A good nutshell description of the type of Bayesianism that many LWers think correct is objective Bayesianism with critical rationalism-like underpinnings. Where recursive justification hits bottom is particularly relevant. On my cursory skim, Albert only seems to be addressing "subjective" Bayesianism which allows for any choice of prior.
It seems to think the problem of the priors does in Bayesianism :-(
Popper seems outdated. Rejecting induction completely is not very realistic.
I hope you stick around - LW needs people who've read Popper. (However, I take that back if it turns out that you've only read Deutsch's simplified, evangelical caricature of him.)
Solomonoff Induction will keep going wrong in random and perverse ways because it pays no heed to theories as explanations.
This is at best unclear. If a person, or the entire scientific community, were given the task of competing with Solomonoff induction to predict an incoming data stream, then either (i) Solomonoff induction would eventually arrive at "the correct theory" (at least in the sense that it no longer 'keeps going wrong') or (ii) the human scientists would 'keep going wrong in random ways' (i.e. ways that seem random to the scientists) or both.
Talking about the need for 'good explanations' over and above mere predictive success is all very well, but it's not that helpful unless you can say something about what makes an explanation good. (It would be even more helpful if you could say something about how an AI could recognize a good explanation.)
I think the point you should be concentrating on is that human scientists do not face the same problem-situation as Solomonoff induction. We can choose what questions to work on, design experiments, and we're also blessed/cursed with the lack of any stable boundary between 'data' and 'theory'.
I hope you stick around - LW needs people who've read Popper. (However, I take that back if it turns out that you've only read Deutsch's simplified, evangelical caricature of him.)
Turning into a simplified caricature of Popper appears to be a memetic hazard of reading Popper. Not as bad as reading Rand, though.
I have just rediscovered an article by Max Albert on my hard drive which I never got around to reading that might interest others on Less Wrong. You can find the article here. It is an argument against Bayesianism and for Critical Rationalism (of Karl Popper fame).
Abstract:
Any thoughts?