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FAWS comments on Unpacking the Concept of "Blackmail" - Less Wrong
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Comments (136)
Correction: Retracted, likely wrong.
Explicit dependence bias detected. How agent 1 will decide generally depends on how agent 2 will decide (not just on the actual action, but on the algorithm, that is on how the action is defined, not just on what is being defined). In multi-agent games, this can't be sidestepped. And restatement of the problem can't sever ambient dependencies.
Bias denied.
First I make no claims about the outcome of the negotiation so there is no way privileging any dependence over any other could bias my estimation thereof.
Second, I didn't make any claim about any actual dependence, merely about communication, and it would certainly be in the interest of a would-be blackmailer to frame the dependence in the most inescapable way they can.
Third, agent 2 would need to be able to model communicated dependencies sensibly no matter whether it has a concept of blackmail or not, but while how it models the dependence internally would have a bearing on whether the blackmail would be successful that's a separate problem and should have no influence on whether the agent can recognize the relative utilities.
I wasn't thinking clearly; I don't understand this as an instance of explicit dependence bias now, though it could be. I'll be working on this question, but no deadlines.