You think that the one who ignores the literature while working on a problem that is unsolved in the literature is more blameworthy than one who ignores the literature while working on a problem that is solved in the literature?
I suppose it is about the same. I think anyone working on a problem while not knowing if it has been solved, partly solved or not solved at all in the literature is very blameworthy.
For example, if someone makes epistemological claim XYZ, even if no Bayesian epistemologist has refuted that exact claim, their general arguments can be used in evaluating the claim.
Right, I don't know the field nearly well enough to answer this question. I would be surprised if nothing in the literature was a generalizable concern that TDT/UDT should deal with.
If mainstream philosophers had come up with a decision theory better than evidential and causal (which are both wrong), then people who had already surpassed EDT and CDT would be forced to read them. But if they haven't, then lesswrong has already surpassed the limit of the philosophical literature. That's what I'm asking.
There have been lots of attempts to solve Newcomb's problem-by amending EDT or CDT, or inventing a new decision theory. Many, perhaps most of these, use concepts related to TDT/UDT- possible worlds, counterfactuals, and Jeffrey's notion of ratifiability (all three of these concepts are mentioned in Eliezer's paper). Again, I don't know the details of the major proposals, though skimming the literature it looks like none have been conclusive or totally convincing. But it seems plausible that the arguments which sink those theories might also sink the Less Wrong developed ones. It also seems very plausible that the theoretical innovations involved in those theories might be fruitful things for LW decision theorists to consider.
There have also been lots of things written about Newcomb's problem- papers that don't claim to solve anything but which claim to point out interesting features of this problem.
I don't really understand the resistance to reading the literature. Why would you think insight in this subject area would be restricted to a cloistered little internet community (wonderful though we are)?
I suppose it is about the same. I think anyone working on a problem while not knowing if it has been solved, partly solved or not solved at all in the literature is very blameworthy.
I was previously aware that Newcomb's problem was somewhere between partly solved and not solved at all, which is at least something. With the critique brought to my attention, I attempted cheap ways of figuring it out, first asking you and then reading the SEP article on your recommendation.
...Right, I don't know the field nearly well enough to answer this question. I would
Eliezer Yudkowsky identifies scholarship as one of the Twelve Virtues of Rationality:
I think he's right, and I think scholarship doesn't get enough praise - even on Less Wrong, where it is regularly encouraged.
First, consider the evangelical atheist community to which I belong. There is a tendency for lay atheists to write "refutations" of theism without first doing a modicum of research on the current state of the arguments. This can get atheists into trouble when they go toe-to-toe with a theist who did do his homework. I'll share two examples:
The lesson I take from these and a hundred other examples is to employ the rationality virtue of scholarship. Stand on the shoulders of giants. We don't each need to cut our own path into a subject right from the point of near-total ignorance. That's silly. Just catch the bus on the road of knowledge paved by hundreds of diligent workers before you, and get off somewhere near where the road finally fades into fresh jungle. Study enough to have a view of the current state of the debate so you don't waste your time on paths that have already dead-ended, or on arguments that have already been refuted. Catch up before you speak up.
This is why, in more than 1000 posts on my own blog, I've said almost nothing that is original. Most of my posts instead summarize what other experts have said, in an effort to bring myself and my readers up to the level of the current debate on a subject before we try to make new contributions to it.
The Less Wrong community is a particularly smart and well-read bunch, but of course it doesn't always embrace the virtue of scholarship.
Consider the field of formal epistemology, an entire branch of philosophy devoted to (1) mathematically formalizing concepts related to induction, belief, choice, and action, and (2) arguing about the foundations of probability, statistics, game theory, decision theory, and algorithmic learning theory. These are central discussion topics at Less Wrong, and yet my own experience suggests that most Less Wrong readers have never heard of the entire field, let alone read any works by formal epistemologists, such as In Defense of Objective Bayesianism by Jon Williamson or Bayesian Epistemology by Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann.
Or, consider a recent post by Yudkowsky: Working hurts less than procrastinating, we fear the twinge of starting. The post attempts to make progress against procrastination by practicing single-subject phenomenology, rather than by first catching up with a quick summary of scientific research on procrastination. The post's approach to the problem looks inefficient to me. It's not standing on the shoulders of giants.
This post probably looks harsher than I mean it to be. After all, Less Wrong is pretty damn good at scholarship compared to most communities. But I think it could be better.
Here's my suggestion. Every time you're tempted to tackle a serious question in a subject on which you're not already an expert, ask yourself: "Whose giant shoulders can I stand on, here?"
Usually, you can answer the question by doing the following:
There are so many resources for learning available today, the virtue of scholarship has never in human history been so easy to practice.