On the other hand, Popper's idea that there is only falsification and no such thing as confirmation turns out to be incorrect.
There is neither a psychological nor a logical induction. Only the falsity of the theory can be inferred from empirical evidence and this inference is a purely deductive one.
That seems pretty cut and dried - so long as you understand the relationship between confirmation and induction. Popper asserts what Yudkowsky claims he says.
Also, Popper's position is wrong. Few philosophers of science ever bought it in the first place - and now things have moved on, so this is merely of historical interest.
You have to actually read Popper's books to understand what he means. You are taking short summaries of conclusions without understanding Popper's arguments behind them.
For example, when Popper says "theory" there he does not mean any theory. He means a universal theory. This is the kind of thing one finds out by reading him.
Popper gave an argument in LScD along these lines:
Consider a theory, T, that all swans are white. T is a universal theory.
No confirming evidence can prove T is true. You can see 5 white swans or 500 or 50 million. Still might...
I have just rediscovered an article by Max Albert on my hard drive which I never got around to reading that might interest others on Less Wrong. You can find the article here. It is an argument against Bayesianism and for Critical Rationalism (of Karl Popper fame).
Abstract:
Any thoughts?