ArisKatsaris comments on You're in Newcomb's Box - Less Wrong

40 Post author: HonoreDB 05 February 2011 08:46PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (172)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: ArisKatsaris 01 February 2011 09:04:28PM *  3 points [-]

Rationalists should win.

In this scenario two-boxers get 200$ and exist, while one-boxers get 100$ and exist.

Two-boxers will be numerically fewer, because Prometheus is biased in favour of irrationality, but nonetheless it'll be two-boxers that'll be winning. That's the opposite of two-boxers in the Newcomb problem.

Comment author: HonoreDB 01 February 2011 10:43:15PM 25 points [-]

It looks like you're trying to trade decreased measure for increased utility.

Comment author: ArisKatsaris 01 February 2011 11:34:27PM *  6 points [-]

Nice icon, though my reasoning is the exact opposite than that of Quantum Suicide. I have no shared identity with the people who would one-box here, so I don't need to one-box in order to increase their chances at having existed -- if anything such an action would increase the stupidity levels in the multiverse.

Even a one-boxer would have to be particularly weird to want to increase the amplitude of his universe's configuration, as if that would affect his own life at all.

Quantum Suicide on the other hand assumes a shared identity between the people who'll die and the people who'll suffer permanent brain damage with a bullet lodged on their brain, and the people who'll have their consciousness magically copied by magical aliens before they kill themselves. I don't assume shared identity, and that's why I two-box here, quantum suiciders on the other hand assume it and that's why they fail.