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Perplexed comments on Theists are wrong; is theism? - Less Wrong
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I contend that there is evidence for a god. Observation: Things tend to have causes. Observation: Agenty things are better at causing interesting things than non-agenty things. Observation: We find ourselves in a very interesting universe.
Those considerations are Bayesian evidence. The fact that many, many smart people have been theistic is Bayesian evidence. So now you have to start listing the evidence for the alternate hypothesis, no?
Do you mean all arguments on Christian internet fora, or what? There's a vast amount of theology written by people dedicated to finding truth. They might not be good at finding truth, but it is nonetheless what is motivating them.
I should really write a post on the principle of charity...
I realize this is rhetoric, but still... seriously? The question of whether the universe came into being via an agenty optimization process is only slightly more interesting than teapots orbiting planets?
I agree that theism tends to be a very damaging belief in many contexts, and I think it is good that you are fighting against its more insipid/irrational forms.
Your choice of wording here makes it obvious that you are aware of the counter-argument based on the Anthropic Principle. (Observation: uninteresting venues tend not to be populated by observers.) So, what is your real point?
I would think "Observers who find their surroundings interesting duplicate their observer-ness better" is an even-less-mind-bending anthropic-style argument.
Also this keeps clear that "interesting" is more a property of observers than of places.
(nods) Yeah, I would expect life forms that fail to be interested in the aspects of their surroundings that pertain to their ability to produce successful offspring to die out pretty quickly.
That said, once you're talking about life forms with sufficiently general intelligences that they become interested in things not directly related to that, it starts being meaningful to talk about phenomena of more general interest.
Of course, "general" does not mean "universal."
If we have a prior of 100 to 1 against agent-caused universes, and .1% of non-agent universes have observers observing interestingness while 50% of agent-caused universes have it, what is the posterior probability of being in an agent-caused universe?
I make it about 83% if you ignore the anthropic issues (by assuming that all universes have observers, or that having observers is independent of being interesting, for example). But if you want to take anthropic issues into account, you are only allowed to take the interestingness of this universe as evidence, not its observer-ladenness. So the answer would have to be "not enough data".
You can't not be allowed to take the observer-ladenness of a universe as evidence.
Limiting case: Property X is true of a universe if and only if it has observers. May we take the fact that observers exist in our universe as evidence that observers exist there?
I have no idea what probability should be assigned to non-agent universes having observers observing interesting things (though for agent universes, 50% seems too low), but I also think your prior is too high.
I think there is some probability that there are no substantial universe simulations, and some probability that the vast majority of universes are simulations, but even if we live in a multiverse where simulated universes are commonplace, our particular universe seems like a very odd choice to simulate unless the basement universe is very similar to our own. I also assign a (very) small probability to the proposition that our universe is computationally capable of simulating universes like itself (even with extreme time dilation), so that also seems unlikely.
Probabilities were for example purposes only. I made them up because they were nice to calculate with and sounded halfway reasonable. I will not defend them. If you request that I come up with my real probability estimates, I will have to think harder.
Ah, well your more general point was well-made. I don't think better numbers are really important. It's all too fuzzy for me to be at all confident about.
I still retain my belief that it is implausible that we are in a universe simulation. If I am in a simulation, I expect that it is more likely that I am by myself (and that conscious or not, you are part of the simulation created in response to me), moderately more likely that there are a small group of humans being simulated with other humans and their environment dynamically generated, and overall very unlikely that the creators have bothered to simulate any part of physical reality that we aren't directly observing (including other people). Ultimately, none of these seem likely enough for me to bother considering for very long.
The first part of your belief that "it is implausible that we are in a universe simulation" appears to be based on the argument:
If simulationism, then solipsism is likely.
Solipsism is unlikely, so . . .
Chain of logic aside, simulationism does not imply solipsism. Simulating N localized space-time patterns in one large simulation can be significantly cheaper than simulating N individual human simulations. So some simulated individuals may exist in small solipsist sims, but the great majority of conscious sims will find themselves in larger shared simulations.
Presumably a posthuman intelligence on earth would be interested in earth as a whole system, and would simulate this entire system. Simulating full human-mind equivalents is something of a sweet spot in the space of approximations.
There is a massive sweet spot, an extremely effecient method, of simulating a modern computer - which is to simulate it at the level of it's turing equivalent circuit. Simulating it at a level below this - say at the molecular level, is just a massive waste of resources, while any simulation above this loses accuracy completely.
It is postulated that a similar simulation scale separation exists for human minds, which naturally relates to uploads and AI.
I don't understand why human-mind equivalents are special in this regard. This seems very anthropocentric, but I could certainly be misinterpreting what you said.
Cheaper, but not necessarily more efficient. It matters which answers one is looking for, or which goals one is after. It seems unlikely to me that my life is directed well enough to achieve interesting goals or answer interesting questions that a superintelligence might pose, but it seems even more unlikely that simulating 6 billion humans, in the particular way they appear (to me) to exist is an efficient way to answer most questions either.
I'd like to stay away from telling God what to be interested in, but out of the infinite space of possibilities, Earth seems too banal and languorous to be the one in N that have been chosen for the purpose of simulation, especially if the basement universe has a different physics.
If the basement universe matches our physics, I'm betting on the side that says simulating all the minds on Earth and enough other stuff to make the simulation consistent is an expensive enough proposition that it won't be worthwhile to do it many times. Maybe I'm wrong; there's no particular reason why simulating all of humanity in the year of 2011 needs to take more than 10^18 J, so maybe there's a "real" milky way that's currently running 10^18 planet-scale sims. Even that doesn't seem like a big enough number to convince me that we are likely to be one of those.
I meant there is probably some sweet spot in the space of [human-mind] approximations, because of scale separation, which I elaborated on a little later with the computer analogy.
Cheaper implies more efficient, unless the individual human simulations somehow have a dramatically higher per capita utility.
A solipsist universe has extraneous patchwork complexity. Even assuming that all of the non-biological physical processes are grossly approximated (not unreasonable given current simulation theory in graphics), they still may add up to a cost exceeding that of one human mind.
But of course a world with just one mind is not an accurate simulation, so you now you need to populate it with a huge number of pseudo-minds which functionally are indistinguishable from the perspective of our sole real observer but somehow use much less computational resources.
Now imagine a graph of simulation accuracy vs computational cost of a pseudo-mind. Rather than being linear, I believe it is sharply exponential, or J-shaped with a single large spike near the scale separation point.
The jumping point is where the pseudo-mind becomes a real actual conscious observer of it's own.
The rationale for this cost model and the scale separation point can be derived from what we know about simulating computers.
Perhaps not your life in particular, but human life on earth today?
Simulating 6 billion humans will probably be the only way to truly understand what happened today from the perspective of our future posthuman descendants. The alternatives are . . . creating new physical planets? Simulation will be vastly more efficient than that.
The basement reality is highly unlikely to have different physics. The vast majority of simulations we create today are based on approximations of currently understood physics, and I don't expect this to every change - simulations have utility for simulators.
I'm a little confused about the 10^18 number.
From what I recall, at the limits of computation one kg of matter can hold roughly 10^30 bits, and a human mind is in the vicinity of 10^15 bits or less. So at the molecular limits a kg of matter could hold around a quadrillion souls - an entire human galactic civilization. A skyscraper of such matter could give you 10^8 kg .. and so on. Long before reaching physical limits, posthumans would be able to simulate many billions of entire earth histories. At the physical molecular limits, they could turn each of the moon's roughly 10^22 kg into an entire human civilization, for a total of 10^37 minds.
The potential time scale compression are nearly as vast - with estimated speed limits at around 10^15 ops/bit/sec in ordinary matter at ordinary temperatures, vs at most 10^4 ops/bit/sec in human brains, although not dramatically higher than the 10^9 ops/bit/sec of today's circuits. The potential speedup of more than 10^10 over biological brains allows for about one hundred years per second of sidereal time.
I understand that for any mind, there is probably an "ideal simulation level" which has the fidelity of a more expensive simulation at a much lower cost, but I still don't understand why human-mind equivalents are important here.
Which seems pretty reasonable to me. Why should the value of simulating minds be linear rather than logarithmic in the number of minds?
Agreed, but I also think that the cost of simulating the relevant stuff necessary to simulate N minds might be close to linear in N.
I agree, though as a minor note if cost is the Y-axis the graph has to have a vertical asymptote, so it has to grow much faster than exponential at the end. Regardless, I don't think we can be confident that consciousness occurs at an inflection point or a noticeable bend.
I suspect that some pseudo-minds must be conscious observers some of the time, but that they can be turned off most of the time and just be updated offline with experiences that their conscious mind will integrate and patch up without noticing. I'm not sure this would work with many mind-types, but I think it would work with human minds, which have a strong bias to maintaining coherence, even at the cost of ignoring reality. If I'm being simulated, I suspect that this is happening even to me on a regular basis, and possibly happening much more often the less I interact with someone.
Updating on the condition that we closely match the ancestors of our simulators, I think it's pretty reasonable that we could be chosen to be simulated. This is really the only plausible reason I can think of to chose us in particular. I'm still dubious as to the value doing so will have to our descendants.
Actually, I made a mistake, so it's reasonable to be confused. 20 W seems to be a reasonable upper limit to the cost of simulating a human mind. I don't know how much lower the lower bound should be, but it might not be more than an order of magnitude less. This gives 10^11 W for six billion, (4x) 10^18 J for one year.
I don't think it's reasonable to expect all the matter in the domain of a future civilization to be used to its computational capacity. I think it's much more likely that the energy output of the Milky Way is a reasonably likely bound to how much computation will go on there. This certainly doesn't have to be the case, but I don't see superintelligences annihilating matter at a dramatically faster rate in order to provide massively more power to the remainder of the matter around. The universe is going to die soon enough as it is. (I could be very short sighted about this) Anyway, energy output of the Milky Way is around 5x10^36 W. I divided this by Joules instead of by Watts, so the second number I gave was 10^18, when it should have been (5x) 10^24.
I maintain that energy, not quantum limits of computation in matter, will bound computational cost on the large scale. Throwing our moon into the Sun in order to get energy out of it is probably a better use of it as raw materials than turning it into circuitry. Likewise for time compression, convince me that power isn't a problem.
To uploads, yes, but a faithful simulation of the universe, or even a small portion of it. would have to track a lot more variables than the processes of the human minds within it.
Optimal approximate simulation algorithms are all linear with respect to total observer sensory input. This relates to the philosophical issue of observer dependence in QM and whether or not the proverbial unobserved falling tree actually exists.
So the cost of simulating a matrix with N observers is not expected to be dramatically more than simulating the N observer minds alone - C*N. The phenomena of dreams is something of a practical proof.
Variables that aren't being observed still have to be tracked, since they affect the things that are being observed.
Dreams are not a very good proof of concept given that they are not coherent simulations of any sort of reality, and can be recognized as artificial not only after the fact, but during with a bit of introspection and training.
In dreams, large amounts of data can be omitted or spontaneously introduced without the dreamer noticing anything is wrong unless they're lucid. In reality, everything we observe can be examined for signs of its interactions with things that we haven't observed, and that data adds up to pictures that are coherent and consistent with each other.