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Will_Sawin comments on Unpacking the Concept of "Blackmail" - Less Wrong
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Don't even get me started on how ill-defined and far from being formally understood the concept of "Schelling point" is. It's very useful in informal game theory of course.
A Schelling point is a kind of Nash equilbrium, right? It's the kind of equilibrium that an understanding of human psychology and the details of the situation says you should expect.
The union-firefighter looks like a variant on the hawk-dove/chicken game. If default is (Dove,Dove), which isn't an equilibrium, Hawk can be seen as a black mail action as it makes you worse of than default. So at (Hawk,Hawk) everyone is, in fact, being blackmailed, and this is, essentially, a coordination problem.