ArisKatsaris comments on You're in Newcomb's Box - Less Wrong

40 Post author: HonoreDB 05 February 2011 08:46PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Article Navigation

Comments (172)
Tags: evolution evpsych newcomblike timeless decision_theory philosophy

Comments (172)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: benelliott 02 February 2011 08:15:43AM *  2 points [-]

I don't know about you, but I would still one-box on Newcomb's problem even if Omega is not entirely infallible, so the fact the Prometheus is capable of mistakes cannot be the problem. I would also one-box in transparent Newcomb's, since once again being the sort of person that does that seems to end well for me.

What is the difference between this and transparent Newcomb's with an Omega who is very occasionally wrong.

Comment author: Dorikka 02 February 2011 10:24:41PM *  2 points [-]

Ah, bugger. I've lost my link to Transparent Newcomb (TN).

From what I recall, Omega doesn't let you play the game if you would one-box on normal Newcomb but two-box on TN. As a result, having the strategy 'I will one-box on normal Newcomb but two-box on TN' will probably result in you getting no money because when Omega psychoanalyzes you, he'll almost always see this. So you lose, because you're not yet past the filter.

In this problem, you were filtered out prior to birth by a Prometheus who only chose embryos that he believed would one-box. The line 'I should one-box or I won't get to exist' doesn't work because embryos can't think. At the time at which you can first consciously consider this problem, you will be past the filter, and so are free to choose the most effective solution regardless of Prometheus's preferences. So you two-box and win, 'cause you already exist.

The problem changes, of course, if there is any way in which Prometheus could punish you for two-boxing, causing you to lose >100$ in utility.

Edit: Changed a couple of details to properly refer to TN when Omega has a slight possibility of being wrong.

Comment author: ArisKatsaris 04 February 2011 10:28:19PM 0 points [-]

Ah, bugger. I've lost my link to Transparent Newcomb (TN).

Bongo linked to it in response to my question about it.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 04 February 2011 11:00:05PM *  2 points [-]

Wrong rules. Correct rules are as follows (named "Newcomb’s Problem with a Dual Simulation" in Drescher's book):

Omega fills the large transparent box with $1,000,000 iff it predicts that you, when faced with (1) full box, and (2) empty box, would in both cases one-box. If it predicts that there's a nontrivial chance that you'd two-box in either case, it leaves the transparent box empty.

Powered by Reddit Powered by Reddit