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Clippy comments on Working hurts less than procrastinating, we fear the twinge of starting - Less Wrong
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Comments (138)
But that is not an exploit. You buy bucket and chamois from the agent who is procrastinating about washing his car. You plan to sell them back at a profit when the agent decides to work now, but that never happens.
I think that you are right that exponential discounting still allows the paradox of the agent who desires to do X someday, but will never get to the point where he desires to do X today. We need to add another "axiom of rationality" to forbid that. Exponential discounting is not enough. But that doesn't necessarily mean that there is an exploit there.
I don't think the agent ever gets to the point of regretting never having worked, because the warm-and-fuzzy arising from the intention to work persists.
Point conceded: inconsistent preferences do not imply a practical exploitable attack vector (aka "money/paperclip pump"). However, it is common in game-theoretical discussions for e.g. intransitive preferences to not actually hurt agents that hold them, and yet the inconsistency is treated as if it opened the agent to paperclip pumping.
For example, in the Allais problem, people have intransitive preferences, and Editor:Eliezer_Yudkowsky has specified exactly how you would money-pump such a person. Yet it requires very contorted, atypical situations to actually perform the money pump.