Bayesianism versus Critical Rationalism

Jayson_Virissimo

I have just rediscovered an article by Max Albert on my hard drive which I never got around to reading that might interest others on Less Wrong. You can find the article here. It is an argument against Bayesianism and for Critical Rationalism (of Karl Popper fame).

Abstract:

Economists claim that principles of rationality are normative principles. Nevertheless,
they go on to explain why it is in a person’s own interest to be rational. If this were true,
being rational itself would be a means to an end, and rationality could be interpreted in
a non-normative or naturalistic way. The alternative is not attractive: if the only argument
in favor of principles of rationality were their intrinsic appeal, a commitment to
rationality would be irrational, making the notion of rationality self-defeating. A comprehensive
conception of rationality should recommend itself: it should be rational to be
rational. Moreover, since rational action requires rational beliefs concerning means-ends
relations, a naturalistic conception of rationality has to cover rational belief formation including
the belief that it is rational to be rational. The paper considers four conceptions
of rationality and asks whether they can deliver the goods: Bayesianism, perfect rationality
(just in case that it differs from Bayesianism), ecological rationality (as a version of
bounded rationality), and critical rationality, the conception of rationality characterizing
critical rationalism.

Any thoughts?

A good nutshell description of the type of Bayesianism that many LWers think correct is objective Bayesianism with critical rationalism-like underpinnings. Where recursive justification hits bottom is particularly relevant. On my cursory skim, Albert only seems to be addressing "subjective" Bayesianism which allows for any choice of prior.

4XiXiDu15y

For people like me who have no clue, if you scroll down a bit here there is a comparison (so you get a vague idea): * Subjective Bayesians emphasize the relative lack of rational constraints on prior probabilities. * Objective Bayesians (e.g., Jaynes and Rosenkrantz) emphasize the extent to which prior probabilities are rationally constrained. More here: [...] And of course Critical rationalism: * Critical rationalism explicitly proposes a third decision rule for rational belief formation: it is rational to believe a hypothesis if it has so far withstood serious criticism better than its competitors.

5Matt_Simpson15y

I'll add that a decent summary of the position espoused in Where recursive justification hits bottom (linked in the grandparent) is that critical rationalism (or something like it) entails objective Bayesianism. It both entails the use of Baye's rule to update on information and it entails a set of correct priors.

1Jayson_Virissimo15y

Thanks for helping me realize that Critical Rationalism and Bayesianism can be compliments rather than substitutes.

2Elliot Temple15y

FYI that is a misleading statement of Critical Rationalism. For one thing, Popper was not a "belief philosopher" so he wouldn't have stated it quite like that. There are a lot of misleading statements about CR floating around. Most come from its opponents trying to make sense of it on their own terms. In trying to formulate it in a way that makes sense given their anti-CR premises, they change it. It's best to read primary sources for this.

It seems to think the problem of the priors does in Bayesianism :-(

Popper seems outdated. Rejecting induction completely is not very realistic.

2Jayson_Virissimo15y

Critical Rationalism has advanced somewhat since Popper. [...] I think Hume would agree.

2timtyler15y

Not very significantly. The revolution happened mostly without them.

5Jayson_Virissimo15y

After reconsidering your statement, I have come to agree.

1Elliot Temple15y

Who do you think advanced CR? I think only David Deutsch has improved on Popper.

2Jayson_Virissimo15y

I had in mind Miller and Deutsch.

2Elliot Temple15y

Which Miller publication or argument?

5Jayson_Virissimo15y

Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defense and Out of Error: Further Essays On Critical Rationalism.

1Elliot Temple15y

Thanks I ordered them. I'd only read individual articles of his.

-2[anonymous]15y

Hume would agree because he never accepted the full force of his own argument. He couldn't imagine how people can create knowledge without induction even though he could see that induction is impossible. It took Popper to explain how knowledge can be created without induction.

I agree to the explicit meaning of this statement but you are sneaking in connotations. Let us look more closely about what 'authoritarian' means.

I'm not trying to argue by connotation. It's hard to avoid connotations and I think the words I'm using are accurate.

You probably mean it in the sense of centralised as opposed to decentralized control, and in that sense I will bite the bullet and say that thinking should be authoritarian.

That's not what I had in mind, but I do think that centralized control is a mistake.

I take fallibilism seriously: any idea may be wrong, and many are. Mistakes are common.

Consequently, it's a bad idea to set something up to be in charge of your whole mind. It will have mistakes. And corrections to those mistakes which aren't in charge will sometimes get disregarded.

However, the word has a number of negative connotations. Corruption, lack of respect for human rights and massive bureaucracy that stifles innovation to name a few. None of those apply to my thinking process, so even though the term may be technically correct it is somewhat intellectually dishonest to use it, something more value-neutral like 'centralized control' might be better.

Those 3 things are not what I had in mind. But I think the term is accurate. You yourself used the word "force". Force is authoritarian. The reason for that is that the forcer is always claiming some kind of authority -- I'm right, you're wrong, and never mind further discussion, just obey.

You may find this statement strange. How can this concept apply to ideas within one mind? Doesn't it only apply to disagreements between separate people?

But ideas are roughly autonomous portions of a mind (see: http://fallibleideas.com/ideas). They can conflict, they can force each other in the sense of one taking priority over another without the conflict being settled rationally.

Force is a fundamentally epistemological concept. Its political meanings are derivative. It is about non-truth-seeking ways of approaching disputes. It's about not reaching agreement by one idea wins out anyway (by force).

Settling conflicts between the ideas in your mind by force is authoritarian. It is saying some ideas have authority/preference/priority/whatever, so they get their way. I reject this approach. If you don't find a rational way to resolve a conflict between ideas, you should say you don't know the answer, never pick a side b/c the ideas you deem the central controllers are on that side, and they have the authority to force other ideas to conform to them.

This is a big topic, and not so easy to explain. But it is important.

Force, in the sense of solving difficulties without argument, is not what I meant when I said I force my thoughts to follow certain rules. I don't even see how that could work, my individual ideas do not argue with each-other, if they did I would speak to a psychiatrist.

I'm afraid you are going to have to explain in more detail.

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Bayesianism versus Critical Rationalism

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