A good nutshell description of the type of Bayesianism that many LWers think correct is objective Bayesianism with critical rationalism-like underpinnings. Where recursive justification hits bottom is particularly relevant. On my cursory skim, Albert only seems to be addressing "subjective" Bayesianism which allows for any choice of prior.
It seems to think the problem of the priors does in Bayesianism :-(
Popper seems outdated. Rejecting induction completely is not very realistic.
FYI that is a misleading statement of Critical Rationalism.
For one thing, Popper was not a "belief philosopher" so he wouldn't have stated it quite like that.
There are a lot of misleading statements about CR floating around. Most come from its opponents trying to make sense of it on their own terms. In trying to formulate it in a way that makes sense given their anti-CR premises, they change it. It's best to read primary sources for this.
I have just rediscovered an article by Max Albert on my hard drive which I never got around to reading that might interest others on Less Wrong. You can find the article here. It is an argument against Bayesianism and for Critical Rationalism (of Karl Popper fame).
Abstract:
Any thoughts?