HonoreDB comments on A Thought on Pascal's Mugging - Less Wrong

12 Post author: komponisto 10 December 2010 06:08AM

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Comment author: HonoreDB 12 December 2010 07:04:39AM 0 points [-]

The problem, as stated, seems to me like it can be solved by precommitting not to negotiate with terrorists--this seems like a textbook case.

So switch it to Pascal's Philanthropist, who says "I offer you a choice: either you may take this $5 bill in my hand, or I will use my magic powers outside the universe to grant you 3^^^^3 units of utility."

But I'm actually not intuitively bothered by the thought of refusing the $5 in that case. It's an eccentric thing to do, but it may be rational. Can anybody give me a formulation of the problem where taking the magic powers claim seriously is obviously crazy?

Comment author: HonoreDB 13 December 2010 06:33:14AM 0 points [-]

No responses and a downvote. Clearly I'm missing something obvious.

Comment author: komponisto 13 December 2010 06:52:50AM *  0 points [-]

I wasn't the downvoter (nor the upvoter), and wouldn't have downvoted; but I would suggest considering the abstract version of the problem:

Given that, in general, a Turing machine can increase in utility vastly faster than it increases in complexity, how should an Occam-abiding mind avoid being dominated by tiny probabilities of vast utilities?