I do not think this would work.
Pardon me. To be more technically precise: "Implementing an AI that extrapolates the volition of something other or broader than yourself may facilitate cooperation. It would reduce the chance that people will kill you for the attempt and increase the chance of receiving support."
Aha, I see. My mistake, ignoring the larger context.
Seen this? Anyway, I feel that it is really hard to tackle this topic because of its vagueness. As multifoliaterose implied here, at the moment the task to recognize humans as distinguished beings already seems to me too broad a problem to tackle directly. Talking about implementing CEV indirectly, by derivation from Yudkowsky's mind, versus specifying the details beforehand, seems to be fun to argue but ultimately ineffective at this point. In other words, an organisation that claims to solve some meta ...
Taken from some old comments of mine that never did get a satisfactory answer.
1) One of the justifications for CEV was that extrapolating from an American in the 21st century and from Archimedes of Syracuse should give similar results. This seems to assume that change in human values over time is mostly "progress" rather than drift. Do we have any evidence for that, except saying that our modern values are "good" according to themselves, so whatever historical process led to them must have been "progress"?
2) How can anyone sincerely want to build an AI that fulfills anything except their own current, personal volition? If Eliezer wants the the AI to look at humanity and infer its best wishes for the future, why can't he task it with looking at himself and inferring his best idea to fulfill humanity's wishes? Why must this particular thing be spelled out in a document like CEV and not left to the mysterious magic of "intelligence", and what other such things are there?