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Dorikka comments on You're in Newcomb's Box - Less Wrong
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Er...right. I accidentally filled in the first bit with the actual Newcomb's Problem. (In this post, I find the word 'Newcomb' in the title to be misleading unless there's some Newcomb-like aspect that I'm missing.)
So, upon rereading the first bit, I think that two-boxing is definitely optimal in this case. The Prometheus part seems irrelevant. Powerful being A created you to do Z does not mean that you will somehow cease to exist if you do Y instead of Z, nor does it have any impact on your decision unless you also know that the powerful being is benevolent with regard to your utility function.
Whether or not it's truly Newcomb-like is the question. The way I'm suggesting you see it is that in addition to the $100, you are in Box B if and only if you one-box. Otherwise, you're nowhere. You don't cease to exist, you cease to have ever existed (which might be better or worse than dying, but certainly sounds bad).
I don't see any evidence for that hypothesis in the scenario itself. Could you explain why one would draw that from the narrative?
Assume MWI