A good nutshell description of the type of Bayesianism that many LWers think correct is objective Bayesianism with critical rationalism-like underpinnings. Where recursive justification hits bottom is particularly relevant. On my cursory skim, Albert only seems to be addressing "subjective" Bayesianism which allows for any choice of prior.
It seems to think the problem of the priors does in Bayesianism :-(
Popper seems outdated. Rejecting induction completely is not very realistic.
You obviously haven't read much of the heuristics and biases program.
Would you agree that this is a bit condescending and you're basically assuming in advance that you know more than me?
I actually have read about it and disagree with it on purpose, not out of ignorance.
Does that interest you?
And on the other hand, do you know anything about universality? You made no comment about that. Given that I said the universality issue trumps the details you discuss in your bullet points, and you didn't dispute that, I'm not quite sure why you are providing these details, other than perhaps a simple assumption that I had no idea what I was talking about and that my position can be ignored without reply because, once my deep ignorance is addressed, I'll forget all about this Popperian nonsense..
Incorrect. E.T. Jaynes book Probability Theory: The Logic of Science gives a proof in the first two chapters.
Ordered but there's an error in the library system and I'm not sure if it will actually come or not. I don't suppose the proof is online anywhere (I can access major article databases), or that you could give it or an outline? BTW I wonder why the proof takes 2 chapters. Proofs are normally fairly short things. And, well, even if it was 100 pages of straight math I don't see why you'd break it into separate chapters.
You misunderstand me. What I meant was that as a Bayesian I force my own thoughts to follow certain rules. I don't force other people to do so.
No I understood that. And that is authoritarian in regard to your own thoughts. It's still a bad attitude even if you don't do it to other people. When you force your thoughts to follow certain rules all the epistemological problems with authority and force will plague you (do you know what those are?).
Regarding Popper, you say you don't agree with the common criticisms of him. OK. Great. So, what are your criticisms? You didn't say.
If this looks circular that's because it is, but it works.
If there was an epistemology that didn't endorse circular arguments, would you prefer it over yours which does?
Would you agree that this is a bit condescending and you're basically assuming in advance that you know more than me?
I actually have read about it and disagree with it on purpose, not out of ignorance.
I apologise for this, but I really don't see how anyone could go through those studies without losing all faith in human intuition.
I don't suppose the proof is online anywhere (I can access major article databases), or that you could give it or an outline?
The text can be found online. My browser (Chrome) wouldn't open the files but you may have more lu...
I have just rediscovered an article by Max Albert on my hard drive which I never got around to reading that might interest others on Less Wrong. You can find the article here. It is an argument against Bayesianism and for Critical Rationalism (of Karl Popper fame).
Abstract:
Any thoughts?