CEV will decide. In general, it seems unlikely that the preferences of nonsentient objects will have moral value.
Edit: Looking back, this comment doesn't really address the parent. Extrapolated human volition will be used to determine which things are morally significant. I think it is relatively probable that wireheading might turn out to be morally necessary. Eliezer does think that the preferences of a paperclip maximizer would have moral value if one existed. (If a nonexistent paperclip maximizer had moral worth, so would a nonexistent paperclip minimizer. This isn't completely certain, because paperclip maximizers might gain moral significance from a property other than existence that is not shared with paperclip minimizers, but at this point, this is just speculation and we can do little better without CEV.) A nonsentient paperclip maximizer probably has no more moral value than a rock with "make paperclips" written on the side.
The reason that CEV is only based on human preferences is because, as humans, we want to create an algorithm that does what is right and humans are the only things we have that know what is right. If other species have moral value then humans, if we knew more, would care about them. If there is nothing in human minds that could motivate us to care about some specific thing, than what reason could we possibly have for designing an AI to care about that thing?
near future : "you are paper clip maximazer! Kill him!"
In You Provably Can't Trust Yourself, Eliezer tried to figured out why his audience didn't understand his meta-ethics sequence even after they had followed him through philosophy of language and quantum physics. Meta-ethics is my specialty, and I can't figure out what Eliezer's meta-ethical position is. And at least at this point, professionals like Robin Hanson and Toby Ord couldn't figure it out, either.
Part of the problem is that because Eliezer has gotten little value from professional philosophy, he writes about morality in a highly idiosyncratic way, using terms that would require reading hundreds of posts to understand. I might understand Eliezer's meta-ethics better if he would just cough up his positions on standard meta-ethical debates like cognitivism, motivation, the sources of normativity, moral epistemology, and so on. Nick Beckstead recently told me he thinks Eliezer's meta-ethical views are similar to those of Michael Smith, but I'm not seeing it.
If you think you can help me (and others) understand Eliezer's meta-ethical theory, please leave a comment!
Update: This comment by Richard Chappell made sense of Eliezer's meta-ethics for me.