dxu comments on A Bayesian Argument for the Resurrection of Jesus - Less Wrong
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Ignoring the fact that any argument that comes up with a number on the order of 10^39 is obviously flawed in some way, even if the flaw isn't itself obvious (I don't have the patience to read through the entire article and frankly doubt I would gain much from it, so that's about as far as my analysis on the article itself goes), any argument from human psychology is screened off by lower-level arguments. To put it directly: even allowing the argument as valid, simple physics says "no". For Jesus to be resurrected, the following had to have occurred:
So, now we have two options. We can assume approximate independence of the above three statements, in which case I wonder what you'd get if you multiplied their probabilities together, or we can contend that they were all caused by a common factor (Jesus being God), in which case I'd like someone to please calculate Kolmogorov complexity of God.
Either way, you're going to get a Bayes factor of more than 10^39 against the resurrection from scientific considerations alone, and that's assuming there was nothing wrong with the original argument from human psychology. Realistically speaking, there's simply no way you're going to get a Bayes factor of 10^39 out of an argument involving human behavior; we're far too noisy for that.
Ad hominem: I also note that the authors are Christians, which strongly suggests to me that motivated reasoning is occurring, even if I can't pinpoint where exactly the flaw(s) is/are. At the very least, there's some major hypothesis privileging going on; why are you looking at Jesus specifically? For example, I wonder what a Bayes calculation for Islam's account of Muhammad's vision of the angel Gabriel being true would look like?