There have been other changes as well, which don't fit this generalization. For instance, we now treat the people who do have moral worth much better, in many ways.
Also, there have historically been major regressions along the "percentage of society having moral worth" scale. E.g., Roman Republican society gave women, and all Roman citizens, more rights than the post-Roman Christian world that followed.
Finally, "not random drift" isn't the same as "moving towards a global singular goal". A map with fractal attractors isn't random, either.
Agreed on all points.
Taken from some old comments of mine that never did get a satisfactory answer.
1) One of the justifications for CEV was that extrapolating from an American in the 21st century and from Archimedes of Syracuse should give similar results. This seems to assume that change in human values over time is mostly "progress" rather than drift. Do we have any evidence for that, except saying that our modern values are "good" according to themselves, so whatever historical process led to them must have been "progress"?
2) How can anyone sincerely want to build an AI that fulfills anything except their own current, personal volition? If Eliezer wants the the AI to look at humanity and infer its best wishes for the future, why can't he task it with looking at himself and inferring his best idea to fulfill humanity's wishes? Why must this particular thing be spelled out in a document like CEV and not left to the mysterious magic of "intelligence", and what other such things are there?