Big topic, but what not to do is use force: arbitrarily decide which side wins (often based on some kind of authority or justification), and declare it the winner even though the substance of the other side is not addressed. Don't force some of your ideas, which have substantive unaddressed points, to defer to the ideas you put in charge (granted authority).
I certainly don't advocate deciding arbitrarily. The would fall into the fallacy of just making sh*t up which is the exact of everything Bayes stands for. However, I don't have to be arbitrary, most of the ideas that run up against Bayes don't have the same level of support. In general, I've found that a heuristic of "pick the idea that has a mathematical proof backing it up" seems to work fairly well.
There are also sometimes other clues, rationalisations tend to have a slightly different 'feel' to them if you introspect closely (in my experience at any rate), and when the ideas going up against Bayes seem to include a disproportionately high number of rationalisations, I start to notice a pattern.
I also disagree about ideas being autonomous. Ideas are entangled with each other in complex webs of mutual support and anti-support.
I also disagree about ideas being autonomous. Ideas are entangled with each other in complex webs of mutual support and anti-support.
Did you read my link? Where did the argument about approximately autonomous ideas go wrong?
However, I don't have to be arbitrary, most of the ideas that run up against Bayes don't have the same level of support.
Well this changes the topic. But OK. How do you decide what has support? What is support and how does it differ from consistency?
I have just rediscovered an article by Max Albert on my hard drive which I never got around to reading that might interest others on Less Wrong. You can find the article here. It is an argument against Bayesianism and for Critical Rationalism (of Karl Popper fame).
Abstract:
Any thoughts?