This seems to assume that change in human values over time is mostly "progress" rather than drift. Do we have any evidence for that, except saying that our modern values are "good" according to themselves, so whatever historical process led to them must have been "progress"?
Changes in human values seem to have generally involved expanding the subset of people with moral worth, especially post-enlightenment. This suggests to me that value change isn't random drift, but it's only weak evidence that the changes reflect some inevitable fact of human nature.
Are you sure this isn't the Texas sharpshooter fallacy?
That is to say, values are complicated enough that if they drifted in a random direction, there would exist a simple-sounding way to describe the direction of drift (neglecting, of course, all the other possible axes of change)- and of course this abstraction would sound like an appealing general principle to those with the current endpoint values.
Taken from some old comments of mine that never did get a satisfactory answer.
1) One of the justifications for CEV was that extrapolating from an American in the 21st century and from Archimedes of Syracuse should give similar results. This seems to assume that change in human values over time is mostly "progress" rather than drift. Do we have any evidence for that, except saying that our modern values are "good" according to themselves, so whatever historical process led to them must have been "progress"?
2) How can anyone sincerely want to build an AI that fulfills anything except their own current, personal volition? If Eliezer wants the the AI to look at humanity and infer its best wishes for the future, why can't he task it with looking at himself and inferring his best idea to fulfill humanity's wishes? Why must this particular thing be spelled out in a document like CEV and not left to the mysterious magic of "intelligence", and what other such things are there?