GDC3 comments on Confidence levels inside and outside an argument - Less Wrong
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Isn't the problem more like: they are ignoring the huge number of bits of evidence that say that cells in fact exist. They aren't comparing between hypotheses that say cells exist. They are comparing the uniform prior for cells existing to a the prior for only random proteins existing. They sound more like they are trying to argue that all our experiences cannot be enough evidence that there are cells, which seems weird.
This is a misinterpretation. The argument goes like this:
True statement: There is lots of evidence or cells. P(Evidence|Cells)/P(Evidence|~Cells)>>1.
False statement: Without intelligent design, cells could only be produced by random chance. P(Cells|~God) is very very small.
Debatable statement: P(Cells|God) is large.
Conclusion: We update massively in favor of God and against ~God, because of, not in opposition to, the massive evidence in favor of the existence of cells.
This is valid Bayesian updating, it's just that the false statement is false.
Upvoted for successfully correcting my confusion about this example and helping me get updating a little better.
Edit: wow, this was a really old comment reply. How did I just notice it...