HonoreDB comments on You're in Newcomb's Box - Less Wrong

40 Post author: HonoreDB 05 February 2011 08:46PM

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Comment author: datadataeverywhere 01 February 2011 04:56:25PM 2 points [-]

Others in this thread have pointed this out, but I will try to articulate my point a little more clearly.

Decision theories that require us to two-box do so because we have incomplete information about the environment. We might be in a universe where Omega thinks that we'll one-box; if we think that Omega is nearly infallible, we increase this probability by choosing to one-box. Note that probability is about our own information, not about the universe. We're not modifying the universe, we're refining our estimates.

If the box is transparent, and we can see the money, we simply don't care what Omega says. As long as we trust that the bottom won't fall out (or any number of other possibilities), we can make our decision because our information (about which universe we are in) is not incomplete.

Likewise, our information about whether we exist is not incomplete; we can't change it by choosing to go against the genes that got us here.

For situations where our knowledge is incomplete, we actually can derive information (about what kind of a world we inhabit) from our desires, but it is evidence, not certainty, and certainly not acasual negotiation. We can easily have evidence that outweighs this relatively meager data.

Comment author: HonoreDB 01 February 2011 05:11:27PM 6 points [-]

If the box is transparent, and we can see the money, we simply don't care what Omega says. As long as we trust that the bottom won't fall out (or any number of other possibilities), we can make our decision because our information (about which universe we are in) is not incomplete.

Do you pay the money in Parfit's Hitchhiker? Do you drink Kavka's toxin?

Comment author: datadataeverywhere 01 February 2011 05:25:38PM 4 points [-]

Good question, but permit me to contrast the difference.

You are the hitchhiker; recognizing the peril of your situation, you wisely choose to permanently self-modify yourself to be an agent that will pay the money. Of course, you then pay the money afterward, because that's what kind of an agent you are.

You appear, out of nowhere, and seem to be a hitchhiker that was just brought into town. Omega informs you that you of the above situation. If Omega is telling the truth, you have no choice whether to pay or not, but if you decide not to pay, you cannot undo the fact that Paul picked you up---apparently Omega was wrong.

In the first, you have incomplete information about what will happen. By self-modifying to determine which world you will be in, you resolve that. In the second, you already got to town, and no longer need to appease Paul.

Kavka's toxin is a problem with a somewhat more ambiguous setup, but the same reasoning will apply to the version I think you are talking about.