When you say "Nothing is fundamentally moral" can you explain what it would be like if something was fundamentally moral?

He did, by implication, in describing what it's like if nothing is:

There is nothing that would have value if it existed in an isolated universe all by itself that contained no valuers.

Clearly, many of the items on EY's list, such as fun, humor, and justice, require the existence of valuers. The question above then amounts to whether all items of moral goodness require the existence of valuers. I think the question merits an answer, even if (see below) it might not be the one lukeprog is most curious about.

Or, perhaps more clearly, "intrinsic goodness," following Korsgaard [...]

Unfortunately, lukeprog changed the terms in the middle of the discussion. Not that there is anything wrong with the new question (and I like EY's answer).