he answer you get is the answer to "what should_X X do?" On EY's theory, when you ask "what should X do?", the answer you get is the answer to "what should_Y X do?" where Y is constant across all X's.
Y is presuably varying wth somethjng, or why put it in?.
. The apparent subjectivity comes from thinking that there is a separate "should" apart from any "should_X, and then subtly changing the definition of "should" when someone different asks or someone different is asked about.
I don't follow. Thinkking there is a should that is separate from any should_X is the basis of objecivity.
The basis of subjectivity is having a quesstion that can be valdily answered by reference to a speakers beliefs and desires alone. "What flavour of ice cream would I choose" works that way. So does any other case of acti g ona prefrerence, any other "would". Since you have equated shoulds with woulds, the shoulds are subjective as well..
There are objective facts about what a subject would do, just as it isan objective fact that sos-and-so has a liking for Chocoalte Chip, but these objective facts don't negate the existence of subjectivity. Something is objectice and not subjective where there are no valud answers based on reference to a subjects beliefs and desires. I don't think that is the case here.
Then, in the strongest form of EY's theory, should = would_want_Human. In other words, only would_want_Human has normativity.
The claim that only should_Human is normative contradicts the claim that any would-want isa a should-want. If normativity kicks in for any "would", what does bringing in the human level add.
Every time we ask "what should X do?" we're asking "what would_want_Human X do?" which gives the same answer no matter who X is or who is asking the question (though nonhumans won't often ask this question).
Well, that version of the theory is objective, or intersubjecive enough. It just isnt the same as the version of the theory that equates individual woulds and shoulds. And it relies on a convergence that might not arrive in practice.
Y is presuably varying wth somethjng, or why put it in?.
To make it clear that "should" is just a particular "should_Y." Or, using the other terminology, "should" is a particular "would_want_Y."
The basis of subjectivity is having a quesstion that can be valdily answered by reference to a speakers beliefs and desires alone.
I agree with this. If the question was "how do I best satisfy my preferences?" then the answer changes with who the speaker is. But, on the theory, "should" is a rigid desi...
In You Provably Can't Trust Yourself, Eliezer tried to figured out why his audience didn't understand his meta-ethics sequence even after they had followed him through philosophy of language and quantum physics. Meta-ethics is my specialty, and I can't figure out what Eliezer's meta-ethical position is. And at least at this point, professionals like Robin Hanson and Toby Ord couldn't figure it out, either.
Part of the problem is that because Eliezer has gotten little value from professional philosophy, he writes about morality in a highly idiosyncratic way, using terms that would require reading hundreds of posts to understand. I might understand Eliezer's meta-ethics better if he would just cough up his positions on standard meta-ethical debates like cognitivism, motivation, the sources of normativity, moral epistemology, and so on. Nick Beckstead recently told me he thinks Eliezer's meta-ethical views are similar to those of Michael Smith, but I'm not seeing it.
If you think you can help me (and others) understand Eliezer's meta-ethical theory, please leave a comment!
Update: This comment by Richard Chappell made sense of Eliezer's meta-ethics for me.