think that the costs outweigh the benefits. The costs are very big. Benefits marginal.
This is very important. If the SIAI is the organisation to solve the friendly AI problem and implement CEV then it should be subject to public examination, especially if they ask for money.
The current evidence that anyone anywhere can implement CEV is two papers in six years that talk about it a bit. There appears to have been nothing else from SIAI and no-one else in philosophy appears interested.
If that's all there is for CEV in six years, and AI is on the order of thirty years away, then (approximately) we're dead.
This is rather disappointing, as if CEV is possible then a non-artificial general intelligence should be able to implement it, at least partially. And we have those. The reason for CEV is (as I understand it) the danger of the AI going FOOM before it cares about humans. However, human general intelligences don't go FOOM but should be able to do the work for CEV. If they know what that work is.
Addendum: I see others have been asking "but what do you actually mean?" for a couple of years now.
This strikes me as a demand for particular proof. SIAI is small (and was much smaller until the last year or two), the set of people engaged in FAI research is smaller, Eliezer has chosen to focus on writing about rationality over research for nearly four years, and FAI is a huge problem, in which any specific subproblem should be expected to be underdeveloped at this early stage. And while I and others expect work to speed up in the near future with Eliezer's attention and better organization, yes, we probably are dead.
Somewhat nitpickingly, this is a reason for FAI in general. CEV is attractive mostly for moving as much work from the designers to the FAI as possible, reducing the potential for uncorrectable error, and being fairer than letting the designers lay out an object-level goal system.
This sounds interesting; do you think you could expand?
It wasn't intended to be - more incredulity. I thought this was a really important piece of the puzzle, so expected there'd be something at all by now. I appreciate your point: that this is a ridiculously huge problem and SIAI is ridiculously small.
I meant that, as I understand it, CEV is what is fed to the seed AI. Or the AI does the work to ascertain the CEV. It requires an intelligence to ascertain the CEV, but I'd think the ascertaining process would be reasonably set out once we had an intelligence on hand, artificial or no. Or the process to get to the ascertaining process.
I thought we needed the CEV before the AI goes FOOM, because it's too late after. That implies it doesn't take a superintelligence to work it out.
Thus: CEV would have to be a process that mere human-level intelligences could apply. That would be a useful process to have, and doesn't require first creating an AI.
I must point out that my statements on the subject are based in curiosity, ignorance and extrapolation from what little I do know, and I'm asking (probably annoyingly) for more to work with.
I have recieved assurances that SIAI will go to significant efforts not to do nasty things, and I believe them. Private assurances given sincerely are, in my opinion, the best we can hope for, and better than we are likely to get from any other entity involved in this.
Besides, I think that XiXiDu, et al are complaining about the difference between cotton and silk, when what is actually likely to happen is more like a big kick in the teeth from reality. SIAI is imperfect. Yes. Well done. Nothing is perfect. At least cut them a bit of slack.
What?!? Open source code - under a permissive license - is the traditional way to signal that you are not going to run off into the sunset with the fruits of a programming effort. Private assurances are usually worth diddly-squat by comparison.
I think that you don't realize just how bad the situation is. You want that silken sheet. Rude awakening methinks. Also open-source not neccessarily good for FAI in any case.
Ok by me. It is pretty obvious by this point that there is no evil conspiracy involved here. But I think the lesson remains, I you delete something, even if it is just because you regret posting it, you create more confusion than you remove.
I think the question you should be asking is less about evil conspiracies, and more about what kind of organization SIAI is -- what would they tell you about, and what would they lie to you about.
If the forbidden topic would be made public (and people would believe it), it would result in a steep rise of donations towards the SIAI. That alone is enough to conclude that the SIAI is not trying to hold back something that would discredit it as an organisation concerned with charitable objectives. The censoring of the information was in accordance with their goal of trying to prevent unfriendly artificial intelligence. Making the subject matter public did already harm some people and could harm people in future.
But the forbidden topic is already public. All the effects that would follow from it being public would already follow. THE HORSE HAS BOLTED. It's entirely unclear to me what pretending it hasn't does for the problem or the credibility of the SIAI.
I really don't see how that follows. Will more of the public take it seriously? As I have noted, so far the reaction from people outside SIAI/LW has been "They did WHAT? Are they IDIOTS?"
That doesn't make it not stupid or not counterproductive. Sincere stupidity is not less stupid than insincere stupidity. Indeed, sincere stupidity is more problematic in my experience as the sincere are less likely to back down, whereas the insincere will more quickly hop to a different idea.
Citation needed.
Citation needed.
I wish I could upvote twice