Agreed. I was just being lazy.
I already didn't believe in the Copenhagen Interpretation because of a Philosophy of Physics course where my professor took Copenhagen to be the problem statement instead of a possible solution. That whole sequence is more or less something one could find in a philosophy of physics book- though I don't myself think it is Eliezer's best series.
Before coming here my metaethics were already subjectivist/anti-realist. There's about a century's worth of conceptual distinctions that would make the Metaethics Sequence clearer- a few of which I've made in comments leading to constructive discussion. I feel like I'm constantly paraphrasing Hume in these discussions where people try to reason their way to a terminal value.
There is Philosophy of Math, where there was a +12 comment suggesting the suggestion be better tied to academic work on the subject. My comments were well upvoted and I was mostly just prodding Silas with the standard Platonist line plus a little Quine.
History and Philosophy of Science comes up. That discussion was basically a combination of Kuhn and Quine (plus a bunch of less recognizable names who talk about the same things).
Bayesian epistemology is, itself, a subfield of philosophy but people here seem mostly unfamiliar with the things academics consider to be open problems. Multiple times I've seen comments that take a couple paragraphs to hint at the fact that logical fallibility is an open problem for Bayesian epistemology- which suggests the author hadn't even read the SEP entry on the subject. The Dutch Book post I made recently (which I admittedly didn't motivate very well) was all philosophy.
Eliezer's posts on subjective probability are all Philosophy of Probability. Eliezer and other have written more generally about epistemology and in these cases they've almost always been repeating or synthesizing things said by people like Popper and Carnap.
On the subject of personal identity much of what I've said comes from a few papers I wrote on the subject and many times I've thought the discussion here would be clearer if supplemented by the concepts invented by people like Nozick and Parfit. In any case, this is a well developed subfield.
The decision theory stuff on this site, were it to be published, would almost certainly be published in a philosophy journal.
Causality hasn't been discussed here much except for people telling other people to read Judea Pearl (and sometimes people trying to summarize him, though often poorly). I heard about Pearl's book because it argues much the same thing as Making Things Happen which I read for a philosophy class. Woodward's book is a bit less mathy and more concerned with philosophical and conceptual issues. Nonetheless, both are fairly categorized as contemporary philosophy. Pearl may not hold a teaching position in philosophy- but he's widely cited as one and Causality won numerous awards from philosophical institutions.
The creator of the Sleeping Beauty Problem is a philosopher.
I'm certain I'll think of more examples after I publish this.
I would not underestimate the value of synthesizing the correct parts of philosophy vs. being exposed to a lot of philosophy.
The Bayesian epistemology stuff looks like something I should look into. The central logic of Hume was intuitively obvious to me, philosophy of math doesn't strike me as important once you convince yourself that you're allowed to do math, philosophy of science isn't important once you understand epistemology, personal identity isn't important except as it plays into ethics, which is too hard.
I'm interested in the fact that you seem t...
Eliezer Yudkowsky identifies scholarship as one of the Twelve Virtues of Rationality:
I think he's right, and I think scholarship doesn't get enough praise - even on Less Wrong, where it is regularly encouraged.
First, consider the evangelical atheist community to which I belong. There is a tendency for lay atheists to write "refutations" of theism without first doing a modicum of research on the current state of the arguments. This can get atheists into trouble when they go toe-to-toe with a theist who did do his homework. I'll share two examples:
The lesson I take from these and a hundred other examples is to employ the rationality virtue of scholarship. Stand on the shoulders of giants. We don't each need to cut our own path into a subject right from the point of near-total ignorance. That's silly. Just catch the bus on the road of knowledge paved by hundreds of diligent workers before you, and get off somewhere near where the road finally fades into fresh jungle. Study enough to have a view of the current state of the debate so you don't waste your time on paths that have already dead-ended, or on arguments that have already been refuted. Catch up before you speak up.
This is why, in more than 1000 posts on my own blog, I've said almost nothing that is original. Most of my posts instead summarize what other experts have said, in an effort to bring myself and my readers up to the level of the current debate on a subject before we try to make new contributions to it.
The Less Wrong community is a particularly smart and well-read bunch, but of course it doesn't always embrace the virtue of scholarship.
Consider the field of formal epistemology, an entire branch of philosophy devoted to (1) mathematically formalizing concepts related to induction, belief, choice, and action, and (2) arguing about the foundations of probability, statistics, game theory, decision theory, and algorithmic learning theory. These are central discussion topics at Less Wrong, and yet my own experience suggests that most Less Wrong readers have never heard of the entire field, let alone read any works by formal epistemologists, such as In Defense of Objective Bayesianism by Jon Williamson or Bayesian Epistemology by Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann.
Or, consider a recent post by Yudkowsky: Working hurts less than procrastinating, we fear the twinge of starting. The post attempts to make progress against procrastination by practicing single-subject phenomenology, rather than by first catching up with a quick summary of scientific research on procrastination. The post's approach to the problem looks inefficient to me. It's not standing on the shoulders of giants.
This post probably looks harsher than I mean it to be. After all, Less Wrong is pretty damn good at scholarship compared to most communities. But I think it could be better.
Here's my suggestion. Every time you're tempted to tackle a serious question in a subject on which you're not already an expert, ask yourself: "Whose giant shoulders can I stand on, here?"
Usually, you can answer the question by doing the following:
There are so many resources for learning available today, the virtue of scholarship has never in human history been so easy to practice.