We previously debated the disagreements between those with different values here.
The dictionary apparently supports the idea that any conflict is a disagreement.
To understand the other side of the argument, I think it helps to look at this:
all disagreements are about facts. What else would you be talking about?
One side has redefined "disagreement" to mean "a difference of opinion over facts"!
I think that explains much of the sound and fury surrounding the issue.
A "difference of opinion over goals" is not a "difference of opinion over facts".
However, note that different goals led to the cigarette companies denying the link between cigarettes and cancer - and also led to oil company AGW denialism - which caused many real-world disagreements.
All of which leaves me with the same question I started with. If I know what questions you and I give different answers to -- be they questions about facts, values, goals, or whatever else -- what is added to my understanding of the situation by asserting that we disagree, or don't disagree?
ata's reply was that "we disagree" additionally indicates that we can potentially converge on a common answer by arguing. That also seems to be what EY was getting at about hot air and rocks.
That makes sense to me, and sure, it's additionally worth clarifying...
In You Provably Can't Trust Yourself, Eliezer tried to figured out why his audience didn't understand his meta-ethics sequence even after they had followed him through philosophy of language and quantum physics. Meta-ethics is my specialty, and I can't figure out what Eliezer's meta-ethical position is. And at least at this point, professionals like Robin Hanson and Toby Ord couldn't figure it out, either.
Part of the problem is that because Eliezer has gotten little value from professional philosophy, he writes about morality in a highly idiosyncratic way, using terms that would require reading hundreds of posts to understand. I might understand Eliezer's meta-ethics better if he would just cough up his positions on standard meta-ethical debates like cognitivism, motivation, the sources of normativity, moral epistemology, and so on. Nick Beckstead recently told me he thinks Eliezer's meta-ethical views are similar to those of Michael Smith, but I'm not seeing it.
If you think you can help me (and others) understand Eliezer's meta-ethical theory, please leave a comment!
Update: This comment by Richard Chappell made sense of Eliezer's meta-ethics for me.