If the Predictor breaks sometimes, in a way dependent on the algorithm used, not on the decision made, then that's not decision-determined. That's decision-determined-unless-you-play-tit-for-tat, which doesn't count at all.
I think the fact that it's not decision-determined is fairly important, because that means it's not necessarily a Newcomblike problem. Haven't finished the manuscript yet, so I don't know all the implications of that, but I have my suspicions.
If the Predictor breaks sometimes, in a way dependent on the algorithm used, not on the decision made, then that's not decision-determined.
Yes, that's the mantra. But how do you unpack "dependent" and "breaks"? Dependent with respect to what alternatives (and how to think of those alternatives)? More importantly, how can you decide that something dependent on one thing doesn't depend on some other thing (while some uncertainty remains)?
As far as I can tell, all this dependence business has to be about resolution of logical uncertaint...
I have not seen any place to discuss Eliezer Yudkowsky's new paper, titled Timeless Decision Theory, so I decided to create a discussion post. (Have I missed an already existing post or discussion?)