# Efficient Charity: Do Unto Others...

130 24 December 2010 09:26PM

This was originally posted as part of the efficient charity contest back in November. Thanks to Roko, multifoliaterose, Louie, jmmcd, jsalvatier, and others I forget for help, corrections, encouragement, and bothering me until I finally remembered to post this here.

Imagine you are setting out on a dangerous expedition through the Arctic on a limited budget. The grizzled old prospector at the general store shakes his head sadly: you can't afford everything you need; you'll just have to purchase the bare essentials and hope you get lucky. But what is essential? Should you buy the warmest parka, if it means you can't afford a sleeping bag? Should you bring an extra week's food, just in case, even if it means going without a rifle? Or can you buy the rifle, leave the food, and hunt for your dinner?

And how about the field guide to Arctic flowers? You like flowers, and you'd hate to feel like you're failing to appreciate the harsh yet delicate environment around you. And a digital camera, of course - if you make it back alive, you'll have to put the Arctic expedition pics up on Facebook. And a hand-crafted scarf with authentic Inuit tribal patterns woven from organic fibres! Wicked!

...but of course buying any of those items would be insane. The problem is what economists call opportunity costs: buying one thing costs money that could be used to buy others. A hand-crafted designer scarf might have some value in the Arctic, but it would cost so much it would prevent you from buying much more important things. And when your life is on the line, things like impressing your friends and buying organic pale in comparison. You have one goal - staying alive - and your only problem is how to distribute your resources to keep your chances as high as possible. These sorts of economics concepts are natural enough when faced with a journey through the freezing tundra.

But they are decidedly not natural when facing a decision about charitable giving. Most donors say they want to "help people". If that's true, they should try to distribute their resources to help people as much as possible. Most people don't. In the "Buy A Brushstroke" campaign, eleven thousand British donors gave a total of £550,000 to keep the famous painting "Blue Rigi" in a UK museum. If they had given that £550,000 to buy better sanitation systems in African villages instead, the latest statistics suggest it would have saved the lives of about one thousand two hundred people from disease. Each individual $50 donation could have given a year of normal life back to a Third Worlder afflicted with a disabling condition like blindness or limb deformity.. Most of those 11,000 donors genuinely wanted to help people by preserving access to the original canvas of a beautiful painting. And most of those 11,000 donors, if you asked, would say that a thousand people's lives are more important than a beautiful painting, original or no. But these people didn't have the proper mental habits to realize that was the choice before them, and so a beautiful painting remains in a British museum and somewhere in the Third World a thousand people are dead. If you are to "love your neighbor as yourself", then you should be as careful in maximizing the benefit to others when donating to charity as you would be in maximizing the benefit to yourself when choosing purchases for a polar trek. And if you wouldn't buy a pretty picture to hang on your sled in preference to a parka, you should consider not helping save a famous painting in preference to helping save a thousand lives. Not all charitable choices are as simple as that one, but many charitable choices do have right answers. GiveWell.org, a site which collects and interprets data on the effectiveness of charities, predicts that antimalarial drugs save one child from malaria per$5,000 worth of medicine, but insecticide-treated bed nets save one child from malaria per $500 worth of netting. If you want to save children, donating bed nets instead of antimalarial drugs is the objectively right answer, the same way buying a$500 TV instead of an identical TV that costs $5,000 is the right answer. And since saving a child from diarrheal disease costs$5,000, donating to an organization fighting malaria instead of an organization fighting diarrhea is the right answer, unless you are donating based on some criteria other than whether you're helping children or not.

Say all of the best Arctic explorers agree that the three most important things for surviving in the Arctic are good boots, a good coat, and good food. Perhaps they have run highly unethical studies in which they release thousands of people into the Arctic with different combination of gear, and consistently find that only the ones with good boots, coats, and food survive. Then there is only one best answer to the question "What gear do I buy if I want to survive" - good boots, good food, and a good coat. Your preferences are irrelevant; you may choose to go with alternate gear, but only if you don't mind dying.

And likewise, there is only one best charity: the one that helps the most people the greatest amount per dollar. This is vague, and it is up to you to decide whether a charity that raises forty children's marks by one letter grade for $100 helps people more or less than one that prevents one fatal case of tuberculosis per$100 or one that saves twenty acres of rainforest per $100. But you cannot abdicate the decision, or you risk ending up like the 11,000 people who accidentally decided that a pretty picture was worth more than a thousand people's lives. Deciding which charity is the best is hard. It may be straightforward to say that one form of antimalarial therapy is more effective than another. But how do both compare to financing medical research that might or might not develop a "magic bullet" cure for malaria? Or financing development of a new kind of supercomputer that might speed up all medical research? There is no easy answer, but the question has to be asked. What about just comparing charities on overhead costs, the one easy-to-find statistic that's universally applicable across all organizations? This solution is simple, elegant, and wrong. High overhead costs are only one possible failure mode for a charity. Consider again the Arctic explorer, trying to decide between a$200 parka and a $200 digital camera. Perhaps a parka only cost$100 to make and the manufacturer takes $100 profit, but the camera cost$200 to make and the manufacturer is selling it at cost. This speaks in favor of the moral qualities of the camera manufacturer, but given the choice the explorer should still buy the parka. The camera does something useless very efficiently, the parka does something vital inefficiently. A parka sold at cost would be best, but in its absence the explorer shouldn't hesitate to choose the the parka over the camera. The same applies to charity. An antimalarial net charity that saves one life per $500 with 50% overhead is better than an antidiarrheal drug charity that saves one life per$5000 with 0% overhead: $10,000 donated to the high-overhead charity will save ten lives;$10,000 to the lower-overhead will only save two. Here the right answer is to donate to the antimalarial charity while encouraging it to find ways to lower its overhead. In any case, examining the financial practices of a charity is helpful but not enough to answer the "which is the best charity?" question.

Just as there is only one best charity, there is only one best way to donate to that charity. Whether you volunteer versus donate money versus raise awareness is your own choice, but that choice has consequences. If a high-powered lawyer who makes $1,000 an hour chooses to take an hour off to help clean up litter on the beach, he's wasted the opportunity to work overtime that day, make$1,000, donate to a charity that will hire a hundred poor people for $10/hour to clean up litter, and end up with a hundred times more litter removed. If he went to the beach because he wanted the sunlight and the fresh air and the warm feeling of personally contributing to something, that's fine. If he actually wanted to help people by beautifying the beach, he's chosen an objectively wrong way to go about it. And if he wanted to help people, period, he's chosen a very wrong way to go about it, since that$1,000 could save two people from malaria. Unless the litter he removed is really worth more than two people's lives to him, he's erring even according to his own value system.

...and the same is true if his philanthropy leads him to work full-time at a nonprofit instead of going to law school to become a lawyer who makes $1,000 / hour in the first place. Unless it's one HELL of a nonprofit. The Roman historian Sallust said of Cato "He preferred to be good, rather than to seem so". The lawyer who quits a high-powered law firm to work at a nonprofit organization certainly seems like a good person. But if we define "good" as helping people, then the lawyer who stays at his law firm but donates the profit to charity is taking Cato's path of maximizing how much good he does, rather than how good he looks. And this dichotomy between being and seeming good applies not only to looking good to others, but to ourselves. When we donate to charity, one incentive is the warm glow of a job well done. A lawyer who spends his day picking up litter will feel a sense of personal connection to his sacrifice and relive the memory of how nice he is every time he and his friends return to that beach. A lawyer who works overtime and donates the money online to starving orphans in Romania may never get that same warm glow. But concern with a warm glow is, at root, concern about seeming good rather than being good - albeit seeming good to yourself rather than to others. There's nothing wrong with donating to charity as a form of entertainment if it's what you want - giving money to the Art Fund may well be a quicker way to give yourself a warm feeling than seeing a romantic comedy at the cinema - but charity given by people who genuinely want to be good and not just to feel that way requires more forethought. It is important to be rational about charity for the same reason it is important to be rational about Arctic exploration: it requires the same awareness of opportunity costs and the same hard-headed commitment to investigating efficient use of resources, and it may well be a matter of life and death. Consider going to www.GiveWell.org and making use of the excellent resources on effective charity they have available. ## Comments (318) Sort By: New Comment author: 28 March 2014 02:55:16PM * 0 points [-] The Pollination Project is run by a guy who gives$1,000 a day, to a different recipient every day. Rational justifications for this approach include minimizing the model risk - i.e., perhaps the model you used to decide which single charitable cause is the best is wrong. Also, small donations seem likely to produce a high velocity of the money donated.

Comment author: 13 April 2013 01:56:13PM 1 point [-]

With respect to the lawyer example, I understand that the lawyer can maximize the good he does by remaining a lawyer instead of working for a non-profit. But if all the most talented/productive people (and thus those with the highest potential salaries in the private sector) took private sector jobs, then only the least talented/productive people would be available to start and run the non-profits. Given that we can expect this low talent pool to make many mistakes, a lot of the high talent pool's donations will be squandered and wasted. So having all the $1,000 lawyers, doctors, CEO etc... stay in the private sector may not maximize the total good achieved. In my view we need some of the most talented/productive to run the non-profits. Yes they will make less than they will in their private sector occupation and therefore will not be able to personally donate as much. But they will make the overall charity system more efficient. As for the self-interest piece of this puzzle the talented non-profiteers would need to have a strong preference for charity so the gains in utility from their occupation offset the decrease in purchasing power from the lower salary. Comment author: 03 January 2013 10:28:26AM 1 point [-] For the "lawyer work for another hour and donate the money vs. volunteer", it also what matters what the side effects of his labor are, right? If the lawyer can make$1000 an hour, but only in ways that actually harm society (working on frivolous lawsuits against hospitals, for example), then working for another hour and donating the money isn't necessarily the best thing he could be doing. Now, on the other hand, if his work also genuinely helps society and creates more wealth for people, then it's even better then the null case.

Comment author: 03 January 2013 11:09:26AM *  1 point [-]

For the "lawyer work for another hour and donate the money vs. volunteer", it also what matters what the side effects of his labor are, right? If the lawyer can make $1000 an hour, but only in ways that actually harm society (working on frivolous lawsuits against hospitals, for example), then working for another hour and donating the money isn't necessarily the best thing he could be doing. Then the equation becomes ($1,000 - damage-per-hour + damgage-per-hour-if-the-next-lawyer-available-did-it > next-best-value-opportunity). It is highly unlikely that the lawyer choosing to not involve himself in such lawsuits will make much difference at all, at the margin. Lawyer availability isn't a particularly limiting factor.

Participating in the society-destructing behavior, taking huge amounts of money for doing so (and using it well) while still voting for laws that prohibit or limit such behavior in general is probably the correct thing to do.

Comment author: 03 January 2013 10:31:06PM *  0 points [-]

It's possible that that might be true, in theory, but considering that we are running on corrupted hardware, I would be very suspicious of actually trying to put any plan into effect that sounded like an excuse for "I'm going to do something unethical to make myself really rich, but I'll make sure I use the money for good, and if I don't do it someone else will anyway." Even if that is actually your plan, in reality you will probably end up doing more harm then good.

Comment author: 04 January 2013 12:38:33AM 0 points [-]

I would be very suspicious of actually trying to put any plan into effect that sounded like an excuse for "I'm going to do something unethical to make myself really rich, but I'll make sure I use the money for good, and if I don't do it someone else will anyway." Even if that is actually your plan, in reality you will probably end up doing more harm then good.

I implement ethical inhibitions too. The difference is in a different understanding of the economic implications of the behavior. Putting "be a lawyer who is willing to work on 'frivolous' lawsuits" in the class of things that must be inhibited for ethical reasons is a mistake.

Comment author: 14 December 2012 10:23:01PM *  0 points [-]

Interesting article.

But if you really really want to do more good, you also have to change the way you see people in need. This might involve buying a ticket to Sudan and seeing children face to face while they are starving to death.

So in the long run, your $5k trip to Sudan might do more good than giving a one time$5k donation to an organization, because by changing the way you think about starving people, you will have the urgency of actually changing your priorities. So you will literally work for those who die of starvation in other countries, and deprive yourself from buying useless stuff or entertainment in order to feed more children in Sudan.

... unless you're psychopath, of course. ;-)

Comment author: 01 December 2012 12:42:58AM 0 points [-]

It is important to be rational about charity for the same reason it is important to be rational about Arctic exploration: it requires the same awareness of opportunity costs and the same hard-headed commitment to investigating efficient use of resources

In his Mars Direct talks, Robert Zubrin cited the shoestring budget Amundsen expedition through the Northwest Passage in comparison to around 30 contemporary government funded expeditions with state of the art steam frigates and huge logistics trains. The Amundsen expedition traveled in a cheap little sealing boat and fed themselves largely through rifles and ammunition they brought with them.

Comment author: 30 November 2012 04:46:31AM *  1 point [-]

There's one flaw in the argument about Buy a Brushstroke vs African sanitation systems, which is the assumption/implication that if they hadn't given that money to Buy a Brushstroke they would have given it to African sanitation systems instead. It's a false dichotomy. Sure, the money would have been better spent on African sanitation systems, but you can say that about anything. The money they spent on their cars, the money I just spent on my lunch, in fact somewhere probably over 99.9% of all non-African-sanitation-system-purchases made in the first-world would be better to have been made on African sanitation systems. It makes the Buy a Brushstroke campaign look actively malicious, despite the fact that all it reall did was redirect money from personal junk luxury items to, well, another more public junk luxury item. Neutral at worst.

To me, it's silly to only apply the sanitation sytems comparison to people's charitable donations. They're a softer target, because it's obvious that people could have spared that money, but the end result is people who've given nothing to anyone sitting there thinking "Well at least I'm not that stupid to have made such suboptimal donations", and feeling superior about themselves compared to those who are at least giving something to a cause that's not themselves. Not to mention people feeling actively guilty about raising money for a good local cause just because every donation they gather is money those people could have given to a better cause.

I agree with your point on the whole I just think these side-effects of that comparison are worth raising.

Comment author: 12 June 2012 02:02:06AM 16 points [-]

I can't see any flaws in the argument, but the conclusion is far more radical than most of us would be willing to admit.

Am I the sort of person who would value my computer over another human being's life? I hope not, that makes me sound like the most horrible sort of psychopath---it is basically the morality of Stalin. But at the same time, did I sell my computer to feed kids in Africa? I did not. Nor did any of you, unless you are reading this at a library computer (in which case I'm sure I can find something you could have given up that would have allowed you to give just a little bit more to some worthy charitable cause.)

It gets worse: Is my college education worth the lives of fifty starving children? Because I surely paid more than that. Is this house I'm living in worth eight hundred life-saving mosquito nets? Because that's how much it cost.

Our entire economic system is based on purchases that would be "unjustified"---even immoral---on the view that every single purchase must be made on this kind of metric. And so if we all stopped doing that, our economy would collapse and we would be starving instead.

I think it comes down to this: Consequentialism is a lot harder than it looks. It's not enough to use the simple heuristic, "Is this purchase worth a child's life?"; no, you've got to carry out the full system of consequences---in principle, propagated to our whole future light cone. (In fact, there's a very good reason not to ask that question: Because of our socialization, we have a taboo in our brains about never saying that something is worth more than a child---even when it obviously is.) You've got to note that once the kid survives malaria, he'll probably die of something else, like malnutrition, or HIV, or a parasite infection. You've got to note that if people didn't go to college and become scientific researchers, we wouldn't even know about HIV or malaria or anything else. You've got to keep in mind the whole system of modified capitalism and the social democratic welfare state that makes your massive wealth possible---and really, I think you should be trying to figure out how to export it to places that don't have it, not skimming off the income that drives it to save one child's life at a time.

And if you think, "Ah ha! We'll just work for the Singularity then!" well, that's a start---and you should, in fact, devote some of your time, energy, and money to the Singularity---but it's not a solution by itself. How much time should you spend trying to make yourself happy? How much effort should you devote to your family, your friends? How important is love compared to what you might be doing---and how much will your effectiveness depend on you being loved? We might even ask: Would we even want to make a Singularity if it meant that no one ever fell in love?

This is why I'm not quite a gung-ho consequentialist. Ultimately consequentialism is right, there can be no doubt about that; but in practical terms, I don't think most people are smart enough for it. (I'm not sure I'm smart enough for it.) It might be better, actually, to make people follow simple rules like "Don't cheat, don't lie, don't kill, don't steal"; if everyone followed those rules, we'd be doing all right. (Most of the really horrible things in this world are deontic violations, like tyranny and genocide.) At the very least, the standard deontic rules are better heuristics than asking, "Is it worth the life of a child?"

Comment author: 11 August 2013 10:18:24AM 0 points [-]

I have yet to familiarize myself more with effective altruism to know the details of their metrics, but it seems like the reliance on 'number of lives saved per unit money' doesn't necessarily align with the goal of helping people, which i think this post demonstrates well. And then there's the arguably relevant issue of over-population. If everyone contributed some of their education funding on saving lives, wouldn't the Earth get over-populated before sufficient technological progress was made to e.g inhabit another planet?

Comment author: 04 July 2012 04:07:58AM *  4 points [-]

This is a super-duper nice comment.

Most of the really horrible things in this world are deontic violations, like tyranny and genocide.

Disagree. Most of the really horrible things in this world are just accidents that not enough people are paying attention to. If animals can suffer then millions of Holocausts are happening every day. If insects can suffer then tens of billions are. In any case humans can certainly suffer, and they're doing plenty of that from pure accident. Probably less than a twentieth of human suffering is intentionally caused by other humans. (Though I will say that the absolute magnitude of human-intent-caused human suffering is unbelievably huge.)

Comment author: 02 July 2012 07:07:35AM 2 points [-]

Upvoted. I really like this comment because it shows some of my own concerns about consequentialism. For example I have decided that for most cases the deontic answers fit the consequentialist ones so well that we should start out following them and only if they appear to be nonsatisfactory we should dive into consequentialist reasoning. This quite leads to some peace of mind, but it obviously is the easy answer, not the correct one... Is there a post on lesswrong for deontology as a subset of consequentialism? (According to wikipedia there seem to be some scientists that state a similar opinion.)

Comment author: 04 July 2012 03:33:46AM 4 points [-]

The utilitarian philosopher RM Hare has proposed a solution along the lines you suggest, it's called two-level utilitarianism. From Wikipedia:

As a descriptive model of the two levels, Hare posited two extreme cases of people, one of whom would only use critical moral thinking and the other of whom would only use intuitive moral thinking. The former he called the 'archangel' and the latter the 'prole'.

I think the concept has merit, but if you're smart and willing enough to do it, you'd have to act according to the "critical level" (conventional consequentialism) anyway.

Comment author: 02 July 2012 09:27:57AM 0 points [-]

we should start out following them and only if they appear to be nonsatisfactory we should dive into consequentialist reasoning.

Your actual values are the ones that determine "what appears satisfactory".

Comment author: 03 July 2012 10:05:39AM 2 points [-]

Of course, that's why I would call myself a consequentialist even though I mainly/very often argue by using deontic principles. I wasn't talking about theory (or foundation), but about the practicality/practical use of deontic reasoning versus consequentialism.

Comment author: 18 April 2012 04:46:20AM -2 points [-]

A good article, if your goal is to save as many lives as possible from perishing. But I'm going to say, for most people, this is not their goal. Yes, if you ask someone directly "would you save a painting, or save 1000 lives", they would almost all say "lives of course". But in reality, people don't have an emotional attachment to 1000 people they have no idea about.

In my case, I really don't care if 1000 lives are lost if I don't do something. I know that makes me sound like a bad person. But what are people really? We're a self-replicating gene machines. There's 6 billion of us in the world. There is inherently very little value in saving 1000 lives out of 6 billion. It's like saying "if you give us money we can prevent a loon from destroying 1000 iPads just because he feels like it". Now, if in this world there were only 5000 iPads left, then I might consider preserving those doomed 1000 iPads.

I think you should apply this argument towards something else, and it really needs it: animal conservation efforts. The amount of disproportionate money and focus spent on certain animals over others is highly unfair. It happens because people give money according to their emotional attachment. Hence, whales over basking sharks, or seal pups over frogs, for example. Biodiversity is an asset with unlimited potential, but before we can gene sequence it all, we're losing this diversity in front of our lives. It's like, nature has served to us on a plate amazing designs patterns and strategies, but we don't care.

Comment author: [deleted] 18 April 2012 08:33:30PM 0 points [-]

So, clearly, the best way to optimize your utility function is to start a gene bank for freezing tissue samples from every species. You can clone them back if they turn out to be useful. It's a lot cheaper than conservationism, I assure you.

Comment author: 27 March 2012 10:56:23AM *  0 points [-]

Congratulations! I Liked the article very much.

I just have some doubts about two specific points:

In the part that there's the text:

"And when your life is on the line, things like impressing your friends and buying organic pale in comparison."

I got the impression that it's missing the end of the sentence. As my english is not good, maybe it's my fault. Sorry if that is the case.

The other thing is that I found a little problematic the math comparing U$10.000 spent on a U$ 500 charity with overhead of 50% and the one spent on a U$10.000 charity with 0% overhead. It's said that in the first case we could save 10 people and in the second just 2. Isn't that 20 people in the first case? Comment author: 27 March 2012 11:47:55AM * 1 point [-] "And when your life is on the line, things like impressing your friends and buying organic pale in comparison" I got the impression that it's missing the end of the sentence. As my english is not good, maybe it's my fault. Sorry if that is the case. Parse it as follows: And when your life is on the line, certain other things (like "impressing your friends" and "buying organic foods") pale in comparison. Comment author: 04 February 2012 02:55:13PM * -2 points [-] http://jackt123.blogspot.com/2012/02/efficient-charity-or-is-that-oxymoron.html The essence of this argument is that charities which save human lives are more valuable than charities which don't. Furthermore, it assumes that charities which save the most lives per dollar donated are the most worthy charities and the most deserving of our contributions. How valid is this philosophy? Is saving human lives really the most crucial goal towards which we all should advance? If we explore the author's contention that the frivolous waste of money on a painting would have been better spent in the saving of one-thousand lives in Africa, then we must also explore the results of this binary decision made by the contribution giver. The thousand saved Africans would almost certainly agree that they are the most deserving of the charitable contribution. This however ignores an unfortunate fact. The amount of life-sustaining resources in Africa―food, medicine, shelter, clean water―are sadly insufficient to sustain the lives of the Africans already living on this desperately poor continent. By funding a non-African outside force to travel thousands of miles carrying the cargo and resources and man-power necessary to save all these thousands of lives makes the donator in large part responsible for putting further strain on an already unsustainable economy. The idea that these thousand "saved" Africans will now live happily-ever-after in peace and harmony along with the other six-hundred million starving Africans is so absurd that it literally boggles the mind. That money spent on sanitation and sewage treatment could have purchased perhaps one-million condoms, which would have decreased the birth-rate and allowed those hundreds of millions of Africans to endure for perhaps another generation. But here again the logic trips us up. For perhaps in those one-million babies never born, was the African leader who would have led the African people out of darkness and savagery into a better more compassionate future. And who's to say to what use those condoms would have gone? Perhaps all the wise Africans would have used the condoms while all the foolish Africans would have continued making babies. Your big-hearted and thoughtful gift could wind up turning a hellish brutal land into something so much worse that there's no way it could even be imagined. Indeed even among the original thousand saved lives might be a great one with destiny riding his shoulders. So perhaps saving the most lives possible is the best answer. Unless... what if among those thousand saved lives is another Hitler or Stalin or Pol Pot! No, the only thing I'm certain of is that trying to predict what the future holds based on a spur of the moment impulsive charitable gift is enough to drive a person to drink... Comment author: 04 February 2012 03:27:10PM 1 point [-] Do you have a point, or are you just throwing up a smokescreen? Africa has problems, sure, but not dying of malaria is still a good thing (in expectation.) Malthus has not been proven right yet, and indeed Africa does usually have enough food (famines are rare, and usually the result of a completely fscked up government. Efficient aid does consider the government.) Comment author: 05 December 2011 10:52:04PM 0 points [-] I agree with the idea that efficiency should be taken into account when considering charitable actions, but I do not know if I agree with your conclusion of what is most efficient. Alleviating a problem does not cure it. While paying for malaria nets, cleaning up the beach, donating to charities alleviates real social issues, it does not address the issue of their causation. In my opinion, what is most efficient is not concentrating on recuperation, but attacking the sickness. Without changing the causal conditions the disease will continue to grow endlessly no matter how much you suppress it. This is why even after going through successful rehab, addicts will experience relapse if reintroduced into their original environments because nothing has changed to prevent the same symptoms from arising again. What then is the cause of social travesties? I would argue a lack of high-level empathy. In my opinion the question then becomes does financial donation increase a person's empathetic capacity? I do not think it does. It definitely increase the amount of pure capital being pushed at a problem, but i do not think that necessarily cures the problem. I know that some of the poorest schools in America have recently gotten state of the art equipment, smart rooms, i-pads, new schools, but their test scores are not changing. That is because the problem is the values being pushed into the kids not the amount of money. What does promote empathy? Pierre Bourdieu is a prominent sociologist who is best known for the idea of habitus. The general idea of habitus is that cognitive and emotional patterns are shaped by human physicality. Aristole's virtue ethics represent the idea that morality is developed through habitus. Mencius, the second most famous confucian moralist, also had notions of empathy being like a muscle that must be strengthened within people. From this theoretical framework the type of charity proposed in the essay above would be inefficient. While I cannot for certain say what action/ environments cultivate empathy/morality; I think it is a safe bet to say that working to make more money and spending money does not. if that was the case, then the most successful business men and women would also be the most empathetic people. No, it seems more likely that empathy would be developed through committing time to people and places that are not readily identified with the actor's self. Meaning that the lawyer taking an hour each day to work on the beach would increase his virtue/empathetic capacity, making that working more valuable than the thousands of dollars that he could have earned in that time seeing as there is no way to buy morals. I am not sure if my idea is correct. If the author of this essay writes from a fundamentally economic frame, I write from a fundamentally sociological/anthropological/confucian one. The correct answer is probably a mediation of the two depending on type of charity and circumstance. Thanks for your thoughtful writing. Comment author: 05 December 2011 11:35:25PM 0 points [-] Your comment tries to answer the question, "How can I make myself more charitable?" rather than the question, "Now that I'm very charitable, how can I maximize my impact?" If someone is not a very charitable person, yes some learned empathy might fix that, and hands-on experience might be the best way to do that. But such a person would not be asking the first question above. If someone is already a very charitable person, then they should be concerned with how much of an impact their actions are actually having - then, the work on the beach is inefficient as compared to the thousands of dollars. Comment author: 06 December 2011 02:43:32AM 0 points [-] Well said, but I would tweak your wording of my question to "now that I am a good person, how can maximize my impact?" What is the estimate of a good person? I would argue that a good person is one who produces meaningful relationships in the world. The model of efficiency above touches only on how to most impact the person-captial relationship, i.e what to do with the material and labor resources I have accumulated to most positively impact humanity. I agree that this is important, but add that the "good person" is defined by multiple relationships, not just of the one they have to capital. For example, I would argue a truly good person would be a good child, good parent, good friend, good older/younger (depending on the age of the opposing actor), good stranger, good citizen, good character, and potentially much more. To maximize the meaning and positivity of all critical relationships is not done through economic efficiency. And while I cannot make any absolute claims that the social impact a person makes is more beneficial than the way they use their capital, personally I believe it to be so. Now if your original statement about already being charitable was meant to mean that you are already a very humane person (meaning your relational impact in your community is maximized) , then sure, I think maximizing charitable action is great. But I think to maximize your role within a social network is really hard, if not impossible to some extent. I also think that most people are not as empathetically developed as they would like to think. I would go as far to as to say that a perfect empathetic awareness is as unreachable as Truth with a capital T. I apologize if I sound argumentative, I just was not sure if my question was already dealt with in your minds/blogs and this is a further point. Comment author: 06 December 2011 01:08:11PM 0 points [-] That story sounds suspiciously nice. Given the choice between being a 'good person' and fostering local relationships of various fuzzy impacts, or saving the lives of ten thousand people, would you really choose the former over the latter? Do you think that actually makes you a good person? Note that this is not merely a hypothetical; that is effectively the choice the lawyer is making when he works in soup kitchen instead of donating money. Comment author: 06 December 2011 08:49:08PM 0 points [-] Well given the way you word it, yes, it does seem suspicious. There are several things I would change about your retelling of my position. 1.) I advocate for proper and efficient relationships. This idea is local if you mean thinking of mechanical solidarity before organic solidarity, but in this day in age with telecommunication and a globally mobile workforce I would not call relationship cultivation "local" in the traditional sense. For example, my self-network spans multiple continents. The potential for impact is huge. 2.) Proper relationships are by no means "fuzzy," I would say that the fact that you would describe relationship cultivation as fuzzy shows a serious lack of mental effort. Since it is something I think about a lot, I will give you an example. First let me say I am currently trying to define all core relationships of the social self. The social self is the idea that human identity, motivation, action, cognition, do not arise from autonomous agents, but from, a network of human, non-human, and cultural relationships. One such relationship is the relationship between child and parent/ child and guardian. It is possible to not have parents, or to not have a guardian, but it is not possible to avoid the consequences of this fact. The dynamics of the child to parent/ guardian relationship is fundamental to a person's actions, thoughts, and feelings. If my mom or dad were to die, no matter how happy, satisfied, complete I felt immediately prior to this, it would completely rearrange my feelings and thoughts. I would eventually recover, but I would be a different person, one who had to figure out how to be happy, satisfied and complete knowing my mother was not alive. So far I have been trying to show the impact of a core relationship. The point I originally wanted to make was that cultivating relationships is not "fuzzy." Frankly speaking it is hard being a good son. If your parents are racist, religious zealots, unhealthy, insecure, it is not your job to fix that. You think it is your job, because your parents raised you, fixed you in a sense, and at some point to validate your own maturity you want to do the same. And honestly in a perfect world you should be able to. I have far more education than my parents about health, psychologically, and sociality. I am positive that if I know what my parents are doing wrong in certain aspects of their life, and that I could do better. There is nothing wrong with telling your parents you think they should change in some way; the problem arises when they do not want to. You cannot force your parents to change. You can cut them out of your life, but that is destroying a relationship not cultivating it. Now I am not talking about extremes here. There might be some cases where they choice comes between those two options, but the majority of the time it is not. The majority of the time, the choice is to either accept your parents for their imperfection, ignore it, or abandon them. The proper choice being the former. It is a hard thing to do. Proper relationships are not fuzzy. If a relationship is fuzzy all the time, generally you are not maintaining it well. 3.) I see cultivating good people as making transformation change. Meaning that it is a transforming change that does not just stop at initial impact. It is perpetual. If you model proper relations in your social network, then the networks connected peripherally will be impacted. In the short run pouring money on the problem might help, but I do not see this as a solution. A perfect example of this is Aristotle's appeal for the need of practical wisdom to complement laws. You can make laws to regulate, but if people do not have an internal commitment to the spirit behind the laws then the laws will become perpetually less effective. How many thousands of pages of new laws does the United States produce each year? The byproduct of which is that normal people can no longer understand the law because it has become so complex. If normal people cannot understand it the result is two-fold. The masses do not internalize it, and the elite figure out how to take advantage of it. I would argue this problem of deficient practical wisdom is directly related to a lack of proper relationships and knowledge of how to cultivate them. 4.) I do not think you can save 10,000 people with any one action. Nor do I think just because your intention is to save people that is what you actually do. If you get 10,000 people malaria nets that does not save them from a. being able to get malaria, b.) living in an environment where malaria is prevalent, c.) the poor condition of their lives, d.) being able to sustain their lineage for multiple generations. Dambisa Moyo has a book called "Dead Aid" the argument is that the millions of dollars in aid sent to africa is actually doing more damage than good. There are several reasons for this, if you are interested in hearing them I would be happy to share. Comment author: 06 December 2011 09:06:01PM * 0 points [-] You are equivocating on the word fuzzy. There's a contrast between doing something because it feels good and doing something because it actually helps others. Contrast serving food at a soup kitchen on Thanksgiving, which makes one feel good vs. serving food on some random day in June, which is probably more helpful to the soup kitchen. The first act provides "fuzzy." The second provides more social utility. None of this asserts that maintaining relationships is not valuable or real. The argument is that transformational relationships have less payout per effort than other social improvement acts (like donating lots of money). And one point of anti-Aid groups is that international donors are so consumed with "trendy" types of aid that they crowd out both African self-improvement and foreign aid that might help. For more on Dead Aid in particular, you might find this developmental economist's take interesting. Comment author: 06 December 2011 09:23:33PM 0 points [-] " The argument is that transformational relationships have less payout per effort than other social improvement acts (like donating lots of money)." I realize this is the argument, it is what I am disagreeing with. Comment author: 14 November 2011 06:02:01PM 0 points [-] I apologize if I am rehashing somebody else's post; I find that skimming the comments and then putting my own .02 in is a more valuable use of my time than thoroughly reading the comments (and thus allocating less time to an English paper I have coming up) and trying to sound like I'd exhaustively researched the topic (which would take way too much time). The payoff in terms of lives saved per work unit expended (either directly through volunteering or indirectly via donating money) varies from person to person. Even among those who consider themselves rationalists, there may be variations in which charity is most "efficient". For example, if one is incapable of becoming a high-powered lawyer for some reason, one may well have a different payoff matrix in terms of "fuzzies" and ways to go about donating. In addition, a high-powered lawyer who quits his$1000-per-hour job to work at a nonprofit may inspire others to donate to said nonprofit, which might increase the amount of lives saved. Personally, I am not concerned with world-optimization; in my opinion, perfection is unattainable in any discipline (Godel undecidablilty generalized) and, as such, we should be concerned with improvement; any improvement over the baseline is "good" and should be accepted. My goal is not to leave the world as close to perfection as I can; my goal is to maximize my happiness. As such, I donate to charities that align with my beliefs and volunteer at places I enjoy volunteering at. This may not be strictly rational, but a strict rationalist is much like a working communistic government: only attainable in fiction. I apologize if I have offended anyone; I am relatively new to LW and have much to learn about the community and rationality.

Comment author: 24 July 2011 07:25:21PM 8 points [-]

I have a question. This article suggests that for a given utility function there is one single charity that is best and that's the one one should give money to. That looks a bit problematic to me - for example, if everyone invests in malaria nets because that's the single one that saves most lives, then nobody is investing in any other kind of charity, but shouldn't those things get done too ?

We can get around this by considering that the efficiency function varies with time - for example, once everybody gives their money to buy nets the marginal cost of each saved life increases, until some other charity becomes best and all charitable giving switches to that one.

But we don't have a complete and up-to-the-second knowledge of how many lives each marginal dollar will save in every charity, all we have to work with is approximations. In that situation, wouldn't it be best to have a basket of charities one gives to, with more money going to those that save the most lives but not putting all the money on a single charity ?

Or is this consideration completely and utterly pointless in a world where most people do NOT act like this, and most people don't give enough money to change the game, so rational actors who don't have millions of dollars to give to charity should always give to the one that saves the most lives per dollar anyway ?

Comment author: 30 October 2011 03:52:37PM 11 points [-]

What happens in that situation is that people continue to invest in malaria nets, so much that the marginal cost of saving another life goes from say, $500 to$700, and for $600 dollars you can dig a well, saving another persons life. In essence, you donate to the most efficient charity until that money has caused the charity to have to pay more to save lives, and therefore stops being the most efficient charity. Comment author: 17 January 2012 04:18:29PM 3 points [-] I've thought about this problem before, but in the context of peer peer-to-peer file sharing. The problem is that everyone is acting independent and with limited knowledge. It's hard to know what other people are choosing. There may also be long delays between you and others paying and the cost changing. Say that the optimal outcome is that out of$1000M, $200M is spent on insect nets and$800M on wells, and that you can only donate to one charity (too bothersome or high transaction costs or something). Now, if everyone is rational they are going to donate to the wells, and no one to nets. This is a suboptimal outcome. It'd also be difficult to coordinate the millions of people donating, so that just the right amount choose nets instead of wells. A solution to such coordination is to roll a dice. If everyone makes a random selection and lets the probability of choosing nets be 2/10ths then the expected outcome is just what we want.

Now, you can adjust this to how many (you think) are playing like yourselves. E.g. if you know most people are going to give to wells, perhaps it'd be better if you put higher probability on nets (perhaps 100%).

Comment author: 14 February 2012 09:52:38PM 2 points [-]

The thing about that is, is that not everyone is donating at the same time, so that they can see the expected value change.

Comment author: 15 February 2012 11:05:17AM 2 points [-]

Yes, but there can be long delays between a donation happening and updates. Coordinating donations can be non-trivial, especially when flash crowds appear (e.g. sob story on reddit).

Also, such a randomized approach is not necessary if one can just donate small amounts to multiple projects instead (i.e. if transaction fees are not a problem).

Comment author: [deleted] 15 February 2012 03:58:06PM 12 points [-]

I once donated some money to VillageReach a few minutes before getting the GiveWell newsletter issue announcing that VillageReach wasn't going to be among the top charities in the next update because their founding gap had mostly closed and encouraging people to wait for the next update before deciding whom to donate money to. True story!

Comment author: 09 June 2011 07:27:24AM 30 points [-]

This week on Facebook, Derek Sivers (founder of CD Baby) wrote that this article had more impact on him than anything else he read all year. He said: "Of all the articles I've read in the past 6 months, this one had the biggest impact on me."

Comment author: 05 July 2011 09:13:20PM 6 points [-]

I hadn't seen that! Thanks for bringing it up.

Comment author: 07 June 2011 08:06:19AM 0 points [-]

Nice post. You could write a similar one on helping the environment. How often do you hear people say, about helping the environment, that "every little bit helps"?

Comment author: 07 January 2011 05:02:35AM 12 points [-]

Although I definitely agree with the thrust of the article, I don't feel that lives-saved is necessarily a very good metric of utility. A child in the Third World might be saved from malaria, but grow up nutrient deficient leading to reduced mental capacity, work on a subsistence farm, contract HIV, and die after having three kids, who subsequently starve. A charity that prevented fewer deaths in a predictable causal sequence might still be a better utility maximizer if it had a greater positive effect on people's quality of life.

Of course, a lot of us already agree on the best available utility maximizing charity, but even among the more "mundane" options I think that causes such as promoting education in the third world may beat out direct life-saving maximizers.

Comment author: 17 January 2012 05:21:39PM 2 points [-]

Perhaps a better idea would be to spend money on education of women in poor areas, something that is known to reduce the fertility rate.<citation needed> By reducing the fertility rate we also reduce the number of poor, starving, dying in HIV etc children born into this world.

I think that simply measuring the number of dead children may be useful as a simplification, but it's too simplistic. Really, to me it seems like it's just something that people believing in axiomatic morals are having problems dealing with. "But, think of the children!"

If the answer to "is it better to spend this money on saving a kids life?" is always yes, I'd say you have a problem with your value system.

Comment author: 16 November 2011 03:26:14PM 6 points [-]

I agree with Desrtopa in that "I don't feel that lives-saved is necessarily a very good metric of utility." Death is binary (dead / not dead), but human pain and suffering is not. This should impact the analysis. Assuming the same cost to save the life, if forced to decide between saving someone from a fatal gunshot wound (perhaps in a war or encampment somewhere) versus saving someone from pancreatic cancer (according to Livestrong, one of the most painful terminal diseases), the outcome (life-saving) may be the same in either case, but there is more utility in saving the latter because overall pain would be reduced.

Comment author: 30 December 2010 10:01:33PM 0 points [-]

Good guide, indeed having more money to spend through whatever career may allow for being more useful for charity.

The expedition analogy is good. I'll get into discussing the specific goal or utility function. What is the goal we're heading to?

I'd say the goal as I see it is to increase the intelligence (or cure the lack of it) to make the agents of this world able to willingly solve their problems, and thereby reach a state of technological advancement that allows them to get rid of all problems for good, and start doing better things such as spending time in paradise and exploring the universe.

We shouldn't medicate our problems in the short-term, we should think in the long-term in curing them for good. How to do that? Scientific research into intelligence, artificial intelligence and human intelligence augmentation.

How does "saving" (should I say, prolonging?) African lives help with that? Not at all, in my view. Africa receives many billions of dollars in donations, there's clearly something wrong with the way it works, and you're not going to fix it by adding a million dollars to that sea of resources that doesn't end up changing anything in the long-term. It's like a car that leaks fuel, you can keep adding more and more fuel, or you should try and fix it, and that is what I suggest. You should rather spend a million dollars in a vital area that is badly lacking funding, such as intelligence augmentation and artificial intelligence.

I don't think that we want to "save lives". Save suffering instead. If you prolong an African life you're probably prolonging suffering, which is a waste. A life of suffering and misery is not worth saving. People have no souls. This is a physical world, if you lose consciousness somewhere you still got plenty of it all around.

Comment author: 04 July 2011 02:01:29PM 1 point [-]

I think you're falsely assuming that "Africa" is a single monolithic recipient for that "sea of resources" - that ignores both the spectacular variation between and within African nations, and the difference between resources given to a corrupt government aand resources applied by non-government organisations for the benefit of people there.

I think it is fair to say that the staggering sums of money given by Western nations to African governments has been at best a complete waste of money - in fact I consider that money to have caused significant net harm. It props up corrupt regimes, increases and strengthens class differences, and generally results in increased oppression and widespread misery of various kinds. Your argument applies very well to this - "Africa" does indeed receive billions of dollars, and there is indeed something broken (most of the governments receiving the money).

This argument does not apply to the international NGO's working in Africa. Some of those organisations are short-term oriented and thus arguably pointless in the long term, but some are not. A classic example would be Kiva, which offers micro-loans for people to start small businesses to support themselves and family (incidentally not just in Africa) - there are a fair few organisations doing things like this, and it is "teach a man to fish" rather than "give a man fish". These initiatives, when they work right (which they often do) help lift Africans out of poverty and put them in a position to do something about their own future (and Africa's future). A lot of worthwhile initiatives centre around education, for instance, for fairly obvious reasons.

I think you're conflating "intelligence" with other concepts such as education and good judgement (which are what's actually needed here). Rephrased like that, it becomes obvious that a much more practical action is to fund and organise education of African people - give them the means with which to figure out the solutions to their own problems, but now rather than post-Singularity. Add direct financial support (eg. by Kiva or Grameen etc) in order that these now-educated people have the means to implement their ideas, and we have tomorrow's solution today. This is currently happening, but all we tend to know about Africa's current situation is an assortment of dramatic bad news merged together into a highly misleading narrative. To give you some idea of how significantly our perceptions differ from reality on this matter, here's a TED talk from from the incomparable statistician Hans Rosling 4.5 years ago: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RUwS1uAdUcI - feel free to poke around for more recent presentations and data, of course, but even this old one is an eye-opener.

I'm not saying that investment in education and entrepreneurship in Africa is necessarily the most effective use of resources from a strictly utilitarian standpoint - what I am saying is that you have not presented a strong case for African investment not being a worthwhile use of resources. Personally I regard your argument largely as an excuse to not feel guilty about distant suffering, but that is just an unsupported opinion.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 11:49:03PM *  0 points [-]

I finally remembered to post this here

Good timing, though: now this is fresh in our minds during the challenge.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 08:28:39PM *  2 points [-]

And likewise, there is only one best charity: the one that helps the most people the greatest amount per dollar.

I disagree. Giving money to charity is not different from spending money on a latte at Starbucks. I spend money according to my values. And I still buy lattes. I am not Zachary Baumkletterer. Even Jesus said, "The poor you will have with you always", to justify spending an INCREDIBLE amount of money (enough to buy ten people's entire lives, in an era with no inflation, making it comparable to ten million US dollars today) on pouring perfume once on Jesus' feet. The guy was tired and depressed and about to be crucified and wanted his damn perfume, like I want my damn latte.

Similarly, people who gave money to keep a painting in a museum, might also spend considerably more money to buy paintings to hang in their houses, than it would take to save a life in another country. These people value art, and they value benefitting others. Draw a 2D plot, and label the axes "selfish ... unselfish" and "spiritual ... physical" ("spiritual" standing for art and other "impractical" values). One person might

• buy a painting to hang in their bedroom (spiritual, selfish)
• buy a painting to hang in their guest room (spiritual, sorta selfish)
• spend to preserve a painting in a museum (spiritual, unselfish)
• buy fuzzy slippers (physical, selfish)
• spend money for vaccines in Africa (physical, unselfish)

And each of those things could have similar utility for them.

I don't think this is irrational. Irrational is spending any money at all on "charity" instead of spending it according to your utility function.

This post contains the hidden presupposition that charity, using a collective utility function, is more moral than self-oriented actions; and therefore, following our utility functions is immoral. This is an assertion about morality and rationality that has huge implications! It is resonant with a very common meme that says that "moral" behavior is behavior that we don't want to do, because we are fundamentally immoral. I say, instead, that morals are part of our utility function - that we have these things called morals because part of us really wants to be nice to other people. They are just another part of our utility function.

Encouraging unselfish behavior can be done by manipulating peoples' selfish desires to produce "unselfish" behavior (give to charity and get social benefits, or stay out of Hell), as a mechanism to solve PD problems with a given payoff matrix. But it can also be done by treating people in ways that encourage what natural unselfish tendencies they have - solving PD problems by changing people's payoff matrices.

Apply Kant's imperative. This post suggests that we have 2 utility functions, one for everyday life, and another for charity; and that the one for charity is more moral. But if everyone used such a charity utility function for everything they did, it would result in a global race to the bottom as economies imploded after spending all national wealth on ameliorating suffering while undercutting all private motivation. Therefore, it is less moral. It is not only not obviously moral, it is immoral, if that means anything, for a government, or a person, to spend every last dollar on helping the unfortunate before spending any money on education, roads, defense, art, or even entertainment.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 11:17:09AM *  0 points [-]

It is not only not obviously moral, it is immoral, if that means anything, for a government, or a person, to spend every last dollar on helping the unfortunate before spending any money on education, roads, defense, art, or even entertainment.

This seems a false dichotomy; the unfortunate will also be helped by money spent on education, roads and other measures which increase the common good (so long as they do not make the plight of the unfortunate worse).

Whether to spend money on medicine for the sick, education for those who cannot get access to it with their own resources, or art and etertainment by which a culture might examine these problems strikes me as being a bit like medical triage in an emergency room. Perhaps it makes sense to treat personal resource management similarly.

Comment author: 12 June 2012 01:41:52AM -1 points [-]

Well, think of it this way: What would an economy look like, if everyone in it obeyed the maxims of Peter Singer?

It seems to me it would be a complete mess, far worse than what we have today.

Now, if everyone in the world gave just a small amount of their income (5%? 10%?) to a wide variety of charities they care about---e.g. scientific research, medicine, economic development, and yes, arts and culture---we would get all the benefits of our present system and eliminate a lot of the worst flaws. US GDP is $14 trillion. US development aid and private charity are more like$300 billion (about 2% if you're playing at home). Step that up to $600 billion, or$1 trillion, and what we could accomplish!

But I don't think we're going to get there by making people feel guilty about supporting one thing rather than another. Far better, it seems, to get them to just make a habit of writing a check---think of it like another bill to pay---and not worrying so much about whether it is going the best possible place.

Comment author: 12 June 2012 02:37:06AM 3 points [-]

Well, think of it this way: What would an economy look like, if everyone in it obeyed the maxims of Peter Singer?

They would donate up until the point of diminishing marginal returns as determined by experts in the relevant fields and then spend on themselves.

Seems like a pretty good world.

Comment author: [deleted] 12 June 2012 05:35:28PM 1 point [-]

It seems like a world in which most resources are controlled by "experts in relevant fields." When I consider this possible world should I imagine it with the experts we have now, or with more idealized experts?

Comment author: 12 June 2012 05:58:42PM 0 points [-]

How about the existing experts that the existing Singer recommends in his existing books, and not some straw Singer as pnrjulius seems to be thinking of?

Comment author: [deleted] 12 June 2012 08:59:46PM *  1 point [-]

Singer wants us to donate to these organizations. Seemingly, he wants us to donate a lot, but not so much as he personally gives.

I don't know what Straw Singer wants us to do.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 11:18:53AM 0 points [-]

(Sorry for bad html, I'll try to learn to use the interface when I'm next at a real computer.)

Comment author: 28 December 2010 11:40:11AM 2 points [-]

When replying to a comment, click the "help" link to the right of the "cancel" button (it's all the way over in the corner).

Comment author: 28 December 2010 12:02:04PM 0 points [-]

Thanks.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 08:00:31AM *  14 points [-]

To some degree, this article is less about moralizing and more of a "how to" guide. If you want to help people, this is how to do it. If you don't want to help people, and you prefer to have lattes or works of fine art or whatever, then a how-to guide on how to help people isn't relevant to your interests.

To the degree that it is more than that, the article is an attempt to expose certain thought processes into consciousness so that they can be evaluated by conscious systems. People may be donating to these inefficient charities because they feel like it and they don't examine their feelings, even though if they were to consciously think the problem through they would give to more efficient charities. If, after realizing that the choice is between one kid's life or 1/1000 of a painting, someone still prefers the painting, I don't really have anything more I can say - but my guess is that's not a lot of the population.

You made a really good point in your mysticism post on Discussion, about the difference between categorizing things by their causes and categorizing things by their effects. When you talk about spiritual and unselfish choices, you're categorizing things by their causes - a donation to the painting come from the same warm feelings that also produce a donation to vaccines.

Efficient charity is about categorizing things by their effects - it doesn't matter how noble the feelings that produced a certain action, only how much that action did what you wanted it to do. If you want to help people, it's about how many people you helped.

Categorizing things by their causes is an academic activity that can only declare some people to be more "unselfish" than others and accord them bragging rights. In my opinion this doesn't have as much to do with the actual work of saving the world as categorizing things by effects. You say this article claims things about morality, but that's really not its purpose. Its purpose is - if you've seen all sorts of horrible things in the world, and it's reached the point where you're so mad you don't care what can or can't be classified as moral, you just want to fix things as quickly as possible, what do you do then?

I think the idea of something to protect is relevant here.

Comment author: 24 October 2011 01:10:58AM 0 points [-]

What a provoking article - excellent! It's healthy for us to be asking these questions.

But I wonder about the dualistic nature of the questions posed in your 'how to guide'. Sometimes, in fact often, it is not a simple choice between two. Biodiversity, like culture, is much more complex than a graph can depict. The multiple layers move at different rhythms & speed and are instructed by differing motivations such as hormone, instinct, sex, survival, power, empathy (to name only a few).

My point is that systemic change is not a matter of choosing between the best charity - that approach only has one outcome which is how many lives to save in one monetary act - if we look at the world in a connected web than demonstrating empathy & care by looking after one's place (cleaning up the local beach) or protecting a rainforest for the future health of the planet - these are all responsibilities with different impacts that contribute to a greater whole. Helping a rainforest now may save millions of lives in the future compared to 10 lives treated for malaria now. And this is not just about humans! I don't think you can measure what you are trying to measure - it denies the complexity of life and reduces it to an economic plan.

Yes you can look at a 'how to guide' if you want to find the best charity and you do make great examples of how to make that decision - but sustaining life and survival is much deeper, chaotic and unknown.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 11:58:13AM *  3 points [-]

It should be noted that if you want to help people then donating something helps more people than being discouraged to the point of not donating at all due to the possibility that your contribution might be used some orders of magnitude less effectively than possible.

Many people do not (yet) have the ability (or nerves/time etc.) to read up on and make sense of the arguments, or the data, to subsequently compute the answer of what would be the most effective way to spend their money in case they want to help other people.

So before you give up and do not donate anything at all, better split your money and give some to the SIAI (or even Wikipedia etc.). Additionally use a service like GiveWell. And also don't worry helping to exhibit some painting. All of those contributions will help some people, if only by making them happy (as in the case of the painting). It will make a difference! And it will make a huge difference compared to doing nothing at all.

Comment author: 12 June 2012 01:36:58AM 0 points [-]

Indeed, it's remarkable how little we would have to spend to end the worst poverty and injustice in the world today, if only people were willing to do it.

We literally spend more on cat food than it would take to eliminate the UN absolute poverty level.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 08:53:57AM *  1 point [-]

And likewise, there is only one best charity: the one that helps the most people the greatest amount per dollar.

One could strip the moralizing element from the quote (and the article) in a fairly straightforward manner. The best charity someone can donate to is subjectively objective: the one that achieves the most benefit per dollar according to that persons values, altruistic or otherwise.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 09:14:03AM *  2 points [-]

The problem with the word "best" there is the same problem the word "good" always runs into - the difference between "a good car" and "a good person". I'm using "best charity" in the same sense I would use "best Arctic survival gear" - best at achieving the purpose you are assumed to have. Although I think there is a case for that also being the morally best for most moral systems in which "morally best" makes sense, that would be way outside the scope of this discussion.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 11:39:14AM *  1 point [-]

I understand what you are doing in the post and follow the sense of 'best'. What I am observing is that the claim "you are moralizing" is factually correct. The moralization is not in the form of a direct 'should' nor is it in the way in which you use best. It can be seen here:

best at achieving the purpose you are assumed to have.

That is an extremely powerful moral gambit.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 10:18:08PM 14 points [-]

Even Jesus said, "The poor you will have with you always", to justify spending an INCREDIBLE amount of money (enough to buy ten people's entire lives, in an era with no inflation, making it comparable to ten million US dollars today) on pouring perfume once on Jesus' feet

"Even Jesus"? Does it occur to you that making this a religious example is actually even MORE likely to get us to notice the moral dissonance, not convince us to excuse it?

Comment author: 27 December 2010 01:43:25PM 5 points [-]

I think this might be correct but that humans are prone to prioritising the welfare of kin and close friends, and so someone working directly with people and forming some kind of relationship with them may be more likely to donate financial resources to that group in future. The lawyer may be more willing to spend money to keep a beach safe and free of litter if he or she has some personal experience which increases the importance of that beach in his mind. Most of us don't give much weight to mosquito nets because our own experience doesn't even put that on the radar.

I make a point of buying only FairTrade chocolate. My mental hack for times when I feel tempted to buy the ordinary kind is to think about people I love and admire, and imagine that my spending decision extends as far as having an immediate impact on whether they are paid fairly for their work. This is not, directly, how the market works, but as a re-framing exercise it does help me in sticking to a resolution when my own desires seem more compelling than those of the people who produce the chocolate.

I also question whether money is always more directly effective than time. I think the human relationships which might draw people to further financial support are often in and of themselves beneficial. That has certainly been my experience in formal and informal mentoring situations. No amount of money can buy lovingkindness, and while a kind word will not fill an empty stomach, someone with their immediate food, shelter and medical needs met may still be very much in need of that kind word. Encouragement and genuine care should not be overlooked as factors in increasing someone's quality and duration of life.

These things are hard to quantify but, for me, they tip the balance toward contributing time and energy directly to local causes, especially as I earn very little money anyway.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 02:20:48PM *  2 points [-]

Welcome to LessWrong! I'd like to mention that here on LessWrong we will try to quantify the value of loving kindness and encouragement, and after quantifying we're going to find that it would fall well below the value of immediate food, shelter, and medical needs.

especially as I earn very little money anyway.

I suspect this is a stronger reason than the preceding paragraph ;)

Comment author: 28 December 2010 10:57:52AM *  2 points [-]

here on LessWrong we will try to quantify the value of loving kindness and encouragement, and after quantifying we're going to find that it would fall well below the value of immediate food, shelter, and medical needs.

It helps in this regard to be really sure of the security of one's own immediate food, shelter and medical needs.

(Can this be claimed of all LessWrong participants? If so, then LW's participant base is not wide enough.)

Comment author: 28 December 2010 01:51:17PM *  2 points [-]

Yes. This is my major disagreement with the "give until it hurts" slogans you sometimes see.

Also, I guess yes to your parenthetical. This is a selection effect caused by LessWrong's medium (generally, shelter is a necessary condition for internet access, and food and medical needs are probably - hopefully? - prioritized over internet access).

Comment author: 28 December 2010 04:50:55PM *  6 points [-]

generally, shelter is a necessary condition for internet access, and food and medical needs are probably - hopefully? - prioritized over internet access

Actually, no, it turns out your view of the world is incorrect and in need of updating. I spent a chunk of 2002 couch-surfing, living on the kindness of friends, looking for work in London. I seriously put rather a high value on Internet, because it was the rational choice in securing a job. "Well, yes, it's a house ... but there's no net there." It's that important.

Comment author: 01 January 2011 12:12:38PM 0 points [-]

What was that t-shirt (from slightly earlier than 2002) 'bout drugs, sex and 'net access?

Comment author: 01 January 2011 04:55:32PM *  1 point [-]

One of the several alt.gothic T-shirts, dating to the mid-1990s. (I had several but appear to have only the original 1994 one left.)

Comment author: 28 December 2010 05:08:29PM 7 points [-]

Wow. I definitely do not treat the internet as that important. Clearly I generalised from my own example instead of seeking out any data. I can even see how it makes rational sense to prefer internet over shelter, food, and medical needs; it's an instrument to achieve all three terminal goals. I just didn't think that way.

Man, that one-mind fallacy is insidious.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 05:18:27PM *  5 points [-]

In the situation, it would have been irrational - blitheringly stupid - not to make damn sure I had internet access in the prospective new place. Medical needs are fine in the UK (here's to the NHS!), cheap food exists in small quantities, shelter is the crippling expense in London.

Fortunately my friends are sysadmins. I would characterise my situation at the time as closer to "distressed gentleman" than "bum". (1)

In any case, I owe the world (and said individuals) lots of kindness points, and am quite proud to pay a sizable chunk of my income in tax, because I know personally what it pays for ...

More broadly: yes, you actually need Internet to participate in Western civil society these days. Restricting it from the homeless is a way to keep them there. They have phones too these days, and not just as some sort of frippery - why do they need them? And also, loving kindness and encouragement are how to treat humans; positing that as somehow dichotomous with food, shelter and medical care is a twist of thought I find confusing.

1. And hadn't been the former long enough for it to smell like the latter.
Comment author: 28 December 2010 11:54:27AM 0 points [-]

The security of one's own access to physical necessities is an interesting factor in this. Are those whose security has been unstable more or less likely to donate time or money to charity?

For me personally, uncertainty about my own circumstances is a double-edged sword. If I am feeling a bit skint I'm unlikely to give money to someone begging on the street, and if I know my budget will be limited I am stingier than usual about charity boxes in shops. At the same time, an awareness that it is only because of the kindness of others that I am not homeless myself makes me eager to pass that kindness on in unstructured ways (being kind to others where I can in the course of my work and leisure) and more formally (this winter, volunteering at a local night shelter).

Comment author: 23 July 2011 12:32:12AM 2 points [-]

Possibly the people who give the most, albeit to relatives, are immigrants from less developed to more developed countries. Even though for many it means lowering their standards of living in the US (or wherever), they know the remittance they send is sending their younger sister to school, buying a new roof for the family house in Bolivia, etc.

In the US, the lowest income bracket gives a <a href=http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/magazine/22FOB-wwln-t.html>larger percent</a> of their income than any other bracket. I haven't seen numbers on whether this includes people on the brink of not having their basic needs met, but I bet a lot of them have been there at some point.

Comment author: 12 June 2012 01:45:35AM -1 points [-]

On the other hand, perhaps the poor give too much! They should be receiving the aid, not giving it out!

Consider all the economic opportunities that poor immigrants are giving up by remitting so much of their income to relatives where they came from. Perhaps it would be better if they saved and invested instead, and then after securing themselves financially, then start giving back?

Comment author: 12 June 2012 01:00:31PM *  2 points [-]

Perhaps it would be better if they saved and invested instead

If you consider yourself as, say, a Mexican 30-year-old who comes to the US and works as a carpenter, would you prefer to save your earnings and invest them (despite having little formal education, and thus being unlikely to invest well) while your wife, son, and parents continue living in a shack in Chiapas? Knowing that they would despise you for hoarding your earnings while they scraped by? I bet you would send them part of your paycheck. The opportunity cost of saving that money is too high.

Comment author: 24 July 2011 01:14:40AM *  2 points [-]

In the US, the lowest income bracket gives a <a href=http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/magazine/22FOB-wwln-t.html>larger percent</a> of their income than any other bracket. I haven't seen numbers on whether this includes people on the brink of not having their basic needs met, but I bet a lot of them have been there at some point.

Note that it's possible that a substantial fraction of these donations are made to community organizations (churches, etc.) and so may effectively serve as membership dues. Despite this I think that this statistic makes a good rejoinder to middle/upper class people who claim that they can't afford to give.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 10:43:39AM 2 points [-]

Thanks for the welcome.

I wonder how it's possible to quantify encouragement and the value of relationships. I have been on the receiving end of a good deal of care and encouragement at a time when my physical health was poor and nothing could immediately be done to improve it. This gave me great hope and is experience I still draw courage from when I find life challenging. I don't have a spare me to experiment on so can only imagine how I might have fared without that support, but I know it has seemed more influential than the practical support I had, and in some cases I would not have sought practical support had I not had steady emotional encouragement. I am fortunate in that I have never been without sufficient food or adequate shelter, but that would not have been the case had I been left to my own devices. I can only experience the world as myself, but for me, loving kindness and unconditional positive regard have been extremely important, and are probably the deciding factor in my subsequent attempts to help others.

On a wider scale, I've often wondered why we don't simply set up a tax system such that everyone can have a decent physical standard of living. Population concerns aside (given the lower birth rate that appears to result from increases in standard of living this should sort itsrlf out) I think some of this comes back to our tendency to prioritise kinship or clan groups over the common good. I would argue that not having a direct relationship with the people we are trying to help makes us more likely to withdraw aid at the first hint of danger. Certainly those withdrawing benefits or financial aid from the most disadvantaged in Britain right now are not those who work with the disabled and the homeless on an ongoing basis. Yes, good people ought to donate to charity, and funds should be used efficiently, but the idea that paying taxes, voting, donating a bit to charity and perhaps writing to an MP or going on a protest is enough seems flawed. I think that for the changes to occur which would guarantee everyone a decent standard of living, people need serious motivation. I see that motivation coming from personal involvement and relationships more than from a cost/benefit analysis of how to spend the "charity" portion of a household budget. The latter is important and I am glad there are organisations like GiveWell which attempt some of the arithmetic, but I question whether money-only donors will, in general, evaluate the rest of their spending and activity with a view to increasing the common good, and I suspect that the abstract connections formed by financial donations are frail, making such aid more likely to be withdrawn if it is inconvenient.

I don't suggest that people who donate money to charity should discontinue that support but I do think it helpful if they also spend some time, perhaps as little as an hour per week or month, doing some kind of aid work that offers the opportunity for a genuine relationship not based on who has more money. As most people do not spend all their waking hours working, this need not detract from their financial contributions.

I would be interested in seeing any data that support or refute this; I am extrapolating from my own observations.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 10:53:41AM *  6 points [-]

I don't suggest that people who donate money to charity should discontinue that support but I do think it helpful if they also spend some time, perhaps as little as an hour per week or month, doing some kind of aid work that offers the opportunity for a genuine relationship not based on who has more money. As most people do not spend all their waking hours working, this need not detract from their financial contributions.

This is an important point: perfectly spherical rationalists of uniform density in a vacuum at absolute zero might make a more productive contribution to charity by working and donating rather than personal contribution of time, but perfectly spherical rationalists of uniform density in a vacuum at absolute zero are in somewhat short supply. In the world of humans, a bit of hands-on participation makes it far more likely that they will bother to continue to contribute to that charity at all.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 12:00:37PM 1 point [-]

In the world of humans, a bit of hands-on participation makes it far more likely that they will bother to continue to contribute to that charity at all.

Exactly what I was trying to say, but much shorter! Thanks.

Comment author: [deleted] 26 December 2010 08:03:31AM 0 points [-]

Would anyone of average intelligence who wants to do as much good as possible fail flagrantly in giving where it maximizes welfare? Why then the drastic difference between personal buying and donation? Someone planning an Arctic trip will not make the contemplated mistakes, which is why you used personal buying to contrast with donation practices. Whether the desire to benefit mankind is powered by warm fuzzies or some other expression of altruistic motivation, if contributors were human-welfare maximizers they would do a lot better at maximizing welfare. People aren't that irrational!

Donations have little to do with welfare maximization and warm fuzzies. They primarily function as a signaling device. Isn't that obvious?

Comment author: 27 December 2010 08:40:26PM 1 point [-]

It doesn't have to be all one thing or the other.

Comment author: 26 December 2010 09:27:04AM 6 points [-]

Isn't that obvious?

Yes. It should also be obvious that it succeeds because "appearing to desire welfare maximization and warm fuzzies" is the signal. If you donated to a charity that burned your money to reduce inflation your signal would fail.

It is less obvious but hopefully inferred by many that one of the intentions of this post and posts like it (and one of the intentions of charity-rating initiatives) is to break conventional giving, turn it into a failed signal, and replace it with efficient giving. That way, all the signalling donors will continue to donate as they did before, signalling the same things, achieving the same status gain, and accidentally helping the world more.

Comment author: 26 December 2010 10:47:48AM 2 points [-]

How does trying to prevent wars and/or stop them rate as charitable activity? On the one hand, wars are tremendously destructive and on the other, it's hard to be sure how effective opposing a war is.

Comment author: 26 December 2010 02:30:35PM *  3 points [-]

I am not sure. One of my nodes for "charitable activity" is non-profit organisations working in the area in question, so I hadn't even considered prevention/stopping of wars as charity. Some very light research suggests that peace activism has had a measurable impact, although by imparting the kind of pressures I think a lobby group would have more success applying.

This suggests to me some sort of lobby group should be formed, and made powerful through charitable donations. Stopping the Iraq war, to work with an example, would have saved about 110,000 lives; if it cost a lobby group around 20 million dollars to achieve the non-invasion of Iraq then you're looking at 180 dollars a life - for comparison, VillageReach gets about $200 a life and Stop TB Partnership gets about 150-170 a life. The non-disruption of citizens' lives should beat the improvement in citizens' lives when charities begin operating in a town; I don't know how to treat it more rigorously though. My intuition is that formalising the disability-adjusted life years lost due to invasion and occupation should blow all the other charities out of the water (at 20 million). Could a lobby group stop a war with 20 million dollars? Maybe. The numbers are in the same ballpark. Lobbying against war might have some better leverage with timing (they might no need constant pressure against, they might just need to cancel out the highest points of pressure for), but declared lobbying might vastly underrepresent actual lobbying. Again, I don't know enough to treat this possibility properly. So it rates as possibly up there with the very best of charities, definitely worth investigating, but not a very warm or fuzzy cause at all. Edit: GiveWell's recommendations on cost-effectiveness give the upper limits of$100 per DALY prevented and $1000 per life significantly changed; without DALYs for war (I can find no figures) this gives us at most 110 million lobby dollars before GiveWell would stop recommending the lobby group. That much money seems like it could have made a significant try at opposing the Iraq war, to be honest. Comment author: 26 December 2010 05:45:21PM * 2 points [-] Thanks. I think stopping wars is a warm and fuzzy cause, but perhaps peace activists are apt to position themselves as outsiders and this has made it less likely for them to create a formal lobby. On the other hand, demonstrations may have become less effective, which may make a lobby more plausible. Not sure how you'd add this to the figures, but veterans make up 1 in 4 of the homeless and Homeless adults have an age-adjusted mortality rate nearly 4 times that of the general population their average life span is shorter than 45 years. I don't have stats for the effects on children of having one or both parents with PTSD, but I expect it to be serious. Comment author: 27 December 2010 04:57:46AM 3 points [-] Hmm. Watch out, more numbers. Trying to take into account those and other factors of war besides being shot in battle led me to this statistical estimate of the effect of the Iraq War. The lowest bound was 400,000, and treating excess mortality as happening on the average between 16 and 67 (an overtly optimistic hope that people under 16 remain the least affected-by-war group), we get 10.2 million expected life years lost. Assume that for every person killed, there is one person disabled in some way (a quick check suggested 3:1 serious injury:death ratio for soldiers and 1.8:1 for civilians, I went with 1:1 because disability doesn't always follow from serious injury, but concerns like PTSD can bring the ratio up to equal) and the figure is just above 20 million DALYs lost to the Iraq war. GiveWell's figure of$100 per DALY being the upper bound of efficient charity means that a lobby group or charity that could have stopped the Iraq War given 2 billion dollars would have been a gold-standard efficient charity.

I believe this answers your query, Nancy. Stopping wars most definitely rates as some of the best charity around.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 06:55:26AM 2 points [-]

I've been amazed for a long time how much people don't add up the costs of war.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 05:47:50AM 0 points [-]

There's another level, I think. Afaik, wars are less likely between democracies than for other permutations of government types, so charities which spread democracy might also be a good choice, depending on one's estimate of their effectiveness.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 05:55:35AM 1 point [-]

Indeed. To the extent that a charity spreads democracy, and to the extent that democratization reduces likelihood of war, these democracy charities are stop-war charities.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 05:39:38AM 0 points [-]

"Excess mortality" is a difficult concept. Most estimates I've seen calculate excess mortality based on a pre-hostilities baseline because this is relatively easy to calculate and produces the highest possible figure for excess mortality. But the number we really want would compare that mortality to the expected post-war mortality. In the case of Iraq, this would provide a higher expected value than the rate immediately pre-war.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 05:57:25AM 0 points [-]

I aimed for the lower bound. If you go by strictly what has been confirmed then something like 400 million dollars is the efficiency cut-off.

Comment author: 06 January 2011 09:28:35PM 1 point [-]

This argument is based on completely ignoring future costs and benefit analysis and the available alternatives. To accept this as a (implicit?) axiom seems unnatural. Imagine a powerful lobby group stopped American involvement in the Korean war and all of South Korea ended up like the North. Imagine NATO did not strike Serbia and Milosevic continued to reign. Even the Iraq war did have some positive effect - Hussein was evil, and potentially the new government in Iraq would lead to less suffering, both internally and because of other - local and global - conflicts avoided. The particulars of these arguments are debatable (the Iraq government may collapse into chaos; even if it does not, we will never know the ultimate costs of keeping or not keeping Saddam in power), but the larger point stands. Other comments mentioned promoting democracy as a means of promoting peace. War can be a radical mean of promoting democracy (at least in Serbia it seems to have worked), and this should not be ignored.

Comment author: 07 January 2011 02:35:51AM 2 points [-]

Even the Iraq war did have some positive effect - Hussein was evil, and potentially the new government in Iraq would lead to less suffering, both internally and because of other - local and global - conflicts avoided.

If you take the after-invasion Iraq government and subtract that from Hussein's governing, you get the improvement in governance. Is that improvement going to save 400,000 lives in its reduction of local and global conflicts? Please keep in mind it is not a dichotomy of "Invade and fix Iraq XOR abandon countries to the whims of evil dictators". It is closer to "Improving Iraq: Military intervention, or other means?".

Assassinating Hussein and backing a democratic coup is a much better way of radically promoting democracy in Iraq. I accuse you of completely ignoring available alternatives.

Comment author: [deleted] 25 December 2010 11:08:11PM 1 point [-]

This speaks in favor of the moral qualities of the camera manufacturer

Why is this? Is it unethical to profit from trade? This made my little inner Objectivist cringe pretty hard... but otherwise, I like this post a lot. It makes an important point about efficiency that isn't obvious and needs to be reinforced.

Comment author: 25 December 2010 11:14:33PM *  3 points [-]

It can speak in favour of the moral qualities of the camera manufacturer without speaking against the moral qualities of the parka manufacturer. Of course it's fine to profit from trade, but generosity is still praiseworthy.

(Though, in practice, selling a $200 camera at no profit is probably not nearly the best way for a camera manufacturer to be altruistic anyway, so that may not be the best example.) Comment author: [deleted] 25 December 2010 06:12:58PM * 5 points [-] If you are to "love your neighbor as yourself" Why use that particular phrase? I think I don't need to love my neighbor as much as me to be interested in charity. And while I suppose the phrase sits well aesthetically in the text, I think it might unfortunately evoke with it a few Christian cached toughs. Pure selflessness rewarded in afterlife don't really seem applicable to what people here want to do. Comment author: 25 December 2010 04:57:55PM 21 points [-] It's a useful exercise for aspiring economists and rationalists to dissect charity into separate components of warm fuzzies vs. efficiency. However, maybe it's best for the general population not to be fully conscious that these are separate components, since the spirit of giving is like a frog: you can dissect it, but it dies in the process (adaptation of an E.B. White quote). Lemma: we want charity to be enjoyable, so that more people are motivated to do it. (Analogy: capitalist countries let rich people keep their riches, to create an incentive for economic growth, even though it might create more utility in the short term to tax rich people very highly.) Consider this quote from the article: If he went to the beach because he wanted the sunlight and the fresh air and the warm feeling of personally contributing to something, that's fine. If he actually wanted to help people by beautifying the beach, he's chosen an objectively wrong way to go about it. Sure, but making the lawyer conscious of this will give him a complete buzzkill. He will realize that he was unconsciously doing the act for selfish (and kind of silly) reasons. Your hope in telling him this is that he will instead opt to use his$1000 salary to hire people, but I question whether he would actually follow through with that kind of giving in the long run, since his unconscious original motive was warm fuzzies, not efficiency. In effect, you may have prevented him from doing anything charitable at all. Don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

Comment author: 07 March 2014 08:35:14PM 0 points [-]

If you learn about how to give right, some of the warm fuzzies will go away, and fewer people will donate, but the people who do donate will donate better.

If all you're going to be doing is picking up litter at a beach, it really doesn't matter if you stop when you find out it's not helping people. You can find another hobby.

Comment author: 07 January 2013 10:58:26PM *  1 point [-]

Not quite the same scenario, but close: often when I'm considering donating to some charity, there's a reminder in the back of my head that if I were to truly support this charity I would donate a much larger amount. This isn't a happy thought, it generates conflict: there's another part of me that doesn't like spending large amounts of money. Thus, I often donate nothing at all.

I'm still working on this conflict.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 06:40:13PM *  15 points [-]

This is a genuine problem you're presenting, and I think it requires a third solution besides the presented options of "Let the lawyer do what he wants" and "Give the lawyer a buzzkill". What we need to do is find a way of getting the lawyer to understand what the right thing to do is, without making them feel defensive or like a jerk. If we make the bullet tasty enough, it'll get easier to swallow.

Rationalist marketing FTU (For The Utilons).

Comment author: 04 November 2015 09:26:44PM 0 points [-]

So, is my goal in explaining this stuff to someone to maximize efficiency at achieving their goals (warm fuzzies), or to maximize efficiency at achieving my goals (charity)? (Or maybe I want warm fuzzies and the lawyer wants charity, whatever.)

Comment author: 01 February 2016 12:51:46AM 0 points [-]

The lawyer wants both warm fuzzies and charitrons, but has conflated the two, and will probably get buzzkilled (and lose out on both measures) if the distinction is made clear. The best outcome is one where the lawyer gets to maximize both, and that happens at the end of a long road that begins with introspection about what warm fuzzies ought to mean.

Comment author: 25 December 2010 04:28:25PM 2 points [-]

I just had a conversation with my father on this subject which significantly clarified my thinking, and resolved most of my internal dilemma. The argument put forward in this post is correct, but there is one significant problem. I care about more than just saving children. I also care about how efficiently it is done, what peripheral good a charity is doing in the community by, say, employing locals, and any number of other things. "Children saved" is an important metric and should absolutely be considered, and it is a decision that should be made carefully, but it is not the only metric to consider. We should spend our money efficiently, but we first need to clarify our goals in order to do so, and "saving children" is not necessarily our only goal, even in cases where it is primary.

Comment author: 26 December 2010 09:30:37AM 5 points [-]

"saving children" is not necessarily our only goal

Unless you have a huge "they are in another country" discount on children's lives, or a huge "they are in my community" boost to the other goals, I can't name any goals off the top of my head that can compete with saving children's lives.

Comment author: 26 December 2010 03:48:31PM 3 points [-]

I didn't say that other goals could compete, but there are other goals that can be considered simultaneously. If one charity saves ten children for $100 and another saves nine and accomplishes a few other things, that is not a choice we should make mindlessly. we can't let "saving children become a buzzword that cuts off thought. What if the second charity saves the children from death and gives them some skills that will help them make a living and help their communities? In that case, I would probably choose the second charity. Think of it as a linear algebra problem, with numerous parameters with different weights. You end up with an optimal solution for all variables together rather than for a single variable alone. Just because saving children is the most heavily weighted variable doesn't mean that it is the only one. Comment author: 02 January 2011 06:51:29AM * 10 points [-] At the risk of provoking defensiveness I will say that it really sounds like you are trying to rationalize your preferences as being rational when they aren't. I say this because the examples that you were giving (local food kitchen, public radio), when compared to truly efficient charities (save lives, improve health, foster local entrepreneurship), are nothing like "save 9 kids + some other benefits" vs. "save 10 kids and nothing else". It''s more like "save 0.1 kids that you know are in your neighborhood" vs. "save 10 kids that you will never meet" (and that's probably an overestimate on the local option). Your choice of a close number is suspicious because it is so wrong and so appealing (by justifying the giving that makes you happy). The amount of happiness that you create through local first world charities is orders of magnitude less than third world charities. Therefore, if you are choosing local first world charities that help "malnourished" kids who are fabulously nourished by third world standards, we can infer that the weight you put on "saving the lives of children" (and with it, "maximizing human quality-adjusted life years") is basically zero. Therefore, you are almost certainly buying warm fuzzies. That's consumption, not charity. I'm all for consumption, I just don't like people pretending that it's charity so they can tick their mental "give to charity" box and move on. Comment author: [deleted] 01 October 2011 06:39:06PM 2 points [-] Let's say you want to start a school, because you like education. You could found a very large school that educates lots of children, but at a so-so quality. Or you could spend the same amount of instruction to make a tiny, amazing school, a little gem. Some people might find it more fulfilling to build the small, wonderful school. When you've achieved your goal, a tiny corner of the world is just perfect, and it's a part you have control over. I think this is part of the reason people sometimes are more motivated to improve conditions in their own country than abroad. On some level, I'd rather make one person really happy and successful than make 100 people just barely better off than dead. Comment author: 02 January 2011 04:47:21PM * 4 points [-] I agree with you completely about consumption vs. charity, and had even mentioned the concept in my point about NPR donation guilt. I also agree that the close number is wildly inaccurate, but even in context it wasn't applied to local charities and it was intended to make the point that multiple factors could and should be considered when picking charities, even when the importance multipliers on some factors are orders of magnitude higher than for other factors. I hope this clarifies my meaning without defensiveness, because none was meant. Comment author: 04 January 2011 05:52:52AM 1 point [-] Ok, great, I'm glad I misunderstood. Comment author: 26 December 2010 04:35:49PM 3 points [-] Think of it as a linear algebra problem, with numerous parameters with different weights. You end up with an optimal solution for all variables together rather than for a single variable alone. This is what I had in mind; I just felt that that the "saving childrens' lives" variable would have a multiplier of a few hundred in front of it (because lives are important) and the other variables like "improves their community" would have multipliers of two or three at best. I couldn't think of any other variable that would have a similar multiplier to "child's life". Comment author: 27 December 2010 11:45:09PM 0 points [-] Some of those other variables will feed back in to the "child's life" variable, a generation or two down the road. Comment author: 28 December 2010 05:26:19AM 3 points [-] Feeding back into "child's life" a few generations down the road is not a multiplier of a few hundred. That it feeds back gives it an extra 10% or so; even with the feeding back, doing anything that isn't directly saving as many lives as possible right now is an objectively worse option. Comment author: 25 December 2010 02:37:52PM 4 points [-] I wonder how many people would just give up on charity altogether if they accepted this argument. I know I did, I pretty much see charity as supererogatory now. Comment author: 07 March 2014 08:51:38PM 0 points [-] Don't people normally see it as supererogatory? Comment author: 25 December 2010 12:30:01PM 24 points [-] Pretty much a corollary of this is Steve Landsburg's (for some reason controversial) point that you should only ever be donating money to one charity at a time (unless you're ridiculously rich). The charity which makes the best use out of your first$1 donation is almost certainly also the charity which makes the best use out of your 1000th dollar as well. Once you've done the calculation, spreading your money between different charities isn't hedging your bets, it's giving money to the wrong charity.

See his Slate article for a slightly more fleshed out version of the reasoning.

Comment author: 29 December 2010 05:17:24AM 18 points [-]

There is one exception to this, which is political charities (ACLU, for instance). Giving to political charities, has a signalling effect: a political charity can say "we have twelve million donors," and this tells politicians that they had better listen to that charity or those twelve million people might be voting for someone else.

That said, a $10 donation is enough to get this effect. Comment author: 28 December 2010 02:21:36PM 2 points [-] I actually tend to argue this point first, and the more general point about efficient charity second. I'm not sure if that's the most effective way to argue it though. Comment author: 23 July 2011 08:18:11AM 3 points [-] I suspect convincing people optimal philanthropy is a good idea is probably one of the most important things one could do. Maybe you should find out? Comment author: 25 December 2010 04:02:17PM * 4 points [-] The advice I hear is "limit yourself to three charities"- useful because it allows you to broaden your fuzzies (like supporting economic liberty and cute animals and 3rd world development) while significantly decreasing the overhead costs to the charities. They would much rather have a$1,000 donor than 10 $100 donors, especially if that donor has made an annual commitment. Comment author: 06 July 2011 06:21:05PM 0 points [-] Is that compatible with points five and six here, or is it a standing disagreement among activists? Comment author: 06 July 2011 07:15:00PM 3 points [-] I suspect that SIAI is in a different position from most charities. I don't know what percentage of charities are low on public support, but I suspect that is not a serious issue for most donors, as most donors couldn't provide more than 2% of a charity's total income, even with a third of their total charity budget. Most charities have a practice of sending endless streams of junk mail, and so for most charities a gift of a few dollars is actually a losing proposition in the long term, since you sent the signal you would be receptive to future donation requests but don't actually send more money. The SIAI's strategy (and costs for emailing) are different from most charities, suggesting that different advice makes sense for them. Comment author: 25 December 2010 07:23:21AM * 59 points [-] Reading this and your article on using dead children as currencies reminds me of an event a few years ago which might have helped stop me from becoming another religious nutcase. I did not know anything about rationality or utilitarian ethics at the time, and I was involved in a youth group at church that was going to be making aid kits for Ethiopia. One of the items that was requested was some kind of clothing, so I picked it up from a second hand store and put the kit together. Later when we were talking about the kits, I was told that we were only supposed to bring new items. when I asked why, the person in charge said something about respecting the feelings of the people who were receiving the gifts, and wanting them to feel like they had been given something special, instead of a discarded item. Everyone else in the group seemed to accept this easily, but I asked how many more people we could have helped with bargain items. This time, they pretty much ignored what I had just said. I think this was the point when it finally hit me that good intentions and appearing kind are horrible indicators that you are really making the world better. So anyway, I probably would never have tried to find out about websites like this without my experiences dealing with religion. Too bad we cannot all just be taught utilitarian ethics and rationality by our parents and school instead of discovering them the hard way. Comment author: 09 July 2012 05:43:18PM -2 points [-] Excuse my noob question, but isn't your subtle anti-religion generalizing implication somehow exactly against the pro-rational attitude this website is spreading? Also, when it comes to utilitarian ethics and rationality or anything, isn't "discovering the hard way" more fruit-bearing than having to learn in schools? Comment author: 08 November 2013 07:19:11AM 2 points [-] Also, when it comes to utilitarian ethics and rationality or anything, isn't "discovering the hard way" more fruit-bearing than having to learn in schools? In addition to what drethelin said, there's also the problem that discovering it the hard way is hard. Most people fail. That way bears no fruit at all. Comment author: 20 October 2012 06:06:14AM 5 points [-] Discovering the hard way generally leads to deeper knowledge, but it's still extremely important to learn about, eg, the germ theory of disease in school. You may not end up knowing as much as its original discoverers about bacteria and their behavior, but you can still spread a lot fewer disease. Comment author: 25 December 2010 06:55:57AM 2 points [-] I'm bothered by the intertemporal implications of this, i.e. if I have$100 that I will spend to help the most humans possible, then I could either spend it today or invest it and spend $105 next year (assumed 5% ROR). Will I then ever spend the money on charity? Or will I always invest it, and just let this amassed wealth be distributed when I die? Comment author: 26 December 2010 01:32:56AM 1 point [-] In order this to be true forever, the world would have to never end, which would mean that there's infinite utility no matter what you do. If this is false eventually, there is no paradox. Whether or not It's worth while to invest for a few centuries is an open question, but if it turns out it is, that's no reason to abandon the idea of comparing charities. Comment author: 26 December 2010 02:40:22AM 1 point [-] In order this to be true forever, the world would have to never end, which would mean that there's infinite utility no matter what you do. That doesn't sound right... even if I'm expecting an infinite future I think I'd still want to live a good existence rather than a mediocre one (but with >0 utility). So it does matter what I do. Say I have two options: • A, which offers on average 1.. utilon per second? (Are utilons measures of utility of a time period, or instantaneous utility?) • B, which offers on average 2 utilons / s The limits as t approaches infinity are U(A) = t, U(B) = 2t. Both are "infinite" but B is yet larger than A, and therefore "better". Comment author: 26 December 2010 07:48:22AM 0 points [-] You can switch between A and B just by rearranging when events happen. For example, imagine that there are two planets moving in opposite directions. One is a Utopia, the other is a Distopia. From the point of reference of the Utopia, time is slowed down in the Distopia, so the world is worth living in. From the point of reference of the Distopia, it's reversed. This gets even worse when you start dealing with expected utility. As messed up as the idea is that the order of events matter, there at least is an order. With expected utility, there is no inherent order. The best I can do is assign the priors for infinite utility to zero, and make my priors fall off fast enough to make sure expected utility always converges. I've managed to prove that my posteriors will also always have a converging expected utility. Comment author: 26 December 2010 03:25:08AM 0 points [-] So we need to formalize this, obviously. Method 1: Exponential discounting. Problem: You don't care very much about future people. Method 2: Taking the average over all time (specifically the limit as t goes to infinity of the integral of utility from 0 to t, divided by t) Conclusion which may be problematic: If humanity does not live forever, nothing we do matters. Caveat: Depending on our anthropics, we can argue that the universe is infinite in time or space with probability 1, in which case there are an infinite number of copies of humanity, and so we can always calculate the average. This seems like the right approach to me. (In general, using the same math for your ethics and your anthropics has nice consequences, like avoiding most versions of Pascal's Mugging.) Comment author: 27 December 2010 07:43:52AM 2 points [-] Problem: You don't care very much about future people. Why is this a problem? This seems to match reality for most people. Comment author: 01 January 2011 12:34:36AM 1 point [-] So does selfishness and irrationality. We would like to avoid those. It also is intuitive that we would like to care more about future people. Comment author: 06 January 2011 09:33:16AM * 1 point [-] Excessive selfishness, sure. Some degree of selfishness is required as self-defense, currently, otherwise all your own needs are subsumed by supplying others' wants.. Even in a completely symmetric society with everybody acting more for others' good than their own is worse than one where everybody takes care of their own needs first -- because each individual generally knows their own needs and wants better than anyone else does. I don't know the needs and wants of the future. I can't know them particularly well. I have worse and worse uncertainty the farther away in time that is. Unless we're talking about species-extinction level of events, I damn well should punt to those better informed, those closer to the problems. It also is intuitive that we would like to care more about future people. Not to me. Heck. I'm not entirely sure what it means to care about a person who doesn't exist yet, and where my choices will influence which of many possible versions will exist. Comment author: 06 January 2011 03:31:30PM * 0 points [-] each individual generally knows their own needs and wants better than anyone else does. I don't know the needs and wants of the future. Expected-utility calculation already takes that into effect. Uncertainty about whether an action will be beneficial translates into a lower expected utility. Discounting, on top of that, is double counting. Knowledge is a fact about probabilities, not utilities. Not to me. Let's hope our different intuitions are resolvable. I'm not entirely sure what it means to care about a person who doesn't exist yet, and where my choices will influence which of many possible versions will exist. Surely it's not much more difficult than caring about a person who your choices will dramatically change? Comment author: 26 December 2010 05:44:21AM 2 points [-] How about this: If you have a set E = {X, Y, Z...} of possible actions, A (in E) is the utility-maximising action iff for all other B in E, the limit $\lim_{t\rightarrow\infty}\left(\int_0^t Eu(A, t')dt' - \int_0^t {Eu(B, t')dt' \right)$ is greater than zero, or approaches zero from the positive side. Caveat: I have no evidence this doesn't implode in some way, perhaps by the limit being undefined. This is just a stupid idea to consider. A possibly equivalent formulation is $\exists e\forall t.~(t>e) \implies \left(\int_0^t Eu(A, t')dt' \geq \int_0^t Eu(B, t')dt'\right)$ The inequality being greater or equal allows for two or more actions being equivalent, which is unlikely but possible. Comment author: 27 December 2010 06:59:42PM 4 points [-] Side comment: that math equation image generator you used is freakin' excellent. The image itself is generated based from the URL, so you don't have to worry about hosting. Editor is here. Comment author: 28 December 2010 03:06:43AM * 4 points [-] I prefer this one, which automatically generates the link syntax to paste into a LW comment. There's a short discussion of all this on the wiki. Comment author: 26 December 2010 12:28:12PM 1 point [-] Functions whose limit is +infinity and -infinity can be distinguished, so your good there. I think it's the same as my second: As long as the probability given both actions of a humanity lasting forever is nonzero, and the differences of expected utilities far in the future is nonzero, nothing that happens in the first million billion years matters. Comment author: 27 December 2010 09:30:13AM * 0 points [-] The difference in expected utility would have to decrease slow enough (slower than exponential?) to not converge, not just be nonzero. [Which would be why exponential discounting "works"...] However I would be surprised to see many decisions with that kind of lasting impact. The probability of an action having some effect at time t in the future "decays exponentially" with t (assuming p(Effect_t | Effect_{t-1}, Action) is approximately constant), so the difference in expected utility will in general fall off exponentially and therefore converge anyway. Exceptions would be choices where the utilities of the likely effects increase in magnitude (exponentially?) as t increases. Anyway I don't see infinities as an inherent problem under this scheme. In particular if we don't live forever, everything we do does indeed matter. If we do live forever, what we do does matter, excepts how it affects us might not if we anticipate causing "permanant" gain by doing something. Comment author: 26 December 2010 06:04:15AM 0 points [-] Can't think about the underlying idea right now due to headache, but instead of talking about any sort of limit, just say that it's eventually positive, if that's what you mean. Comment author: 26 December 2010 03:58:38AM 2 points [-] Bostrom would disagree with your conclusion that infinities are unproblematic for utilitarian ethics: http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf Comment author: 25 December 2010 10:56:14AM * 2 points [-] Will I then ever spend the money on charity? What's likely to happen is that the RoR and benefit of charity will fluctuate over time and over the size of your pot- so your pot will grow until there's a need, then you'll spend, and then it'll go back to growing. The problem is that requires active management (which is hard to continue after your death) and typically the view is that if you value warm fuzzies, you can find some charity that returns more than the RoR of profitable ventures. There is quite a bit of warm fuzzies in generating a giant pot of cash and then endowing it to stand perpetually- but beyond stability effects I'm not sure there is much to recommend that model of charity. Comment author: 25 December 2010 07:24:00AM * 12 points [-] Assuming that charities can invest and borrow at prevailing interest rates (and large charitable trusts can in fact borrow from their endowment), you should be indifferent to this choice. Robin Hanson has addressed this issue here. Comment author: 25 December 2010 07:07:26AM * 7 points [-] The good you do can compound too. If you save a childs life at$500, that child might go on to save other childrens lives. I think you might well get a higher rate of interest on the good you do than 5%. There will be a savings rate at which you should save instead of give, but I don't think we're near it at the moment.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 07:42:07AM 2 points [-]

that child might go on to save other childrens lives.

Or, of course, go on to harm them. Or be neutral. It seems almost certain that on average there is some benefit from the standard trade and comparative advantage reasons, but I have no idea how to even approach that calculation.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 05:16:15AM 3 points [-]

This, incidentally, is also an argument for supporting less immediately-efficient charities. If you spend $500 on mosquito nets, you are saving the life of a child whose expected lifetime earning potential is low. This is wonderful, but the rate of "interest" may well be small. If you spend$500 on saving the painting Blue Rigi, you have not saved a single life in the short run. But it contributes to the education of thousands of British children, many of whom will grow up to create and donate large amounts of wealth/knowledge. Your incremental impact on their education may plausibly prevent more malarial deaths than your donation of mosquito nets, though I've no idea how to calculate this.

At the very least, I'd suggest that analogy of "setting out on an Arctic journey" sets us up to mentally discount future benefits in favor of immediate results. Instead we might imagine that we've set up an Arctic village, or are planning a journey a decade from now. Our spending habits would change accordingly.

Comment author: 27 December 2010 06:22:14AM 10 points [-]

If you spend $500 on saving the painting Blue Rigi, [...] it contributes to the education of thousands of British children, many of whom will grow up to create and donate large amounts of wealth/knowledge Contributes how much? For each child, how much more knowledge do you expect they will create because they saw the original, rather than a facsimile, Blue Rigi? My estimate for this is so close to 0 that I can't conscience paying even$1 for Blue Rigi, except for aesthetic reasons.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 01:46:02AM 1 point [-]

Is this another way of saying that schools should focus on math and science, ignoring art? Or is this an argument that we need to restructure the way public museums work, slashing the cost by replacing the paintings with copies?

Comment author: 28 December 2010 02:36:10AM 5 points [-]

It's just an argument that art is not in the same bucket as saving lives. I'm not going to tell you how to spend your money, but if your stated objective is to help people, saving Blue Rigi is not a cost effective way of doing that.

The way we run schools, math and science aren't very useful to begin with. Slashing art budgets is probably not a useful place to start.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 03:28:41AM *  2 points [-]

Well, I want to make sure I understand it. Which of the following do you mean: a. If British people become more productive that productivity won't translate into more charity/inventions that will save lives? b. Education does not improve productivity? c. Art museums are not an important part of education (at least not in terms of scientific/economic productivity)? d. Blue Rigi does not improve the overall quality of the Tate? e. Actually none of the above, but Blue Rigi was simply priced too high?

I am not attempting to make an argument in this post. I am trying to identify the point at which datadataeverywhere first has a problem. For instance, I don't need to discuss whether the cultural given (fetish?) that our museums will seek out originals is easily mutable if his objection really starts earlier in my list. For instance, is it possible that the education of British children is a better way to save African lives than the immediate purchase of mosquito nets? If that's implausible, then the question of how one educates a child is irrelevant to this discussion.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 09:16:43PM 3 points [-]

Aris' expanded explanation is excellent, and what I would have tried to say at first.

I find it pretty implausible that the education of British children in the artwork of an 18th century British landscape painter is a better method of saving African lives than a proven method that currently saves lives and is reckoned to be one of the cheapest methods per life saved.

Over the long term, how we educate children probably determines a great deal about what our world looks like in the future. However, unless you have an oracle, or are educating them in something specifically related, such as the concept of Efficient Charity, I would place the upper and lower guesses of the median increase in QALY/DALY well below and above zero, respectively, indicating that you shouldn't do it on that basis.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 03:46:29AM *  3 points [-]

Downvoted for extreme amounts of muddled thinking, and a line of argumentation that's so hole-ridden it gives me a headache.

Also he has answered you already: He argued that displaying the original Blue Rigi as opposed to a facsimile doesn't contribute one iota to the education of any child. You either didn't pay attention, or are trying to wear him out by keep on asking something he already answered.

Comment author: 28 December 2010 03:58:51AM *  1 point [-]

Maybe. But I still don't know if that's because art doesn't contribute or because originals are the same as facsimiles.

Anyway, can you help me understand what you consider the holes/muddle?

Comment author: 28 December 2010 04:46:15AM *  10 points [-]

Muddled thinking is when your line of argumentation "painting contributes to museum, museum contributes to education, education contributes to productivity, productivity contributes to charity" implies there's some single metric each of these increase, which can be traced from one to the other simply, step by step.

An original painting may contribute to museum's "quality", but it needn't contribute to the educational quality of the museum, so you can't transfer that sort of contribution down that next step.

An art museum contributes to education, but it needn't contribute to education in such a manner that it becomes the sort of "productivity" that saves lives. Art is about aesthetics, which contribute to quality of life, but not the preservation of such. Art contributes, but it contributes differently - and you were told that already.

Education may contribute to productivity, but depending what you're educated to value, it may increase or decrease the amounts of charity provided. For example, if you're taught to value the presence of original paintings, you'll probably give money to keep original paintings in your nation, not to save lives.

Wanting an original painting, as opposed to a copy, isn't about educating, it's about satisfying a fetish. A national fetish in this case, much the way that Greece was obsessing with Olympic Games and museums to house the unreturned Parthenon marbles, while in the meantime its economy was going down the crapper.

In that way I could easily argue that the original is of less utility than a facsimile, exactly because it encourages such unproductive fetishes, while being aesthetically identical.

Comment author: 25 December 2010 05:58:08AM *  16 points [-]

Most of us allocate a particular percentage to charity, despite the fact that most people would say that nearly nothing we spend money on is as important as saving childrens lives.

I don't know whether you think it's that we overestimate how much we value saving childrens lives, or underestimate how important xbox games, social events, large tvs and eating tasty food are to us. Or perhaps you think it's none of that, and that we're being simply irrational.

I doubt that anyone could consistently live as if the difference between choice of renting a nice flat and renting a dive was one life per month, or that halving normal grocery consumption for a month was a childs life that month, etc. If that's really the aim, we're going to have to do a significant amount of emotional engineering.

I also want to stick up for the necessity of analysing the way that a charity works, not just what they do. For example, charities that employ local people and local equipment may save fewer people per dollar in the short term, but may be less likely to create a culture of dependence, and may be more sustainable in the long term. These considerations are important too.

Comment author: 07 March 2014 08:38:09PM 2 points [-]

I doubt that anyone could consistently live as if the difference between choice of renting a nice flat and renting a dive was one life per month, or that halving normal grocery consumption for a month was a childs life that month, etc.

Then don't. Use two-level utilitarianism. Live like this for a brief amount of time, during which you decide how to live the rest of the time. Work out how much you can cut your budget before you start earning less or the risk of giving up goes to high, and live like that for a period before you go back and check to see if it's working well again.

Comment author: 25 December 2010 05:40:47AM 8 points [-]

"The lawyer who quits a high-powered law firm to work at a nonprofit organization certainly seems like a good person. But if we define "good" as helping people, then the lawyer who stays at his law firm but donates the profit to charity is taking Cato's path of maximizing how much good he does, rather than how good he looks."

Wouldn't that depend on how much harm the lawyer might do by remaining at the high-powered law firm? What if the law firm specializes in socially-harmful activities, like defending corporate malfeasance or (pick your example). How does that fit into the equation?

In other words, I don't think it's that simple, although it's an excellent place to start, and I will certainly check out GiveWell for our next charitable tithing session.

Comment author: 25 December 2010 05:15:39AM 22 points [-]

I find I run into a conundrum on this question, because there is a bias I fear overcompensating for. I know as a human that I am biased to care more about the one person standing in front of me than those ten thousand people starving in India that I'll never meet, but I find it difficult to apply that information. I know that donating money to, say, those malaria nets, will probably save more lives than donating to, say, my local food pantry. By these arguments, it seems that that fact should trump all, and I should donate to those malaria nets.

However, I know that my local food pantry is an organization that feeds people who really need food, that it has virtually no overhead, and that there are children who would be malnourished without it. I also know that there are people all over the world who will contribute to malaria nets, but it is highly unlikely that anyone outside my community will contribute to my local food pantry.

I agree that it is vitally important to think carefully about how we spend our charity money, and I understand that the difficulty I am having with this topic is an indication that I need to think more deeply on it, but I keep coming up against two basic issues.

• There is no simple metric for "most good done." What if one disease costs little to prevent death, but leaves survivors crippled, while another costs much more to prevent death but leaves people healthy? Should I donate to the first, and burden the communities with many cripples, or to the second, and let people die? With food and medical care costing more in the developed world, should I only donate to help those in the undeveloped world, where my dollar will go farther?

• Should I feel guilty for donating money to public radio because it doesn't save children? No. My purpose in donating money to public radio is to keep my favorite shows on the air, and my donations do that very efficiently. Yes, the money could go to save children, but so could the money I use to pay my cable bill. I should perhaps not consider it as charity the way I do a donation that saves children, but I should not feel guilty. If I have $500 allocated for entertainment and$500 allocated for charity, perhaps it should come out of the former. However, it would be disingenuous to say that donations for more frivolous causes, such as saving artwork, could be donated to better causes, such as malaria nets, unless we also point out that what we spent on our fancy dinner or our new dress or going to the movies could also be thus allocated.

Comment author: 22 January 2011 07:24:32AM *  2 points [-]

Late response, but:

(a) The domestic vs. international issue is not clear cut - see, e.g. GiveWell research message board posts by Elie Hassenfeld and by Jason Fehr. More generally, I think that at least at present it's quite unclear which philanthropic efforts are most cost-effective.

(b) In regards to

However, I know that my local food pantry is an organization that feeds people who really need food, that it has virtually no overhead, and that there are children who would be malnourished without it. I also know that there are people all over the world who will contribute to malaria nets, but it is highly unlikely that anyone outside my community will contribute to my local food pantry.

see Holden Karnofsky's post Hunger Here vs. Hunger There.

(c) In regards to:

My purpose in donating money to public radio is to keep my favorite shows on the air, and my donations do that very efficiently. Yes, the money could go to save children, but so could the money I use to pay my cable bill. I should perhaps not consider it as charity the way I do a donation that saves children, but I should not feel guilty.

You might be interested by komponisto's comments to a post that I made which are in similar spirit.

See also Holden Karnofsky's Nothing wrong with selfish giving - just don't call it philanthropy and the comments to it.

Comment author: 25 December 2010 11:30:10PM 1 point [-]

There is no simple metric for "most good done."

I suggest the QALY, or quality-adjusted life year.

Should I feel guilty for donating money to public radio because it doesn't save children?

Yes. Sure you want radio, but they don't want to die. Who says your wants are more important?

Could you justify killing people for entertainment? Is this any different?

Comment author: 08 November 2013 03:32:26PM 1 point [-]

Sure you want radio, but they don't want to die. Who says your wants are more important?

My autonomy.

Comment author: [deleted] 08 November 2013 07:59:18AM 2 points [-]

Yes. Sure you want radio, but they don't want to die. Who says your wants are more important?

The fact that it's her own money?

Comment author: 26 December 2010 03:05:53PM 7 points [-]

Basically, I am leery of letting people choose their own factors when given a range of 1 being perfect life and 0 being death. For instance, a charity that cures blindness in impoverished sections of Africa, with a pro-this-charity treatment might choose 0.1 as blind, 0.9 as cured (blindness is hugely disadvantageous, giving back sight is therefore a huge improvement); an anti-this-charity treatment might choose 0.1 as blind and 0.3 as cured (the rest of their life still sucks). This means a QALY-based look at the charity could over- or under-estimate by as much as a factor of 4! Comparisons of charities based on QALYs that are gamed could, possibly, be only viable on order-of-magnitudes.

Comment author: 08 November 2013 07:33:29AM 0 points [-]

Is there a standard for DALYs?

I'm told that there's some kind of difference, but I still think of them as the same unit.

Comment author: 25 December 2010 09:10:21PM 11 points [-]

Should I feel guilty for donating money to public radio because it doesn't save children? No.

I agree and would go even further. Guilt is a terrible motivator and one that I would does not apply to anything involving charitable contributions. Well except for, say, mugging the aid workers to steal other's contributions. In such cases guilt serves an entirely different and somewhat useful role.

This is a simple question of "What do you want?" If you want to reduce malaria infections buy nets (probably). If you want to save a radio station save a radio station. If you have multiple things you want to prioritize them and do multiplications or approximations thereof.

Never let anyone make you feel guilty for doing things that achieve your goals. Even yourself.