A good nutshell description of the type of Bayesianism that many LWers think correct is objective Bayesianism with critical rationalism-like underpinnings. Where recursive justification hits bottom is particularly relevant. On my cursory skim, Albert only seems to be addressing "subjective" Bayesianism which allows for any choice of prior.
It seems to think the problem of the priors does in Bayesianism :-(
Popper seems outdated. Rejecting induction completely is not very realistic.
Applying dutch book arguments to real life situations always goes way behind deduction and definitions, yes.
lets say "there is a need to assign probabilities to events, no probability can be less than 0 or more than 1 and probabilities of mutually exclusive events should add".
A need? Are you talking about morality now?
Why are we saying this? You now speak of probabilities of events. Previously we were discussing epistemology which is about ideas. I object to assigning probabilities to the truth of ideas. Assigning them to events is OK when
1) the laws of physics are indeterministic (never, as far as we know)
2) we have incomplete information and want to make a prediction that would be deterministic except that we have to put several possibilities in some places, which leads to several possible answers. and probability is a reasonable way to organize thoughts about that.
So what?
Can you give an example of what you mean by "moral knowledge"?
Murder is immoral.
Being closed minded makes ones life worse because it sabotages improvement.
Can you give an example of what you mean by "moral knowledge"?
Murder is immoral.
Are you saying Popper would evaluate "Murder is immoral." in the same way as "Atoms are made up of electrons and a nucleus."? How would you test this? What would you consider a proof of it?
I prefer to leave such statements undefined, since people disagree too much on what 'morality' means. I am a moral realist to some, a relativist to others, and an error theorist to other others. I could prove the statement for many common non-confused defin...
I have just rediscovered an article by Max Albert on my hard drive which I never got around to reading that might interest others on Less Wrong. You can find the article here. It is an argument against Bayesianism and for Critical Rationalism (of Karl Popper fame).
Abstract:
Any thoughts?