I don't know, but individual differences do exist (the existence of masochistic people should prove that)
But is that relevant to the question that CEV tries to answer? As far as I know, most masochistic people don't also hold a belief that everybody should be masochistic.
Even if individual differences in fundamental goals are not extended to other people as imperatives, they imply that the ability of a coherent extrapolated volition scheme to satisfy individual preferences must be limited.
Depending on the size of those differences, this may or may not be a big deal. And we're very likely to have fundamental social goals that do include external imperatives, although masochism isn't one.
Taken from some old comments of mine that never did get a satisfactory answer.
1) One of the justifications for CEV was that extrapolating from an American in the 21st century and from Archimedes of Syracuse should give similar results. This seems to assume that change in human values over time is mostly "progress" rather than drift. Do we have any evidence for that, except saying that our modern values are "good" according to themselves, so whatever historical process led to them must have been "progress"?
2) How can anyone sincerely want to build an AI that fulfills anything except their own current, personal volition? If Eliezer wants the the AI to look at humanity and infer its best wishes for the future, why can't he task it with looking at himself and inferring his best idea to fulfill humanity's wishes? Why must this particular thing be spelled out in a document like CEV and not left to the mysterious magic of "intelligence", and what other such things are there?